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Fault Detection and Isolation in a Networked Multi-Vehicle Unmanned System 
Nader Meskin, Ph.D. 
Concordia Unviersity, 2008 
Recent years have witnessed a strong interest and intensive research activities 
in the area of networks of autonomous unmanned vehicles such as spacecraft forma-
tion flight, unmanned aerial vehicles, autonomous underwater vehicles, automated 
highway systems and multiple mobile robots. The envisaged networked architecture 
can provide surpassing performance capabilities and enhanced reliability; however, it 
requires extending the traditional theories of control, estimation and Fault Detection 
and Isolation (FDI). One of the many challenges for these systems is development of 
autonomous cooperative control which can maintain the group behavior and mission 
performance in the presence of undesirable events such as failures in the vehicles. In 
order to achieve this goal, the team should have the capability to detect and isolate 
vehicles faults and reconfigure the cooperative control algorithms to compensate for 
them. 
This dissertation deals with the design and development of fault detection 
and isolation algorithms for a network of unmanned vehicles. Addressing this prob-
lem is the main step towards the design of autonomous fault tolerant cooperative 
control of network of unmanned systems. We first formulate the FDI problem by 
considering ideal communication channels among the vehicles and solve this prob-
lem corresponding to three different architectures, namely centralized, decentralized, 
and semi-decentralized. The necessary and sufficient solvability conditions for each 
architecture are also derived based on geometric FDI approach. The effects of large 
environmental disturbances are subsequently taken into account in the design of FDI 
m 
algorithms and robust hybrid FDI schemes for both linear and nonlinear systems 
are developed. Our proposed robust FDI algorithms are applied to a network of 
unmanned vehicles as well as Almost-Lighter-Than-Air-Vehicle (ALTAV). 
The effects of communication channels on fault detection and isolation per-
formance are then investigated. A packet erasure channel model is considered for 
incorporating stochastic packet dropout of communication channels. Combining 
vehicle dynamics and communication links yields a discrete-time Markovian Jump 
System (MJS) mathematical model representation. This motivates development of 
a geometric FDI framework for both discrete-time and continuous-time Markovian 
jump systems. Our proposed FDI algorithm is then applied to a formation flight of 
satellites and a Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL) helicopter problem. 
Finally, we investigate the problem of fault detection and isolation for time-
delay systems as well as linear impulsive systems. The main motivation behind con-
sidering these two problems is that our developed geometric framework for Marko-
vian jump systems can readily be applied to other class of systems. Broad classes of 
time-delay systems, namely, retarded, neutral, distributed and stochastic time-delay 
systems are investigated in this dissertation and a robust FDI algorithm is developed 
for each class of these systems. Moreover, it is shown that our proposed FDI algo-
rithms for retarded and stochastic time-delay systems can potentially be applied in 
an integrated design of FDI/controller for a network of unmanned vehicles. Neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for solvability of the fundamental problem of residual 
generation for linear impulsive systems are derived to conclude this dissertation. 
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Recent technological advances have spurred a broad interest in cooperative control of 
systems composed of autonomous unmanned vehicles such as spacecraft, unmanned 
aerial vehicles, autonomous underwater vehicles, automated highway systems and 
multiple mobile robots. The explosion in computation and communication capabili-
ties, the advent of miniaturization technologies such as MEMS, and the development 
of powerful control techniques have created numerous research interests in vehicles 
that can interact autonomously with environment and other vehicles to perform 
tasks beyond the capabilities of individual vehicles. The overambitious goal of these 
systems is autonomy, meaning the ability to accomplish the mission goals in the 
face of significant uncertainty and unexpected events such as faults without human 
intervention. 
Unmanned vehicles such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are indeed among 
the most complicated systems that are being developed. Since they operate in an en-
vironment subjected to a high degree of uncertainties and disturbances, the problem 
of precise and accurate control of such vehicles is difficult and requires complicated 
1 
control systems theory. On the other hand, with an increasing requirement for con-
trol systems to be more secure and reliable, fault tolerance in such control systems 
is becoming more and more critical and important. 
In the presence of undesirable effects such as failures in the actuators or sen-
sors, the vehicle control systems must be responsive and adaptive to such failures. 
Under these circumstances there may be a necessity to adjust the control laws to 
recover the vehicle from the effects of anomalies and failures. Furthermore, the re-
quired adjustments of control laws must be done expeditiously in a relatively short 
period of time to guarantee the operation of the safety critical subsystems of the 
vehicle. Specifically, it is required to develop an autonomous fault diagnosis and 
reconfigurable control system. 
In particular for a network of unmanned vehicles, if any of the vehicles un-
dergoes a failure and the vehicle controller is not equipped with autonomous fault 
tolerant capabilities, the stability of the entire network may not be maintainable 
and could lead to instability. Therefore, fault tolerant control systems for a network 
of unmanned vehicles needs to be fully investigated. 
Advanced computers have resulted in more capable and advanced vehicle con-
trol systems. Thus, activities such as navigation and maneuver planning, command 
planning and sequencing, and fault diagnosis and recovery can all potentially be 
autonomously handled onboard the vehicle. Aside from the obvious cost savings re-
alized by smaller operations staff, there are traditional advantages to placing some 
of these functions on the vehicle. For example, onboard fault diagnosis and recovery 
algorithms can detect, identify, and remedy vehicle faults, both minor and major, in 
real-time, possibly saving the mission in the process. Moreover, the ability to plan 
the vehicle activities onboard allows one to respond to major instrument failures or 
other anomalies without impacting the remaining healthy subsystems. In the event 
of a major anomaly, the vehicle can respond quickly and generate a new sequence 
2 
of commands to carry out the remaining possible mission objectives. 
Cooperative control of networked unmanned vehicles poses many interesting 
challenges such as optimal control of vehicles, collision and obstacle avoidance during 
reconfiguration, information flow among the vehicles and development of advanced 
hardware such as sensors and actuators. One of the main challenges in these systems 
is developing autonomous cooperative control which can maintain the group behav-
ior and mission performance in the presence of undesirable events such as failures in 
vehicles sensors, actuators, or other components. In order to achieve this goal, the 
team should have the capability of detecting and isolating faults in its vehicles and 
reconfigure the cooperative control algorithms to compensate for the faults. This 
thesis explores the Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) issue in these systems. 
1.2 Literature Review 
1.2.1 Fault Detection and Isolation 
Modern control systems are becoming increasingly more complex and issues of avail-
ability, cost efficiency, reliability, operating safety, and environmental protection 
concerns are receiving more attention. This requires a fault diagnosis system that 
is capable of detecting plant, actuator and sensor faults when they occur and of 
identifying and isolating the faulty component. A fault diagnosis algorithm consists 
of fault detection, isolation and identification steps. A traditional approach to fault 
diagnosis is based on the hardware redundancy method which uses multiple sensors, 
actuators, computers and software to measure or control a particular value. Typi-
cally, a voting scheme is applied to the hardware redundant system to decide if and 
when a fault has occurred and its likely location among redundant components. The 
major problems encountered with hardware redundancy are the extra equipment, 
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Figure 1.1: Comparison between hardware and analytical redundancy schemes. 
An alternative approach for fault diagnosis is based on analytical redundancy which 
uses the redundant analytical relationships among system inputs and measured sys-
tem outputs to generate residual signals where no extra hardware is required in this 
approach. In analytical redundancy schemes, the resulting difference generated from 
consistency checks of different variables is called a residual signal. Analytical re-
dundancy makes uses of a mathematical model of the monitored system and is often 
referred to as the model-based approach to fault diagnosis. Figure 1.1 illustrates the 
concepts of hardware and analytical redundancy [4]. 
The principle of model-based fault detection and isolation is depicted in Figure 
1.2. Model-based residual generation techniques have been categorized by Patton 
et al. [5-7], Basseville and Nikiforov [8], Gertler [9] as a) observer-based approach, 
b) parity equation, and c) identification and parameter estimation. 
In observer or filter-based approaches, the outputs of the system are estimated 
from the measurements (or subset of measurements) by using either Luenberger 
observers in the deterministic setting [10-22] or Kalman filters in a stochastic set-
ting [8,23-28]. Then the weighted output estimation error (or innovations in the 
stochastic case) is used as a residual. The flexibility in selecting observer gains has 
been fully utilized in the literature yielding a rich variety of FDI schemes. The 
increasing popularity of state-space models as well as the wide usage of observers 
in modern control theory and applications have made the observer-based FDI ap-
proach as one of the most common approaches in this domain. In parity space 
4 
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Figure 1.2: Scheme for the model-based FDI. 
approach [9,29-32] residual signals (or parity vector) are generated based upon con-
sistency checks on system input and output data, over a given time window. It 
has been shown that there exists some correspondence between observer-based and 
parity relation approaches [5,33-35]. In other words, the parity relation approach 
is equivalent to the use of a dead-beat observer and a residual signal generated by 
a non dead-beat observer is equivalent to a post-filtered residual generated by a 
dead-beat observer. This implies that the parity space method provides less design 
flexibility when compared with methods which are based on observers without any 
restriction [6]. 
Parameter estimation method [36-38] is developed based on system identifi-
cation techniques. In this approach, the faults are reflected in the physical system 
parameters such as friction, mass, viscosity, resistance, inductance, capacitance, etc. 
The basic idea of the detection method is that the parameters of the actual pro-
cess are estimated on-line using well-known parameter estimation methods and the 
results are compared with the parameters of the reference model obtained initially 
5 
under the fault-free condition. It should be pointed out that a typical limitation on 
parameter estimation-based approaches is the fact that the input signal should be 
persistently exciting. This condition is satisfied if the input signal provides enough 
information to estimate the parameters. However, many industrial systems may not 
allow feeding such persistently exciting signals as inputs [39]. 
The successful fault detection of a fault is followed by the fault isolation proce-
dure which will isolate a particular fault from others. While a single residual signal 
is sufficient to detect faults, a set of residuals is usually required for fault isolation. 
One way to fulfill the fault isolation task is to design a set of structured residuals. 
Each residual is designed to be sensitive to a subset of faults, whilst remaining in-
sensitive to the other faults. The residual set which has the required sensitivity to 
specific faults and insensitivity to other faults is known as the structured residual 
set [40]. The design procedure consists of two steps [6]. The first step is to specify 
the sensitivity and insensitivity relationships between residuals and faults according 
to the assigned isolation task, and the second step is to design a set of residual gen-
erators according to the desired sensitivity and insensitivity relationships. In the 
second step different residual generation techniques such as observer-based or parity 
space approaches can be used for designing a residual set. The main advantage of 
the structured residual set is that the diagnostic analysis is simplified to determin-
ing which of the residuals have exceeded their thresholds. Several special residual 
schemes have been suggested in the literature [3,5,41]. In the dedicated residual 
set [3], all faults can be detected simultaneously, however it is difficult to design such 
residual sets for many practical systems, and generally there are no design degrees 
of freedom to achieve other desirable performance specifications and requirements 
such as robustness against uncertainty and modeling errors. More importantly, the 
necessary condition for designing such a residual set is independence of the fault sig-
natures. In [5], a generalized residual set is introduced which can only detect a single 
6 











Figure 1.3: Structured residual set. 
fault although it has design degree of freedom for achieving robustness against un-
certainty and modeling errors. Figure 1.3 depicts the above two different structured 
residual sets for isolating three different faults {fi, f2,fz}-
An alternative way of achieving the isolability of faults is to design a directional 
residual vector [10-13] which in response to a particular fault, a residual vector lies 
in a fixed and fault-specified direction in the residual space. With fixed directional 
residual vector, the fault isolation problem is to determine which of the known fault 
signature directions the generated residual vector lies the closest to. The solvability 
conditions for generating a structured residual set are generally more relaxed when 
compared to the directional residual vector since in the later approach, the design 
objective is to generate one residual vector with the above isolability condition while 
in the former approach a set of residuals is generated and one may have more design 
degree of freedom [12]. 
Recent years have witnessed a strong interest and considerable research activ-
ities on the design and analysis of FDI schemes for nonlinear systems [6,39,42,43]. 
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Most techniques in the literature constitute direct extension of the approaches de-
scribed above for linear systems. In [44], an extension of the parity space approach 
to nonlinear polynomial dynamic systems is proposed. Parity relation for a more 
general class of nonlinear systems was proposed in [45]. In [46], the concept of the 
parity relation and parameter estimation fault detection techniques are combined for 
nonlinear systems. Many observer-based FDI approaches have also been developed 
in the literature for solving nonlinear system FDI problem [47,48]. The unknown 
input observer approach was extended to include nonlinear terms in [49-51]. Adap-
tive nonlinear observer based FDI scheme was proposed in [52,53], and sliding mode 
observers have been designed in [54-58] for nonlinear FDI problem. Persis and 
Isidori [59, 60] have extended Massoumnia's method [3,12] to nonlinear systems. 
They showed that the problem of fault detection and isolation for nonlinear systems 
is solvable if and only if there is an unobservability distribution that leads to a quo-
tient subsystem which is unaffected by all faults but one. In [61] the result of [60] 
is extended to a more realistic situation when measurement noise is present in the 
state affine system. Furthermore, the approach was extended to a special class of 
nonlinear systems. Hammouri et. al. [62] addressed the problem of fault detection 
and isolation for bilinear systems using the same geometric approach. In [63] the 
nonlinear geometric approach was successfully applied to a nonlinear longitudinal 
model of an aircraft subject to various types of actuator faults. 
Model-based fault diagnosis approaches relay on the key assumption that a 
perfectly accurate and complete mathematical model of the system under supervi-
sion is available. However, such assumption may not always be valid in practice. 
This problem has contributed to the rapid development of soft computing-based 
FDI methods [64]. Generally, the most popular soft computing techniques that 
are used in the FDI framework can be divided into three groups [39]: a) neural 
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networks [64-73], b) Fuzzy logic-based techniques [64], and c) Evolutionary algo-
rithms [66,74,75]. 
In this thesis, we adopt the model-based FDI approach based on structured 
residual set concept and the geometric FDI approach [3,60] is considered as the main 
methodology of this dissertation. In general, a primary advantage of geometric-type 
techniques is the formulation of the results in terms of very simple and intuitive 
concepts that gives the feeling of problems not being masked by heavy, complex 
mathematics and they are easily reduced to matrix arithmetic as soon as one needs 
to compute them. Moreover, as it will be shown in this thesis, FDI problem for 
linear and nonlinear systems can be tackled in one framework. 
1.2.2 Network of Unmanned Vehicles 
Research in the cooperative control of vehicles is currently progressing in multiple 
directions and domains. Some examples are discussed in the paragraphs below. 
Spacecraft Formation Flight: In recent years, there has been increased 
research interest in the formation control of spacecraft [76-83]. The use of multi-
ple spacecraft has the potential to expand functionality, performance and reduce 
operational cost. For instance, a formation of interferometric imaging spacecraft 
can achieve an optical imaging system with an aperture of kilometers giving the 
resolution required to image planets in the other solar systems. Many space mis-
sions planned for the upcoming decades such as NASA's terrestrial planet finder 
(TPF) [84], ESA Darwin project [85] involve spacecraft formations. 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Advances in avionics and flight control tech-
niques have led unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology to a point where it is 
routinely used in commercial and military applications. These advances have re-
newed a lot of research interest in UAV cooperative control. Applications of this 
technology include coordinated rendezvous of UAV [86-88], cooperative forest fire 
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surveillance [89], cooperative search [90-92], and drag reduction via close formation 
flight [93-97]. 
Autonomous Underwater Vehicles: Over the last decade, numerous re-
search and development activities have occurred in the area of autonomous under-
water vehicles (AUVs) where they have been used in commercial, scientific and 
military applications [98]. Recently, researchers have turned to AUV formations to 
accomplish more challenging tasks. Potential applications of AUV formations in-
clude oceanographic surveying at deep sea [99], operations under ice for exploration 
of Arctic areas and efficient monitoring sub-sea oil installations [100]. 
Automated Highway Systems: In the last two decades, there has been a lot 
of research in automated highway systems (AHS) and new advances in computation 
and machine vision are bringing this technology closer to completion [101,102]. 
Multiple Mobile Robots: Coordinated control of land mobile robots has 
been investigated in last decade [103-106]. Cooperative robots can be used to per-
form tasks that are too difficult for a single robot to perform alone. For example, a 
group of robots can be used to move large awkward objects [107,108] , or to move 
a large number of objects [109]. Moreover, groups of robots can be used for terrain 
model acquisition [109], planetary exploration [110], or measuring radiation levels 
over a large area [111]. In [112], a group of robots are used for path obstruction. 
While each of the above areas has its own unique challenges, several common 
themes can be found [113,114]. In most cases, the vehicles are dynamically decoupled 
which implies that the motion of one does not directly affect the others. However, 
the vehicles are coupled through the goal they are trying to achieve. Each vehicle, 
through its sensors or communication links has limited information about the other 
vehicles which may be subjected to uncertainty and information transmission delays. 
The interactions between the vehicles motions make the network of vehicles an 
interconnected dynamic system whose behavior depends not only on the individual 
10 
vehicles dynamics, but also on the nature of their interactions. 
In recent years, only a few results on fault tolerant cooperative control of 
unmanned vehicle systems have been developed. In [115], a software architecture was 
developed to facilitate the fault tolerant cooperative control of teams of heterogenous 
mobile robots. In this architecture, if a robot fails, it cannot necessarily communicate 
its failure to its teammate and behavior-based fault detection approach was used 
to detect the failure in the robots. In this approach, each robot knows the tasks of 
other robots and if the specific task has not been completed in certain interval, this 
will be interpreted as a failure in the corresponding robot. 
A conversation protocol for failure detection is proposed in [116] where the 
robots can communicate with each other and send their faulty status to other robots. 
A fault tolerant algorithm is developed in [117] for the formation flight of UAVs in 
the presence of a failure of one or more of UAVs. In this approach, it is assumed that 
the communication channel faults can be detected by the UAVs and the algorithm 
was proposed to reconfigure the formation according to the type of the fault. 
In [118] a decentralized fault detection filter is designed as a combination of a 
game theoretic fault detection filter [18] with the decentralized filtering introduced 
in [119]. The approach is applied to a platoon of cars in an advanced vehicle control 
system. In [120], a decentralized detection filter for a large homogeneous collection 
of LTI systems is developed, with inspiration from platoons of vehicles with typical 
"look-ahead" structure. Recently in [121] a distributed, model-based, qualitative 
fault diagnosis scheme in developed for multi robots formation. 
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1.3 General Problem Statement 
The main objective of this thesis is to explore the fault detection and isolation 
issues in networked multi-vehicle systems. These systems can be modeled as inter-
connected dynamical systems whose behavior depends not only on the individual 
vehicle dynamics, but on the nature of their interaction. FDI is one of the main 
challenges in autonomous network of unmanned vehicles. In this dissertation, we 
first investigate the development of and comparison among three different FDI ar-
chitectures for a network of unmanned vehicles, namely, centralized, decentralized 
and semi-decentralized. 
Each FDI architecture has its own challenges. In the centralized scheme, all 
the information is sent to a central FDI unit through communication network chan-
nels. Conceptually, the FDI algorithms used are similar to those for a single system 
and hence relatively simple. However, the effects of communication channels such 
as data dropout and time delay have a negative impact on the performance of FDI 
algorithms that should be investigated. In a decentralized scheme, all the informa-
tion is processed locally and there is no central processing unit. In this scheme, FDI 
problem should be solved locally at each vehicle on the basis of local observations, 
commands and information communicated from neighboring vehicles. The FDI solv-
ability condition will be investigated in this thesis for the centralized, decentralized 
and semi-decentralized architectures and the comparison will be made among them. 
One of the main challenges in the design of FDI algorithms is to distinguish 
the effect of disturbances from faults and develop a robust FDI scheme without 
comprising the detection of incipient faults in the vehicles. In unmanned vehicles 
such UAV's, this problem is more challenging due to the small size feature and more 
sensitivity of them with respect to disturbances such as wind gust. In this thesis, we 
investigate development and design of robust hybrid FDI approach for both linear 
and nonlinear systems to tackle this problem. 
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In this thesis, the FDI problem for time-delay systems as well as linear im-
pulsive systems are also investigated. A great deal of attention has recently been 
devoted to time-delay systems. However, only few results on FDI of time-delay 
systems have been developed in the literature [122-129]. It should be emphasized 
that the presently available FDI algorithms in the literature cannot generate the 
structured residual signals for time-delay systems. In these algorithms [124-129], 
faults that one needs to be decoupled are considered as unknown inputs and the 
algorithms seek to attenuate the effects of faults on the residual. Therefore, these 
types of algorithms cannot decouple fault effects from the residuals. In this disser-
tation, we investigate design of FDI algorithms for retarded, neutral, distributed 
delay and stochastic time-delay systems based on the geometric approach. 
Another research area that has witnessed a great deal of interest in the last 
decade is in modeling and control of hybrid systems. A subclass of hybrid systems are 
impulsive dynamical systems in which the states behave according to a continuous-
time dynamics and which are also subjected to time-driven or event-driven impulsive 
effects where the states of the system are changed instantaneously. In the past few 
years research has been conducted on stability, controllability and observability of 
these systems. However, no FDI results have been reported for linear impulsive 
systems. In the last part of the thesis, we try to develop a fault detection and 
isolation scheme for linear impulsive systems based on the geometric approach. 
1.4 Contributions of the Thesis 
The main contributions of this thesis are as follows. 
• Fault detection and isolation (FDI) of systems with dependent fault 
signatures 
Motivated by the FDI problem in a network of unmanned vehicles, we study 
13 
systems with dependent fault signatures. For many classes of dynamical sys-
tems such as overactuated systems, fault signatures are generally dependent. 
This fault signature dependency may arise due to redundant actuators or cou-
pling effects among sensors, actuators and plant faults. The first contribution 
of this thesis is in the development, design, and analysis of fault detection and 
isolation schemes for systems with dependent fault signatures. 
• FDI for a network of unmanned vehicles with relative state mea-
surements corresponding to three architectures, namely, centralized, 
decentralized and semi-decentralized 
Our proposed structured residual set is applied to the problem of actuators 
fault detection and isolation in a multi-vehicle system. Three different archi-
tectures, namely centralized, decentralized and semi-decentralized, are investi-
gated for solving this problem and the necessary and sufficient solvability con-
ditions for centralized and semi-decentralized architectures are derived based 
on the dynamics of each vehicle. Moreover, it is shown that the FDI problem 
does not have a solution for the decentralized architecture. 
• Robust hybrid FDI scheme for systems subject to large disturbances 
A robust hybrid FDI scheme is developed for systems that are subject to large 
disturbances. A hybrid architecture is composed of a bank of continuous-time 
residual generators and a discrete-event system (DES) fault diagnoser. The 
main advantage of the proposed FDI algorithm in comparison with previous 
works in the literature is that our algorithm is capable of distinguishing the 
effects of disturbances and incipient faults without imposing any limitation on 
the number of detectable faults in the system. 
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• Fault detection and isolation of Markovian jump systems 
A geometric FDI framework is developed for both discrete-time and contin-
uous time Markovian Jump Systems (MJS). A new geometric unobservable 
subspace property is derived for MJS systems and the notion of unobservabil-
ity subspaces is introduced for these systems. The necessary and sufficient 
conditions for solvability of the fundamental problem of residual generation 
(FPRG) are derived for both discrete-time and continuous-time MJS systems. 
We also present and develop sufficient conditions for designing i/^-based FDI 
algorithms for MJS systems subject to input disturbances. 
• FDI for a network of unmanned vehicles in the presence of imperfect 
communication channels 
By combining a packet erasure channel model of each communication channel 
and the vehicle dynamics yields a discrete-time Markovian jump system. Our 
proposed FDI algorithm for discrete-time Markovian jump systems is then 
applied for solving the FDI problem in a network of unmanned vehicles in the 
presence of imperfect communication links. 
• FDI of time-delay systems: a geometric approach 
Fault detection and isolation algorithms are developed for broad classes of 
time-delay systems, namely, retarded, neutral, distributed and stochastic. A 
geometric framework is developed for solving the FDI problem in time-delay 
systems based on our developed results for Markovian jump systems. A robust 
.f/oo-based FDI algorithm is proposed for each class of the time-delay systems. 
• FDI of linear impulsive systems 
We consider the problem of fault detection and isolation for linear impulsive 
systems and it is shown that the notion of unobservability subspaces and 
its corresponding algorithms developed for MJS systems is also applicable 
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to linear impulsive systems. Based on this fact, the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the FPRG in linear impulsive systems are developed and derived. 
To summarize, the contributions of this dissertation provide the first step to-
wards the design of fault tolerant control systems for a network of unmanned vehicles 
by developing new fault detection and isolation schemes. We tackle different issues 
in these systems such as different FDI architectures, robustness to external distur-
bances and compensating the effects of communication channels in the framework of 
Markovian jump systems. Moreover, it is shown that our proposed FDI algorithm 
for Markovian jump systems can be utilized for solving FDI problems for other 
classes of systems such as time-delay and linear impulsive systems. 
1.5 Organization of the Thesis 
We begin in Chapter 2 with the brief review of Structured Fault Detection and Isola-
tion (SFDIP) for both linear and nonlinear systems. A geometric FDI framework for 
solving the SFDIP problem is presented for linear and nonlinear systems in Sections 
2.2 and 2.3, respectively. 
In Chapter 3, we focus on the problem of fault detection and isolation in 
a network of unmanned vehicles without considering the effect of communication 
channels. It is shown in Section 3.1 that the actuator fault signatures in a network 
of unmanned vehicles with relative state measurements are dependent and the entire 
network can be considered as an overactuated system. This motivate us to develop 
a novel coding scheme applicable to systems with dependent fault signatures. More-
over, it is shown in Section 3.1.2 that the FDI problem for a network of unmanned 
vehicles does not have a solution for the decentralized architecture and vehicles need 
to exchange information. We tackle the FDI problem in a network of unmanned ve-
hicles corresponding to centralized and semi-decentralized architectures in Sections 
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3.3.1 and 3.3.2, respectively. The necessary and sufficient conditions for solvability 
of the FDI problem are derived for centralized and semi-decentralized architectures. 
Our proposed FDI scheme is applied to the actuator FDI problem in the formation 
flight of satellites in Section 3.3.3. To show the applicability of our proposed struc-
tured residual set, two other case studies, namely, F18-HARV and a satellite with 
redundant reaction wheels are also presented in Sections 3.4 and 3.5, respectively. 
In Chapter 4, a network of unmanned vehicles subject to large environmental 
disturbances is considered and a hybrid FDI scheme is developed to achieve robust-
ness with respect to external disturbances. A hybrid architecture for a robust FDI 
is introduced in Section 4.2 that is composed of a bank of continuous-time residual 
generators and a DES fault diagnoser. Moreover, our proposed hybrid FDI algo-
rithms are developed for both linear and nonlinear systems. Our developed hybrid 
scheme is applied to a network of unmanned vehicles and an Almost-Lighter-Than-
Air-Vehicle (ALTAV) in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. 
In Chapter 5, we consider the effects of communication channels on fault de-
tection and isolation. In Section 5.2, a communication channel is modeled using the 
packet erasure model. By combining the vehicle dynamics and the channel packet 
erasure model a discrete-time Markovian jump model is obtained for the "entire" 
network. This motivate us to investigate the FDI problem for both discrete-time 
and continuous-time Markovian Jump Systems (MJS) in Sections 5.4 and 5.5, re-
spectively and a novel geometric framework is introduced for solving this problem. 
We then apply our proposed algorithm to two case studies, namely, formation flight 
of satellites in the presence of imperfect communication links in Section 5.4.4 and 
VTOL (vertical take-off and landing) helicopter in Section 5.5.4. 
In Chapter 6, we focus on the fault detection and isolation for broad classes 
of time-delay systems, namely, retarded, neutral, distributed and stochastic systems 
in Sections 6.2.2, 6.2.3, 6.3 and 6.4, respectively. In this chapter, we show how 
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our proposed notion of unobservability subspaces for Markovian jump systems in 
Chapter 5 can be invoked for time-delay systems. In this chapter, the notion of finite 
unobservability subspaces are introduced for different types of time-delay systems 
and an //oo-based FDI algorithm is developed for each of them. 
In Chapter 7, we consider another important class of systems, namely linear 
impulsive systems and show in Section 7.2 that similar to the notion of unobserv-
ability for Markovian jump system, the same can be defined for linear impulsive 
systems. Consequently, the developed algorithm in Chapter 5 can be invoked for 
constructing unobservability subspaces for linear impulsive systems. Based on our 
developed geometric approach, the necessary and sufficient conditions for solvabil-
ity of the fundamental problem of residual generation are derived in Section 7.3. 
Two case studies, namely mass-spring system with buffer constraint and systems 
with impulsive control are considered in Section 7.4 to show the effectiveness of our 
proposed FDI algorithm. 
In the final Chapter 8, we outline future research directions in which more 
research is needed to be conducted. 
1.6 Notation 
The following notation is used throughout this dissertation. Script letters X,U, y,.. 
denote real vector spaces. Matrices and linear maps are denoted by capital italic 
letters A, B, C,...; the same symbol is used both for a matrix and its map; the zero 
space and zero vectors are denoted by 0. B = Im B denotes the image of B; Ker C 
denotes the kernel of C. The spectrum of A is denoted by <J(A). A set A is said 
to be symmetric if A £ A implies A* £ A where * denotes the complex conjugate. 
For any positive integer k, k denotes the finite set {1,2, • • • , k}. If a map C is epic 
(onto), i.e. the matrix representation of C has full row rank), then C~r denotes 
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the right inverse of C(i.e., CC~r = I). A subspace S C X is termed ^-invariant 
if AS C S. For ^4-invariant subspace S C X, A : S denotes the restriction of A 
to <S, and A : X jS denotes the map induced by A on the factor space X jS. For a 
linear system (C, A, B), < Ker C\A > denotes the unobservable subspace of (C, A). 
<g> denotes the Kronecker product of matrices and for a given matrix A, AN denotes 
IN <S)A where IN is N x N identity matrix. For a given set n, a combination is an un-
ordered collection of the elements of n and is a subset of n. The order of the elements 
in a combination is not important and the elements cannot be repeated. C(n, k) 
denotes a number of k combinations (fc-subset) of n which is equal to
 kun-k)\- ^ e 
denote by 11.11 the standard norm in Mn and £2 denotes the set of L2 norm bounded 
signals. The symbol * within a matrix represents the symmetric term of the matrix. 
For a given set N, \N\ denotes the cardinality of N. 
A directed graph Q consists of a set of vertices, or nodes, denoted V and a set of 
arcs A C V2, where a = (v, w) 6 A and v, w € V. A directed graph is called weakly 
connected if there exist a path between every pair of distinct vertices ignoring the 
direction of arcs. 
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Chapter 2 
Geometric Approach to Fault 
Detection and Isolation 
In this chapter, we briefly review a structured fault detection and isolation problem 
(SFDIP) for both linear and nonlinear systems based on geometric approaches that 
are developed in [3] and [60]. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.1 the Structured Fault Detec-
tion and Isolation Problem (SFDIP) is presented. The geometric FDI framework for 
linear and nonlinear systems are then reviewed in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, respectively. 
In 2.4, common actuator fault modes that we consider in this thesis are presented. 
2.1 Structured Fault Detection and Isolation 
In this section, the structured fault detection and isolation problems for both linear 
and nonlinear systems are reviewed. As pointed out in Chapter 1, the structured 
residual set is one of the common way for fulfilling the fault isolation task and 
it has more design degrees of freedom with respect to other approaches such as 
directional residual vector. The design procedure consists of two steps [6], the first 
step is to specify the sensitivity and insensitivity relationships between residuals 
20 
and faults according to the assigned isolation task, and the second step is to design 
a set of residual generators according to the desired sensitivity and insensitivity 
relationships. In the second step different residual generation techniques such as 
observer-based or parity space approach can be used for designing a residual set. 
In this thesis, we adopt the geometric FDI approach for designing the residual 
generators which will be discussed in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. 
Consider the following linear time-invariant system 
k 
x(t) = Ax(t) + Bu{t) + ^2 LiTTiiit) 
i=i (2.1) 
y(t) = Cx(t) 
and the nonlinear system 
k 
x(t) = f(x(t)) + g(x(t))u(t) + J2li(x(t))mi{t) 
i=i (2.2) 
y[t) = h(x(t)) 
where x € X is the state of the system with dimension n, u € 14, y 6 y are input 
and output signals with dimensions m and q, respectively, m, € Mi are fault modes 
with dimension kt and Lj's (h(x)) are fault signatures. 
The fault modes together with the fault signatures may be used to model the 
effects of actuator faults, sensor faults (for linear systems only) and system faults 
on the dynamics of the system. For modeling a fault in the i-th actuator, Lj (k(x)) 
is chosen as the i-th column of matrix B (g(x)) and the fault mode m» is chosen 
to model the type of a fault. For example a complete failure of an actuator can 
be represented and modeled by m, = —it*. A system fault can be represented by 
a potential variation in the parameters of the matrix A for linear system (2.1) as 
shown below: 
x(t) = {A + AA)x{t) + Bu{t) 
(2.3) 
y(t) = Cx(t) 
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As an example, a change in the i-th row and the j - t h column element of the matrix 
A can be modeled according to [6]: 
AAx(t) = IiAciijXjit). 
where Xj is the j - t h element of the vector x and Ii is the n-dimensional vector with 
all zero elements except a 1 in the i-th element. Defining a signal m,-(£) = Aa,ijXj(t) 
as an external input and fault signature Li = Ii, then equation (2.3) can be rewritten 
as: 
x(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) + Lim,i(t) 
y(t) = Cx(t) 
Similarly, a system fault for nonlinear system (2.2) can be represented by a potential 
variation in the parameters of the vector field f(x). 
It should be noted that sensor faults can initially be modeled as additive inputs 
in the measurement equation 
y(t) = Cx(t) + J2Ejnj(t) (2.4) 
where Ej is an q x 1 unit vector with a one at the j - t h position and rij € R is a sensor 
fault mode, which correspond to a fault in the j - t h sensor. For example a complete 
failure of the j-th. sensor can be represented and modeled by rij(t) = —Cjx(t) where 
Cj is the j - t h row of the matrix C. The sensor fault signature can also be modeled as 
an input to the system [3,18,130]. Following [18], let fj be the solution to Ej = Cfj. 
The new states can be defined according to x = £ + 5 I ? = 1 fjrij, where the state space 
representation for the new states can be written as 
x{t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) + Y^ i j in jW 
i=i (2.5) 
y(t) = Cx(t) 
where Lj = / . Afj \ and mj(t)= [ fij(t) -nj{t) 
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The Structured Fault Detection and Isolation Problem (SFDIP) as introduced 
in [3], [40] is defined formally as design of a dynamic residual generator that takes the 
observables u(t) and y(t) as inputs and generates a set of residual signals ri(t),i G p 
with the following properties. 
1. When no failure is present, all the residuals r,(t) decay asymptotically to zero. 
2. The residuals r^t) for i G ilj are affected by a fault of the j - t h component, 
and the other residuals ra(t) for a G p — Vtj are decoupled from this fault. 
The prespecified family of coding sets fij C p , j £ k should be chosen such 
that, by knowing which of the /•*(£) are zero and which are not, we can uniquely 
identify the fault. The resulting residual set which has the corresponding required 
sensitivity to specific faults and insensitivity to other faults is known as the struc-
tured residual set [40]. For detecting all possible faults in the system, no coding set 
should be empty. The minimum requirement for fault isolation is that all coding 
sets be distinct. Coding sets satisfying these two requirements are defined as weakly 
isolating . 
Definition 2.1 ( [40]). The weakly isolating coding sets £li,i G k are defined as 
being strongly isolating if for each i,j G k, i ^ j 
fti £ Qj (2.6) 
A strongly isolating coding set prevents incorrect fault detection when some of the 
residuals in fi, do not exceed the respective thresholds while the others do. 
In the Extended Fundamental Problem of Residual Generation (EFPRG) in-
troduced in [3] for linear systems and in the nonlinear fundamental problem in 
residual generation (/NFPRG) introduced in [60] for nonlinear system, the coding 
set of Qi = {i} was chosen. This coding set is also called a dedicated residual set [6] 
which is inspired by the dedicated observer scheme that was proposed by Clark [131] 
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(Figure 1.3). In this coding scheme, one looks to design a set of filters which gen-
erates k residuals Vi(t), i e k such that a fault in the i-th component m,i(t) ^ 0 can 
only affect the residual r;(£) and no other residuals rj(t)(i ^ j). With this coding 
scheme one can detect and isolate all faults simultaneously. Another commonly used 
scheme in designing the residual set is to make each residual sensitive to all but one 
fault which is known as a generalized residual set [5]. By utilizing this residual set 
one cannot simultaneously detect and isolate faults in two or more channels. 
Once the residual signals are generated according to given coding sets fi,, i € k, 
the final step for performing fault detection and isolation is to determine the thresh-
old values Jthi and the evaluation functions Jri(t). Various evaluation functions have 
been introduced in [132] as follows: 
• Instantaneous value of the residual signal, i.e. JTi = rt. 
• The average value of the residual signal over a time interval [t — T,t], i.e. 
Jn = ||r||„ = ± J*Tr(r)dr (2.7) 
• Root-mean-square (RMS) which measures the average energy over a time in-
terval (0,T), i.e., 
/ 1 fT \ 1/2 
• Truncated RMS which measures the average energy over a time interval [t — 
T,t], i.e 
Jn = ^fiT\\r{r)\\2dT (2.9) 
The threshold value for each of the above residual evaluation functions can be se-
lected as 
Jthi= sup Jri (2.10) 
mi=0,de'D 
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where d represents the input disturbance or measurement noise and 5) denotes the 
set of allowable disturbances, for instance, 2) = £ 2 or 2) can be selected as a set 
of Gaussian white noise. Based on the thresholds and the evaluation functions, 
the occurrence of a fault can then be detected and isolated by using the following 
decision logic 
Jrj{t)>Jthj, Vj e a -=»m< ^ o , iek (2.11) 
2.2 Geometric Approach to FDI of Linear Sys-
tems 
In this section the geometric approach that was introduced in [3] for the SFDIP 
of linear systems is reviewed. In general, a primary advantage of geometric-type 
techniques is the formulation of the results in terms of very simple and intuitive 
concepts that gives the feeling of problems not being masked by heavy, complex 
mathematics and they are easily reduced to matrix arithmetic as soon as one needs 
to compute them. In the geometric approach to fault detection and isolation certain 
subspaces play a central role. 
Definition 2.2 ( [133]). A subspace W is a (C, A)-invariant subspaces (conditioned 
invariant) if A{W n Ker C) C W. 
It is simple to show that W is (C, ^-invariant if and only if there exists a map 
D : y -> X such that (A + DC)W C W. The set of all (C, ^-invariant subspaces 
containing a given subspace £ C X is denoted by 2U(J4, C, C). It can be shown that 
W{A, C, C) is closed under intersection and nonempty (X € W(A, C, £)); therefore, 
it admits an infimum, the minimal (C, A)-invariant containing C, which will be 
denoted by W* = inf W(A,C,C). The following algorithm [133] can be used for 
finding W*. 
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Algorithm 2.1 ( [133]). Subspace W* coincides with the last term of the sequence 
Z0 = C 
Zi = C + A(Zi^ n Ker C), (i G k) 
where the value of k < n is determined by condition Zk+i = Z^. 
The dual of the (C, ^4)-invariant subspace is the (A, 5)-invariant (controlled 
invariant), which is defined as follows: 
Definition 2.3 ( [133,134]). A subspace V C X is said to be (A, B)-invariant 
(controlled invariant) if 
AVCV + ImB (2.12) 
Similarly, the set of all (^ 4, i?)-invariants contained in a given subspace £ (de-
noted by 5J(v4, B,£))is closed under the subspace addition operator and nonempty, 
hence, it admits a supermum, which is denoted by V* = max9J(^4, B,£). The 
following algorithm [133] can be used for finding V*. 
Algor i thm 2.2 ( [133]). Subspace V* coincides with the last term of the sequence 
Z0 = £ 
Zi = £nA-\Zi_1 + ImB), {iek) 
where the value of k < n is determined by condition Z^+i = Z\.. 
Next, some specific subclass of (C, ^-invariants is introduced. 
Definition 2.4 ( [133]). LetS be a (C, A)-invariant subspace containing a subspace 
£ C X, S is said to be self-hidden with respect to C if 
SC'W*+ KerC (2.13) 
where W* = mi W(A,C,C). 
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It can be shown that the class ^(c,c) of (C, ^ -invariants self-hidden with respect 
to C, i.e. 
^(cx) = {$ • A(S n Ker C) C S, £ C S, S C W* + Ker C} (2.14) 
is closed under the subspace addition and hence it has the supremum element which 
can be found by the following lemma. 
Lemma 2.1 ( [133]). The supremum o / ^ c x ) ^ 
W* + V2* (2.15) 
where V2* = maxVB(A, C, Ker C). 
In the geometrical approach to fault detection and isolation certain unobserv-
ability subspaces play a central role [3,12] as defined below. 
Definition 2.5. A subspace S is a (C,A) unobservability subspace (u.o.s.) [12] 
if S =< Ker HC\A + DC > for some output injection map D : y —> X and 
measurement mixing map H : y —> y. 
It can be shown [12] that for an unobservability subspace S, 
S =< S + Ker C\A + DO (2.16) 
The next theorem provides an alternative characterization of the u.o.s. for the 
system S which is independent of the maps D and H (this is the dual to Theorem 
5.3 in [134] for controllability subspaces). 
Theorem 2.1. Let S C X and define the family G(A,C) as follows 
G(A.C) = { y . y = S + A~ly n Ker C} (2.17) 
S is an (C,A) u.o.s. if and only if 
A(S fl Ker C) CS (S is conditioned invariant) (2-18) 
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and 
S = y* (2.19) 
where 5?* is the maximal element of Q^\,c)-
The maximal element y* can be computed by invoking the following algorithm 
y° = X; y = S + A-1^-1 n Ker C, fi G n (2.20) 
Given an u.o.s. <S, a measurement mixing map H can be computed from S by 
solving the equation KerHC = KerC + S. Let £1{S) denote the class of all maps 
D : y -> X such that (A + DC)S C 5 . The notation 6(^4, C,£) refers to the 
class of u.o.s. containing L C. X. The class of u.o.s. is closed under intersection; 
therefore, it contains an infimal element S* = ini&(A,C,C). Moreover, 
S * = < K e r C + W*|>l + £>C> (2.21) 
The following lemma shows the equivalency between the infimal unobservability 
subspace S* containing a given subspace C and the supremum element of class 
* ( C , £ ) -
Lemma 2.2 ( [133]). The infimal (C, A)-unobservability subspace S* containing C 
is the supremum (C, A)-invariant self-hidden with respect to C, i.e. S* = W* + V|. 
The above lemma provides an easy way for finding S* using Algorithms 2.1 and 2.2. 
In [12] an alternative algorithm for computing <S* is proposed as follows. 
Algorithm 2.3 ( [12]). The subspace S* coincides with the last term of the sequence 
Z0 = X 
Zi = W* + {A-'Z^y) n Ker C (i G k) 
where the value of k < n is determined by condition Z^+i = Z^. 
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The next theorem provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for solvabil-
ity of EFPRG problem (f2j = {i}) based on the concept of unobservability subspaces. 
Theorem 2.2 ( [3]). EFPRG problem has a solution if and only if there exist (C, A) 
unobservability subspaces 
k 
S* = infe(A,C, Y^ A). * e k (2-22) 
such that S* D Ct = 0, i e k. 
The major step in generating the residual r* is to incorporate the image of 
the fault signatures that requires to decouple (Lj(j ^ i)) in the unobservability 
subspace of r, and then factor out the unobservable subspace in a manner that in 
the remaining factor space those faults do not appear. The associated necessary 
condition for this purpose states that the image of Li should not intersect with the 
unobservable subspace of J-J, so that a fault in the z-th component is manifested in 
the residual 7V 
According to [3], let S* be an u.o.s. that satisfies Theorem 2.2, then there 
exists a map DQ € D_(S*) and Hi such that S* =< Ker HiC\A + D0C >, where Hi 
is a solution to Ker HiC = S* + Ker C. Let Mi be a unique solution of MiPi = HiC 
and AQ = (A + D0C : X/S*) , Pi is the canonical projection of X on X/S* and 
(A + D0C : X/Si) denotes an induced map of A + D0C on the factor space X/S? 
which satisfies the following equation 
Pi(A + D0C) = (A + D0C : X/SfiPi (2.23) 
By construction, the pair (Mi,A0) is observable, hence there exists a D\ such that 
o{Fi) = A, where Fi = AQ + D\Mi and A is an arbitrary symmetric set. Let 
D = D0 + PirDxHi, Ei = PiD and Gt = PtB. The following detection filter 
generates the desired residual which is only affected by Li and is decoupled from 
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other faults, 
wt(t) = Frnit) - Ezy(t) + GiU{t) 
(2.24) 
rt{t) = MiWi(t) - Hzy(t) 
Definition 2.6 ( [134]). Letp = (J>I,...,PN) G R W and consider polynomials <pi{ot\,... 
,Oipf),i G k with coefficient in R. A variety V C RN is defined to be the locus of 
common zeros of a finite number of polynomials cfo,.... fa- V is proper ifV^ RN. 
Let A, B,... be matrices with elements in R and suppose \\{A, B,...) is some property 
which may be asserted about them. Let V be a proper variety. We say that J ] is 
generic relative to V provided the property \\ does not hold only for points p € V, 
and Y[ is generic provided such a V exists. In other words, the set of points on 
which the generic property does not hold has a Lebesgue measure of zero. 
The generic solvability conditions for EFPRG problem are stated as follows [3]. 
Proposition 2.1 ( [3]). Let A, C and Li be arbitrary matrices of dimensions n xn, 
q x n and n x ki} respectively, let v = ^2i=1ki. EFPRG problem generically has a 
solution if and only if 
v < n (2.25) 
and 
v — mm{ki,i = 1,..., k} < q (2.26) 
In the next theorem, the solvability condition for the SFDIP problem is pre-
sented. For given coding sets flj,j € k, the finite sets Tj,z € p are denned as 
the collection of all j € k for which the j'-th failure mode affects the i-th residual, 
i.e. Tj = {j £ k|i £ £1,}. It follows that the sets Ti contain all the information 
corresponding to the coding sets £lj,j € k. 
Theorem 2.3. For a given family of coding sets, the SFDIP problem has a solution 
if and only if 
S^nCj = 0, jeTu iep (2.27) 
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where 
5 r , = i n f © ( A C , ^ £ , ) , iep (2.28) 
Proof: According to Theorem 2.2, the SFDIP problem can be solved as p 
separate EFPRG problem. Each residual rt(t),i € p can be generated by applying 
EFPRG results to the following model 
x{t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) + Lifhxit) + L2fh2(t) 
y[t) = Cx(t) 
where L^ = {Lj\j e 1^}, L2 = {Lj\j e k — r , } , fn1 = {m,j\i 6 Tj} and fh2 = 
{m,j\i € k — Tj}. Hence, based on Theorem 2.2 in order to be able to decouple 
the residual r,(£) from fh2(t), there should exists an unobservability subspace that 
contains all fault signature in L2, i.e. S£. = inf <S(A,C, ^23;*r -A')- Moreover, the 
necessary condition for manifesting the effect of faults in components m,j, j € T, in 
the residual r» is that <Sp. does not have intersection with Lj,j € Ti: i.e. condition 
(2.27). • 
A family of fault signatures satisfying the conditions of Theorem 2.2 is desig-
nated as a strongly detectable family. It follows from Theorem 2.2 that a necessary 
condition for existence of a solution to EFPRG problem is that 
k 
Reaik{[L1,L2,...,Lk}} = J2ki (2-29) 
which implies that there should be no dependency among the fault signatures. The 
following example demonstrates situations in which the family of fault signatures is 
not strongly detectable. 
Example 2.1. Consider the following overactuated system 
4 
x(t) = Ax(t) + Bu{t) + ^ ^ m i ( 0 
i (2.30) 
y(t) = Cx(t) 
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where 
1 0 1 1 
A= n - 1 2 ,B= 0 1 1 0 
0 1 0 1 
This system has 4 inputs such that rank B = 3. Therefore, the family of actuator 








 = ,c = 
0 1 0 
0 0 1 
1 0 2 
Example 2.2. Consider the following system 
x(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) 
where 
A = 
1 2 1 
0 1 3 
3 - 1 2 
0 1 1 
0 0 2 
y(t) 
0 0 




= Cx(t) + J2 Ejfij 








1 1 0 0 1 
0 1 1 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 
(2.31) 
(2.32) 
As mentioned earlier, sensor faults can be modeled as input faults to the system. 
Using the state space coordinate transformation x = x + X^=i fj^jy ^ e state space 
representation for the new state is written according to equation (2.5) where 
- 2 1 
2 - 1 
Li= 0 3 ,L2= - 1 - 1 0 ,L3= o 0 (2.33) 
0 1 
0 - 2 
/ / one considers the actuator faults L4 and L5 as the first and second column of B, 
it can be easily checked that the family of fault signatures Li,...,L5 is not strongly 





M = M = 
0 0 





2.3 Geometric Approach to FDI of Nonlinear Sys-
tems 
In this section, the geometric FDI approach introduced in [60] for nonlinear sys-
tems is briefly reviewed. This scheme provides us with the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for solving the problem of generating a structured residual set for gen-
eral nonlinear systems. It is assumed that the nonlinear system is described by the 
following model: 
k 
x(t) = f(x(t)) + g{x{t))u + J2 U(x{t))mi(t) 
i=i (2.34) 
y(t) = h(x(t)) 
with the state x is defined in a neighborhood X of the origin in Rn; the input is 
denoted by u G Rm; the output is denoted by y G K9; the fault modes are denoted 
by m; G Mfci, /j(x)'s are the fault signatures, f(x), g(x) and Zj(a:)'s are smooth vector 
fields, h(x) is a nonlinear smooth mapping, and /(0) = 0, h(0) = 0. It is assumed 
that span{l}(x),..., /^(x)}, i G k is nonsingular where l\ denotes the j-th column of 
h. 
Definition 2.7 ( [135]). The distribution A is said to be conditioned invariant (or 
(h, / ) invariant) for (2.34) if it satisfies 
[gt, A n Ker{dh}] C A, for all i = 0,..., m (2.35) 
where go(x) = f(x), Ker{dh} is the distribution annihilating the differentials of the 
rows of the mapping h(x) and [f,g] denotes the Lie derivative of f and g. 
For a given distribution C, the following algorithm is proposed in [59] to de-
termine the smallest condition invariant distribution which contains C (denoted by 
Sf): 
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Algorithm 2.4 ( [59]). Consider the following sequence of distributions 
m. 
sk+1 = sk + ^2 [&> & n Ker idh}] 
i=0 
where S denotes the involutive closure ofS. Suppose there is an integer k* such that 
Sh'+i = Sk", then Ef = Sk* and 2f is involutive and is the smallest conditioned 
invariant contains C. 
According to [59], it is more convenient to work with a dual object, i.e. with 
a codistribution as defined next. 
Definition 2.8 ( [60]). A codistribution U is said to be conditioned invariant if 
LgJ\ C II + span{dh}, for all i = 0, ...,m (2.36) 
where span{dh} is the codistribution spanned by the differentials of the rows of the 
mapping h(x). 
It is shown in [135] that if AnKev{dh} is a smooth distribution and II = A1- is 
a smooth codistribution, then II satisfies (2.36). In [59], the following algorithm was 
proposed for defining an observability codistribution associated with system (2.34). 
Algorithm 2.5 ( [59]). Consider system (2.34) and ^ © be a fixed codistribution. 
The observability codistribution algorithm (o.c.a.) that characterizes this codistribu-
tion is given according to the following procedure: 
Qo = 0 fl span{dh} 
m 
Qk+i = 0 n ( '^2 /LgiQk + span{dh}) 
i=0 
Suppose all codistributions of the sequences are nonsingular, so that there is an 
integer k* < n — 1 such that Qk = Qk* for all k > k* and set II* = Qk*. The 
following notation is then used to stress the dependency of II* on Q: 
IT = o.c.a.{Q) (2.37) 
34 
Definition 2.9. The codistribution U is an observability codistribution for (2.34) 
if it satisfies (2.36) and 
o.c.a.(II) = n (2.38) 
If 0 is a conditioned invariant codistribution, then o.c.a.(0) is the maximal 
observability codistribution contained in 0 . The next theorem which is proposed 
in [59] states one of the important properties of the observability codistribution. 
Theorem 2.4 ( [59]). Consider system (2.34) with mi — 0. Let II be an observ-
ability codistribution such that II = span{$i} where $! : U° —• Rn i and U° is 
a neighborhood of fixed point x°. One can then find a local state diffeomorphism 
at x° and a local output diffeomorphism at y° = h(x°) such that in the new local 
coordinates system (2.34) is described by the following equations 
Z\ = fi(zi,z2) + gi{z1,z2)u 
Z2 = f2{Zl,Z2,Z3) + g2(Zi,Z2,Z3)u 
h = h(zi,z2, z3) + g3(z1,z2, z3)u (2.39) 
Vi = h(zi) 
V2 = Z2 
where z\ = $i(x) , and in the new coordinates any vector field l(x) in I I 1 will be 
expressed in the form 
( 0 q{zuz2,zz) lj{zuz2,z3)) (2.40) 
The observability codistribution is a special type of condition invariant codis-
tribution where the ^-subsystem, in which z2 can be replaced by y2 and viewed as 
an independent " input", namely system 
z\ = f\ (zi, y2) + 51 (zi, y2)u 
(2.41) 
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satisfies the observability rank condition and where by imposing certain mild as-
sumptions [59], one can design an asymptotic observer for the state z\. 
In the nonlinear fundamental problem in residual generation (ZNFPRG) that 
is introduced in [60], the family of coding sets fJ* = {i} was chosen. The solvability 
of the INFPRG problem is stated as follows. 
Theorem 2.5 ( [60]). The INFPRG has a solution if and only if there exist observ-
ability codistributions 
11* =
 0.c.a.((Ef<y) (2.42) 
such that 
(spanih})1- + U* = T*X (2.43) 
where d = span{l1(x),..., li_1(x),li+1(x), ...,lm(x)}. 
If such observability codistribution exist, then by using Theorem 2.4, the zy 
subsystem corresponding to each II* is described in the new coordinates by 
h = fi(zi,y2) + gu{zi,y2)ui + lii(z1,y2)mi 
(2.44) 
V\ = hizi) 
Consequently, it is now possible to design an observer for the above subsystem which 
generates the state estimate i\. In [60], one way to design an observer for the Zy 
subsystem (2.44) is presented based on a result from Gauthier-Kupca [136]. Once 
the observer is designed, the residual signal r, can be generated according to 
ri = yi-h1{z1) (2.45) 
The next theorem provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for the solv-
ability of the SFDIP problem for given coding sets fij's for the nonlinear system 
(2.34). 
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Theorem 2.6. The SFDIP problem for nonlinear system (2.34) has a solution for 
given coding sets Qi 's if and only if there exist observability codistributions 
n r . = o.c.a.((£f r 'J1), i 6 p (2.46) 
such that 
(spanilj^ + U^TX, Vj eTu iep (2.47) 
where Crt = span{lj(x)\j £ I \ } , iep. 
Proof: According to Theorem 2.5, the SFDIP problem can be solved as p 
separate iNFPRG problem. Each residual rt(t),i € p can be generated by applying 
EFPRG results to the following model 
x = f(x) + g(x)u + Li(x)fhi(t) 4- L2(x)m2(t) 
V = h(x) 
where Li = {li(x)\i € I^}, L2 = {U{x)\i € k — Tj}, fh\ = {m,i\i € Tj} and fh2 = 
{m,|z € k — r , } . The residual r,(t) should be decoupled from all faults in the 
components (771)2 and should be affected by faults in the components rrij,j G T,. 
Hence, based on Theorem 2.5, there should exist an observability codistribution 
that contains all fault signatures in L2, i.e. Ilp = o.c.a.((£, ') )• Moreover, the 
necessary condition for manifesting the effect of faults in components rrij,j € T, is 
(2.47). • 
2.4 Actuator Fault Modes 
Actuator faults that are considered in this dissertation for simulation include [137]: 
(i) freezing or lock in-place (LIP) fault, (ii) float fault, (iii) hard-over fault (HOF), 
and (iv) loss of effectiveness (LOE) fault. In case of the LIP fault, the actuator states 
freezes at a particular value and will not respond to subsequent commands. HOF is 
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characterized by the actuator moving to its upper or lower saturation limits regard-
less of the commanded signal. The actuator transient response time is bounded by 
its rate limits. Float fault occurs when the actuator floats with zero output and does 
not contribute to the control authority. Loss of effectiveness is characterized and 
represented by lowering the actuator gain with respect to its nominal value. The 
various types of actuator faults discussed above are mathematically parameterized 
as follows [137]: 
ucmd No Fault 
k{t)ucmd 0 < e < k{t) < l,Vf >tF (LOE) 
utme = \ 0 Vt > tF (Float) (2-48) 
ucmd(tF) Vi > tF (LIP) 
k um or uM Vf > tF (HOF) 
where tF denotes the time of fault occurrence in the actuator, k denotes the loss 
of effectiveness coefficient where k G [e, 1] and e denotes the minimum loss of effec-
tiveness, and um and UM denote the minimum and maximum values of the input, 
respectively. The general model below integrates the above cases into a single rep-
resentation, utrue — crkucm<i + (1 — a)u where utrue is the actuator output, ucmd is 
the output of the controller (which at the same time is an input to the actuator), 
a = 1 and k = 1 correspond to the no fault operating regime, a = 1 and e < k < 1 
correspond to the loss of effectiveness fault, and a = 0 corresponds to other types 
of fault scenarios, namely Float, LIP and HOF. Finally, um < u < uu denotes the 
state at which the actuator is locked for the float, lock-in-place, and hard-over faults 
cases. 
It should be emphasized that all the algorithms that are developed throughout 
the thesis do not depend on the above fault modeling and the above actuator faults 
are only used in simulation results throughout the thesis. 
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Chapter 3 
Fault Detection and Isolation in a 
Network of Unmanned Vehicles: 
Ideal Communication Channels 
In this chapter, we address the problem of actuator fault detection and isolation in 
a network of unmanned vehicles in three different architectures, namely centralized, 
decentralized and semi-decentralized. It is shown that the fault signatures in a 
network of unmanned vehicles with relative state measurement are dependent and 
the overall system is over actuated. This motivates us to investigate the development, 
design, and analysis of a fault detection and isolation scheme for both linear and 
nonlinear systems with dependent fault signatures. The work presented in this 
chapter has partly appeared in [138-141]. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, the actuator fault detec-
tion and isolation problem in a network of unmanned vehicles is formulized within 
different architectures, namely centralized, decentralized and semi-decentralized. In 
Section 3.2, new coding sets are introduced for fault detection and isolation of both 
linear and nonlinear systems with dependent fault signatures. In Section 3.3, our 
39 
proposed FDI algorithm is applied to the actuator fault detection and isolation in 
a network of unmanned vehicles. Simulation results for FDI in formation flight of 
satellites is presented in Section 3.3.3. Moreover, two other case studies, namely, 
actuator FDI problem of F18-HARV and FDI of a satellite with redundant reaction 
wheel configuration are considered in Sections 3.4 and 3.5, respectively. 
Cont r ibut ions 
The main contributions of this chapter are now summarized below. 
• A new structured residual set is introduced for systems with dependent fault 
signatures. 
• The actuator fault detection and isolation problem in a network of unmanned 
vehicles with relative state measurement is investigated corresponding to three 
architectures, namely, centralized, decentralized and semi-decentralized. The 
necessary and sufficient conditions for solvability of the actuator FDI prob-
lem in centralized and decentralized architectures are provided. Moreover, 
it is shown that the actuator FDI problem does not have a solution in the 
decentralized architecture. 
• Three cases studies, namely, formation flight of satellites, overactuated F18-
HARV aircraft and a satellite with redundant reaction wheels are considered 
as potential applications of our developed algorithm. 
3.1 FDI Problem Formulation in a Network of 
Unmanned Vehicles 
In this section, the problem of actuator fault detection and isolation in a network 
of N homogenous (for sake of simplicity) vehicles is formulized. It is assumed that 
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each vehicle dynamics is governed by the following linear model: 
a 
±i{t) = Axi{t) + Bui(t) + Y^ Lkmik{t) (3.1) 
fc=i 
where the fault signature Lk represents a fault in the A;-th actuator of a vehicle, i.e. Lk 
is the A;-th column of B. It is assumed that the matrix B is full rank (Rank(B)=a). 
Each vehicle has the following relative state measurements: 
ztjit) = C(Xi(t) - Xj{t)) JENi (3.2) 
where the set N, C N \ i represents the set of vehicles that vehicle i can sense (N = 
{1,. . . , TV}) and is designated as the neighboring set of vehicle i, and z^ € Z{, j e N» 
represent the state measurement relative to the other vehicles. 
It is assumed that the pair (A, C) is observable. Let N; = {ii, i-i, ...,1^^. We 
have Zi(t) = [zjh(t),zji2(t),-- • ,zjt (t)]r, and equation (3.2) can be rewritten as 
Zi(t) = Cix(t), where x(t) = [xj(t),xj(t), • • • ,xJj(t)]T and d can be constructed 
from the neighboring set Nj and matrix C. The vehicles and their neighborhood 
sets together form a directed graph, where each node represents a vehicle and an 
arc leads from node i to node j if j € Nj. It is assumed that this graph is weakly 
connected, i.e. there exists a path between every pair of distinct vertices ignoring 
the direction of arcs. 
In the following discussions we will formulate three different architectures for 
FDI of actuator faults in the above network of unmanned vehicles. Namely, we 
are interested in centralized, decentralized and semi-decentralized configurations as 
described and defined below. It will be shown that actuator fault signatures in the 
centralized and semi-decentralized architectures are dependent and therefore, new 
coding schemes need to be developed for systems with dependent fault signatures 
(Section 3.2). Moreover, we will show that the actuator FDI problem does not have 
a solution in the decentralized architecture. 
In this chapter, it is assumed that the communication links among the vehicles 
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and the FDI units are ideal, i.e. there exist no networked-induced delay, packet 
dropout and quantization error due to communication links. This assumption will 
be relaxed in Chapter 5. 
3.1.1 Centralized Architecture 
In the centralized architecture, all information should be sent to a central FDI unit 
through the "entire" communication network channels. The overall system can be 
modeled as follows: 
N a 
x(t) = ANx(t) + BNu(t) + J2Y1 lVmM 
fc=i j = i (3.3) 
where AN IN 
z(t) = Cx(t) 
) A, BN = IN ® B, <g> denotes the Kronecker product, N is a 
positive integer, IN is an iV x N identity matrix, u = [u{ ,uj, • • • ,uj,] , Lkj is the 
(k -1) x a+j-th column of BN, z = [zj ,zj, • • • , zJ,]T and CJ = [Cj, Cj, • • • , C],]. 
It is clear that the entire state x is not fully observable from the relative state 
measurements z and states of the centroid of the vehicles cannot be determined from 
z. Since the pair (AN, C) in not observable, one can first determine the observable 
subspace of system (3.3) as 
N a 
x°(t) = AN-lx°{t) + B°u{t) + J2T,LkJmM 
(3.4) 
z[t) = CJV-1x°(i) 
where x°{t) = [xj (t)-xj(t),xj(t)-xj(t),-• • ,xj(t) -xl(t)]T, CN~l = IN^ ®C, 
B° = 
B -B 0 
B 0 -B 







LP is the (k — 1) x a + j-th column of B°. and z(t) = Tz(t), where T is an output 
transformation that specifies the relative states with respect to the first vehicle. 
Such a transformation exists since it is assumed that the graph of the network is 
weakly connected. Without loss of generality, the relative states between vehicle 
one and other vehicles are taken as observable states of the entire network. It can 
be verified that the rank of B° is a x (N — 1) and system (3.4) is overactuated. 
3.1.2 Decentralized Architecture 
In this section, the decentralized architecture is considered where there exist no 
communication links between the vehicles and we wish to determine whether each 
vehicle can detect and isolate its own faults using only local signals, namely ut and Zj. 
Since the output measurement z, depends on the state of the neighboring vehicles, 
the following nodal model should be considered for the i-th vehicle for designing a 
decentralized FDI filter, namely 
a |Ni |+l
 a 
j=i fc=2 j = i (3.6) 
Zi{t) = CNixNi(t) 
where x^t) = [xj {t),XT(t), ••• ,xJ^(t)}T, uN,(t) = [u[(t),uT{t),- • • ,«JNi l(t)]T , 
%(*) = [ * « ! ( t ) > 2 « 2 ( * ) . " • >*«|N.,(f)]T> a n d Lkj is the (fc - 1) x a + j - t h column of 
£|Ni|+i j^. ghouls
 D e noted that Z i / s represent the fault signatures of the i-th. vehicle 
in the nodal system (3.6). It is clear that the entire state XN; is not fully observable 
from the relative state measurements zit and the states of the centroid of vehicle i 
and its neighbors cannot be determined from z;. Since the pair (.A'Ni'+1, C N J is not 
observable, one can first try to obtain the observable part of system (3.6) as 
a |Ni |+l
 a 
x^(t) = A^x%(t) + B^uNt(t) + T,LZm^t)+ E E Z W ' ) 
j=l fc=2 j = l (3.7) 
Zi(t) = CP*a$((t) 
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where x° (f) = [xj (t) - xT(t),xJ(t) - xT(i),. • • ,xj(t) - xJ^(t)]T and 5 ° = 
[5f, J3? • • • , Bf } has the same structure as the matrix B° in (3.5) with dimension 
\Ni - 1| x ITVJI and Z£. is the (fc - 1) x a + j - th column of B%.. We are now in the 
position to introduce our main theorem in this subsection. 
Theorem 3.1 . The decentralized FDI problem is not solvable for a network of un-
manned vehicles (3.6) using only the relative state measurements. 
Proof: In order to generate the residual signals rtj,j 6 a for the i-th vehicle 
by using only the signals U{ and Zj, the residual signals should be decoupled from 
both faults in the neighboring vehicles 5ZL=2 Yl'j=i^jrnkj(t) and input signals 
ujij ¥" i- However, since the fault signatures L£ 's are the columns of B°., the 
term Ylk=[ &? includes both fault signatures and input channel matrices of other 
vehicles. Therefore, by invoking the result of Theorem 2.3, the existence of the 
(C™,A™) unobservability subspaces S* = inf5(X)L=1 &?k + TLiw£°k) s u c h 
that Sj D Cij = 0, j € a, is the necessary and sufficient condition for generating the 
residual signal r,j(t). This residual signal is only affected by m\j and is decoupled 
from all other fault signatures of the z-th vehicle and YJk=\ &?k • However, it is clear 
from equation (3.5) that C\j C 5 Z l = i ^ > J e a an<^ £ij ^ SjiO e a- Therefore, it 
can be concluded that the above decentralized FDI problem does not have a solution 
for a network of unmanned vehicles using only relative state measurements, and each 
vehicle cannot even detect its own fault by using the local information Ui and zt. • 
3.1.3 Semi-decentralized Architecture 
In the semi-decentralized architecture, it is assumed that local communication links 
exist between each vehicle and its neighbors and the control signals u^ are commu-
nicated among them. The problem is to determine how each vehicle detects and 
isolates not only its own actuator faults but also actuator faults of its neighbors 
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using the signals u^t and zt. The observable nodal model (3.7) is considered for the 
i-th vehicle. 
It can be verified that the rank of B°. is a x |N;| and the fault signatures I/Jy's 
are not strongly detectable. This is due to the fact that one needs to control |Nj| 
vehicles in the nodal system (3.7) in order to control the relative states of |Nj| + 1 
vehicles. In other words, actuator redundancy is present and the system can be 
categorized as an overactuated system. 
As shown above, in centralized and semi-decentralized architectures, the fault 
signatures are dependents and hence concurrent faults in all actuators cannot be 
detected and isolated. This provides us with the motivation to determine and in-
vestigate a suitable coding sets for a family of dependent fault signatures. In the 
next section, we propose the structured residual set for both linear and nonlinear 
systems with dependent fault signatures. 
3.2 Proposed Structured Fault Detection and Iso-
lation Scheme 
For many class of dynamical systems such as overactuated systems, fault signatures 
are generally dependent. Generally speaking, fault signatures are called dependent 
if effect of one fault can be written as a linear combination of effects of other faults. 
This fault signature dependency may arise due to redundant actuators or coupling 
effects among sensor, actuator and plant faults. In this section, we investigate 
the development, design, and analysis of a fault detection and isolation scheme 
for both linear and nonlinear systems with dependent fault signatures. Due to 
dependency among fault signatures, the dedicated residual set cannot be utilized and 
consequently all faults cannot be detected simultaneously. To determine a suitable 
residual set, a isolability index \x is first introduced for a family of fault signatures as 
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the maximum number of concurrent faults that can be detected and isolated. Next, 
two structured residual sets are proposed and developed for achieving a specific 
isolability index. The geometric approach of [3] and [60] is used for generating these 
new residual sets for linear and nonlinear systems, respectively. 
Definition 3.1. For a family of fault signatures Lx, • • • ,Lk for linear system (2.1) 
(li(x),--- ,/fc(x) for nonlinear system (2.34)/, the maximum value of fi < k where 
one can detect and isolate the occurrence of up to ji concurrent faults is denoted as 
the isolability index. 
According to the above definition, Theorem 2.2 shows that the isolability index 
of a family of k fault signatures is k if and only if the family is strongly detectable. 
The next theorem provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for a given 
coding sets that can be used for detecting and isolating up to /J, concurrent faults 
in a given family of fault signatures TL = {Li,L2, ...,Lk} for linear system (2.1). 
The same statement can be derived for nonlinear system by substituting li (x) 's with 
Theorem 3.2. Consider the weakly isolating coding sets Qiti € k and a given 
family of fault signatures FC, = {L\, L2, -.-, Lk} for linear system (2.1). Let for each 
I combination L^, ...,L i( of Li's, £li1i2...il = (Jj=i fy- The family of fault signatures 
TL has a isolability index of fi if and only if the SFDIP problem has a solution 
for the coding sets Q,i,i G k with the following property that for each two different 
1 < l,h < fi combinations L^,..., Li{ and Lj1,..., Ljh of Li's 
Proof: (only if) Let a family of fault signatures L1(..., Lk has the isolability index of 
//, then for any occurrence of I < fi concurrent faults, there should exists a unique set 
of residuals that is affected by these faults. According to the definition of the coding 
46 
sets, a set of residuals that is affected by / faults Lii:...,!/;, is $\i2 . . .j r Therefore, 
the uniqueness of £2j]I2...i; leads to the equation (3.8). 
(if) It is trivial to observe that if the SFDIP problem has a solution for the 
coding sets Q,-,z € k with the above property, then one can detect and isolate up to 
fi concurrent faults. • 
It should be emphasized that for [i = k, there exists only one ^-combination of 
L^s, namely Li,..., L\. and hence condition (3.8) implies that for having an isolability 
index of // = k, we should have 
for any I < k where fli...k = U7=i fy-
Remark 3.1. It can be shown that the coding sets of the EFPRG problem [3] (T2j = 
{i}) and the coding sets of the generalized residual set [5] (T^ = k — {i}) satisfy 
the necessary and sufficient conditions of the above theorem for n• — k and /J, = 1, 
respectively. 
As mentioned in Section 2.1, in order to prevent incorrect fault detection and 
isolation, the coding sets Q.i should be strongly isolating. The same criteria can be 
considered for the coding sets ^ ^ . . . i , . 
Definition 3.2. The coding sets that satisfy the condition of Theorem 3.2 are said 
to be strongly isolating with index /J, if for each two different 1 < I < \i combination 
Li1,...,Lil and Ljr,..., Ljj of Li s 
Moreover, if the SFDIP problem for a given family of fault signatures has a solution 
for a strongly isolating coding set with index //, then we call the isolability index of 
that family as a strongly isolability index ji. 
47 
Lemma 3.1. The strong isolability index /i of a given family of fault signatures is 
either /j, = k or /i < k — 1. 
Proof: Let fij,z € k be strongly isolating with index /j, = k — 1. Consider that 
concurrent faults have occurred in all fault signatures. Since IV s are weakly isolating 
(none of them is empty), all residuals will be affected by these concurrent faults. 
Moreover, since the strong isolability of fault signatures is //, it is clear that for 
each k — 1 combination Ltl,..., Likl of Lj's, we have fli1i2...ik_1 ^ i^,...,fc = U,=i fy-
Therefore, one can also detect that there exist concurrent faults in all channels. 
Moreover by assumption, one can detect and isolate up to k — 1 concurrent faults. 
Hence [i = k. • 
It should be emphasized not every coding sets that satisfy Theorem 3.2 is 
strongly isolating with index /i. For instance, consider the coding sets J72 = 1,2, 
f^ 2 = 3,4 and Jl3 = 2,3. It can easily be verified that these coding sets satisfy the 
condition of Theorem 3.2 with ft = 2 but they are not strongly isolating with index 
2. Indeed it is clear that fi2,3 C r212-
Since strong isolability index is more desirable and it prevents incorrect de-
tection and isolation, we will focus on strong isolability index. The next theorem 
illustrates how one can construct coding sets that have the strong isolability index 
// < k— 1. 
Theorem 3.3. Let r , , i e p be defined as the k — // combinations of the set k. Then 
the corresponding sets £li,i £ k defined as 
a = {j e
 P\i e Tj} (3.10) 
are strongly isolating with index [i. 
Proof: Consider two different 1 < l,h < // combinations ii,...,ii and ji,...,jh of 
the set k. In order to show that equation (3.8) holds it is sufficient to show that the 
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complement sets p — f^ .^..^  and p — Qj1j2...jh are not equal where 
P - ^hi2...i, = {j € p\ik i Tj, Vzfc € {ii,..., ii}} (3.11) 
Assume that I < h. Since two combinations i\, ...,ii and j i , ...,jh are different, there 
exists j t € {ji, •••, j/i} such that j t G k — {^,22,...,^}. Since the sets Ti,i G p are 
defined as k — ji combinations of the set k and I < fi, there exists a combination 
Tj such that j t G Tj and ifc ^ 1^ -, Vz^  G {z'i, --.,fy}, therefore j £ p — ^ 1 J 2 . . . j h and 
j G p — fii!^...!, which shows that equation (3.11) holds. The combination Tj can 
be found by first selecting j t and then selecting k — fi — 1 elements from the set 
k— {ii,i2, •••,ki jt}- It is clear that since I < //, then \k — {ii,i2,...,ii}\ > k — fi and 
one can find the combination Tj. Similarly it can be shown that the coding sets £Vs 
satisfies conditions (3.9) and hence are strongly isolating. 
In order to show that fi is the maximum number of combinations that satisfy 
equation (3.8), it should be noted that |p — 0,ili2_,Al\ = C(k — l,k — fi), therefore for 
I > fi, the set p — fij^...^ is empty and for any different I combinations i\,..., z/ and 
j i , ...,ji, we have ftili2...i( = ftj1j2...jr • 
It can be shown for /j, = 1, the above coding sets results in the generalized 
residual set [5]. For simplicity, we mean isolability index as strongly isolability index 
and drop the term " strongly". 
Theorem 3.4. 1. A necessary condition for the SFDIP problem for linear system 
(2.1) to have a solution for the above coding sets and a given family of fault 
signatures is that for each fi+1 combination Ltl,..., Li +1 of Li's, [Lii: ...,Li//+1] 
is full rank. 
2. A necessary condition for the SFDIP problem for nonlinear system (2.34) to 
have a solution for the above coding sets and a given family of fault signatures 
is that for each fi + 1 combination ltl(x),...,li +1(x) ofli{x)'s, the dimension 
of distribution A = span[lil (x),..., lift+1 (x)] is vt = X^=i ^ • 
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Proof: 
1. If there exists a / i+ 1 combination L^, ...,Lii+1 of Lj's such that [Lj15..., Li/i+1] 
is not full rank, then £ill+1 C YTj=\ ^ y ^ ^s evident that one of the sets Tj is 
equal to k — {i l t i2,..., ?'M} and £ill+1 C Sf.. 
2. Similarly if there exists a fi. + 1 combination /JI(X), ...,Zj/J+1(x) of Zj(x)'s such 
that the dimension of distribution A = s p a n ^ (x),..., Z^+1 (x)] is less than Uj = 
52^=i i^j> then there exists x £ A' such that /iM+1(x) C A; = spanj/j^x),..., 
/j(i(x)}. It is evident that one of the sets I \ is equal to k — {ii, z2, •••, v ) a n o-
span{/ W l } C (n*)^ = o.c.a.((£^)X)- • 
The above necessary condition provides a test to determine the possible values 
of the isolability index for a family of fault signatures. For sake of subsequent further 
referencing, this coding scheme is designated as the coding scheme 1. 
Theorem 3.5. Let A, C and Li be arbitrary matrices of dimensions n x n, q x n 
and n x ki, respectively, then the SFDIP problem for linear system (2.1) generically 
has a solution for the coding sets of Theorem 3.3 if and only if 
1. For each /i + 1 combination Lii: ...,Lifi+1 of Li's let Vi = ^ j = i ^ and v = 
max, Vi, then 
v < n (3.12) 
2. For each [i combination L^,..., Lifi of Li's, 
5>,<<7 (3-13) 
3 = 1 
Proof: (only if) It readily follows that Lj's should satisfy Theorem 3.4, hence (3.12) 
is immediate. Moreover, if for a given combination Lj1(..., Lifi of Lj's, q < Y^=i ^ > 
then generically Sf = X for Tj = k — {ix, ...,i,j}, and therefore condition (3.13) is 
necessary. 
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(if) Inequality (3.12) implies that L,,i 6 k generically satisfies the necessary 
condition of Theorem 3.4. Also, inequality (3.13) implies that for any JJ, combination 
Li1,...,Lill of L^s, generically S^. = Ylj=\£-ij- Therefore, from Theorem 3.4 it 
follows that the SFDIP problem is generically solvable for the coding sets of Theorem 
3.3. 
• 
The above coding scheme needs to generate C(k, k — //) residuals for detection 
and isolation of fi concurrent faults. However, under certain special circumstances 
one can solve the problem with fewer number of residuals. 
Theorem 3.6. Assume that a given family of fault signatures can be categorized 
into m subsets FLi, FL2,..., FLm such that 
1. For FLi — {LiltLi2, ...Lib}, then [Lii: ...,Lib] is not full rank. 
2. Any fa + 1 combination of fault signatures in FLt is linearly independent. 
For each subset FLi, ^ij,j = 1; ••! C(bi, bi — fii) are defined as bi — //j combinations 
of FLi; then the coding sets £2j 's are strongly isolating with index /J, = min^ / v 
Proof: It should be shown that for any two different 1 < I, h < /J, combinations 
Ljj,..., Lit and Ljt,..., LJh, equation (3.8) holds. If both combinations are from one 
subfamily FL^, then according to Theorem 3.3, equation (3.8) holds. If combinations 
are from different subfamilies then using the fact that for each two fault signatures 
Li and Lj from two different subfamilies, 
^ n ^ = 0 (3.14) 
it follows that equation (3.8) holds. Let Lti,..., Li( and Lj1,..., Ljh be from a same 
subfamily FLi and Lit + 1 , . . . ,L i ; and Ljh ,...,Ljh be from a different subfamily 
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FLj. Then using Theorem 3.3, we have 
^,.,h + nju...jhl (3.15) 
Also, using equation (3.14), we have 
nil,...ihnnjhi+1,...jh = o (3.16) 
^,1+1,...i,nn j l,... ih i=0 (3.17) 
Therefore, it follows that 
The same procedure can be used if L^,..., Li; and Lj1,..., Ljh can be categorized into 
more than two subfamilies. • 
The same result can be derived for a nonlinear system with the family of fault 
signatures Zj(x)'s. For the coding sets of Theorem 3.6, the number of residuals are 
P ~ Y^JiL\ C(h, bi — fa) which may be much smaller than C(k, /i) when \x = min, fa. 
Remark 3.2. It should be noted that by utilizing the coding sets of Theorem 3.6, 
one may detect more than \i concurrent faults in cases where the faults are not all 
from one of the subfamilies FLi 's. For example, consider the two different fit + /ij 
combinations Li1, ...,Li/i+ii. and Lj1, ...,LJII+II such that L^, . . . , 1 ^ . and Ljx, ...jLj^ 
are from the same subfamily FLi andLi
 +1,...,Li + and Lj +1,..., Lj + arefrom 
a different subfamily FLj, then it follows that 
so that one can indeed detect and isolate these two combination of concurrent faults. 
The maximum number of concurrent faults that one can detect and isolate is Yl^iLi Vi? 
where only fit fault signatures are selected from the subfamily FLi. 
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Theorem 3.7. 1. The SFD1P problem for linear system, (2.1) has a solution 
for the coding sets of Theorem 3.6 and a given family of fault signatures if 
TCi n Lki = 0, Vi, kj where TCi = 5Z/=i ^H an<^ -^ fc, e FLk, k ^ i. 
2. The SFDIP problem for nonlinear system (2.34) has a solution for the coding 
sets of Theorem 3.6 and a given family of fault signatures if spanlk (x) <£ 
FLi \/i, kj where FLi = = span{lix (x),..., lih (x)} and Ik € FLk, k ^ i. 
Proof: 
1. If there exists L^ € FLk , k ^ i such that TLi D Lkj ^ 0 for some i € m, 
then there exists a Tki such that kj € Tki, but since TLi n Lfc. ^ 0, then 
Lkj H Sf 7^  0, and therefore the SFDIP problem does not have a solution for 
2. The proof is similar to part 1 and is omitted. • 
The next example illustrates some details regarding the above coding scheme. 
For subsequent referencing, the coding scheme in Theorem 3.6 is designated as the 
coding scheme 2. 
Example 3.1. Consider the following family of fault signatures: 
FL = 
1 -0 .5 -0 .5 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 -0 .5 -0 .5 0 
0 0.5 -0 .5 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0.5 -0 .5 0 
0 0 -0 .5 0.5 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 -0 .5 
(3.18) 
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L\ L2 L& L4 (3.19) 
LR LR L-7 La (3.20) 
where Hi = /i2 = 2 and b\ = b2 = 4 as defined in Theorem 3.6. The sets F^ are 
selected as Tn = {1,2}, T12 = {1,3}, T13 = {1,4}, T14 = {2,3}, T15 = {2,4}, 
r16 = {3,4}, r21 = {5,6}, r22 = {5,7}, r23 = {5,8}, r24 = {6,7}, r25 = {6,8}, 
and r2 6 = {7,8}. Utilizing the coding scheme of Theorem 3.6, one needs to generate 
only 12 residuals, whereas by utilizing the coding scheme of Theorem 3.3, C(8, 2) = 
28 residuals need to be generated. Moreover, by assuming that there are concurrent 
faults in Li, L2, L5, L6, then all residuals except r ^ and r26 will be affected by this 
fault, with rij denoting the residual generated by T^-. Therefore, one can detect and 
isolate the occurrence of A concurrent faults in these fault signatures. 
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3.3 Actuator Fault detection and Isolation in a 
Network of Unmanned Vehicles 
In the following discussions, our proposed structured residual set is utilized to solve 
the actuator fault detection and isolation problem in a network of unmanned vehi-
cles. We will investigate the development of and comparison among two architec-
tures for FDI of actuator faults in the network of unmanned vehicles. Namely, we 
are interested in centralized and semi-decentralized configurations as described and 
defined in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.3, respectively. 
3.3.1 Centralized Architecture 
As pointed out in Section 3.1.1, system (3.4) is overactuated and the rank of B° 
in system (3.4) is a x (N — 1). Hence, the first step is to determine the possible 
isolability index of actuator fault signatures in the centralized architecture. It can 
be verified that the family of a x N fault signatures L^,k € N, j G a satisfies 
the necessary condition of Theorem 3.4 with /J, = N — 2 isolability index. If the 
SFDIP problem has a solution for the coding scheme 1, then one needs to generate 
C(a x N, N — 2) residuals for detecting and isolating N — 2 multiple faults. However, 
since matrix B is full rank and in view of the structure of the matrix B°, one can 
categorize the family of fault signatures into the following a subfamilies FL^i € a 
such that FLi = {L^t,k G N} satisfies the condition of Theorem 3.6 with 6$ = N 
and fit = N — 2. In other words, each subfamily FLi contains the fault signatures 
of the i-th. actuator of all the vehicles. If the SFDIP problem has a solution for the 
coding scheme 2, then one needs to generate a x C(N, N — 2) — a x N x (N — l ) /2 
residuals for detecting and isolating N — 2 multiple faults, which is much smaller 
than C(a x N,N — 2). Moreover, according to Remark 3.2, one is able to detect 
multiple faults in all actuators of each vehicle since fault signatures of each vehicle 
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are in different subfamilies. 
Theorem 3.8 presented below provides the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for generating the residual signals for the centralized architecture using the coding 
scheme 2. The following lemma is needed and will be used in the proof of this 
theorem. 
Lemma 3.2. Consider the following diagonal dynamical system 
x(t) = AMx{t) + BMu{t) + LMm{t) 
(3.21) 
y(t) = CMx(t) 
where L = [Lu-• • ,La] and M > 1 (AM = IM®A,BM = IM® B, LM = IM ® L). 
Let Lij,i G M= {1, . . . , M},j G k denote the ( i - l ) x a + j-th column of LM, then 
the family of fault signatures L^ 's in (3.21) is strongly detectable if and only if the 
family of fault signatures Li's is strongly detectable in the following system 
a 
x(t) = Ax{t) + Bu(t) + ^2 Lkmk{t) 
fc=i (3.22) 
y(t) = Cx(t) 
Proof: The fault signatures L^-'s are strongly detectable if and only if there 
exists (CM,AM) unobservability subspace S%' = inf SM(C%) such that S%' n 
Cij = 0, where Lfj,i G M , j G k are obtained by setting the column L,j of LM 
to zero. By using Algorithms 2.1 and 2.3, it can be easily shown that S^* = 
diag{<S*(£),«S*(£), • • • ,S*(Cj), • • • ,S*(C)} where Lj,j G k are obtained by setting 
the j-t\i column of L to zero and S*(C) = inf <S(£) is (C,A) unobservability sub-
space. Hence, Sjj* n C^ = 0 if and only if S*(Cj) D Cj = 0, implying that L / s 
should be strongly detectable. • 
We are now in the position to introduce our main theorem in this subsection. 
Theorem 3.8. The centralized SFDIP problem has a solution for the coding scheme 
2 if and only if the actuator fault signatures L\. 's are strongly detectable for the 
system (3.22). 
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Proof: According to Theorem 3.6, for each subfamily FLiy the sets Ty are defined 
as the 2-combination of iV fault signatures corresponding to the z'-th actuator of each 
vehicle. Therefore, each residual r^ should only be affected by the z'-th actuator fault 
signatures of the two vehicles and should be decoupled from all other actuator fault 
signatures. Since the observable state x° is considered as the relative state of the 
vehicles with respect to the state of vehicle 1, we consider generating the residual 
signals r^-'s such that the residual signal r^ is affected by the i-th actuator of vehicle 
1 and vehicle j and is decoupled from all other actuator fault signatures in the entire 
system. In generating such residual signals, system (3.4) can be rewritten as follows: 
x°(t) = AN~1x°{t) + BN-1u°(t) + LN-lm°{t) 
(3.23) 
z(t) = CN~lx°{t) 
where u° = [uj(t)-u](t),- • • ,uJ(t)-uJj(t)]T, m°(t) = [mj(t)-mj(t), ...,mj(t)-
mJj(t)}T, and mj(t) = [mJi(t), ...,mJa(t)]T. Using the result of the Lemma 3.2, it is 
clear that the residual signals r^ 's can be generated if and only if L/s are strongly 
detectable in system (3.22). The same approach can be considered for generating 
the residual signals that are only affected by the i-th actuator fault signatures of 
vehicles k,jj^l by rewriting the observable subsystem in terms of the relative states 
with respect to vehicle k. • 
In the next section, it is shown that by considering only "local" communication 
links among neighboring vehicles, the vehicles with more than one neighbor can 
detect and isolate not only their own faults but also faults of their neighboring 
vehicles. 
3.3.2 Semi-decentralized Architecture 
As pointed out in Section 3.1.3, the family of actuator fault signatures in the nodal 
model (3.7) is dependent and system (3.7) is also overactuated. It can be verified 
that the family of ax (|Ni| + l) fault signatures L^;, k = 1,..., |Nj| + l, j € a in system 
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(3.7) satisfies the necessary condition of Theorem 3.4 with the isolability index of 
/J, = |Nj| — 1. If the SFDIP problem has a solution for the coding scheme 1, then 
one needs to generate C(a x (|N,| + 1), |Nj| — 1) residuals for detecting and isolating 
|Nj| — 1 multiple faults. However, since matrix B is full rank, and by considering 
the structure of the matrix B°, one can categorize the family of fault signatures 
into the following a subfamilies FLj,j £ a such that FLj = {££ , k = 1,..., |N,| + 1 } 
satisfies the conditions of Theorem 3.6 with bj = |Nj| + 1 and //_,- = |N,| — 1. If the 
SFDIP problem has a solution for the coding scheme 2, then one needs to generate 
a x C(|Nj| + 1, |Nj| — 1) = a x (|Nj| + 1) x |Nj|/2 residuals for detecting and isolating 
|Nj| — 1 multiple faults which is much less than C(a x (|Nj| +1) , |Nj| — 1). Moreover, 
according to Remark 3.2, vehicles with more than one neighbor are able to detect 
multiple faults in all their actuators since fault signatures of each vehicle are in 
different subfamilies. 
Remark 3.3. It should be noted that for the vehicles with only one neighbor (\Ni\ = 
1), the isolability index is fi = 0, which implies that one cannot isolate any fault 
in the vehicle and its neighbor. However, since the matrix B is full rank, one can 
still categorize the fault signatures into a subfamily FLj,j € a such that FLj = 
{Lfp—Lfj}. In this case according to the coding scheme 2, one needs to design 
a residual generators such that each one is affected by only one subfamily and is 
decoupled from others. By utilizing this coding scheme, one can isolate faults among 
actuators but cannot isolate between the vehicle and its only neighbor. 
The result of this subsection is now summarized in the following theorem. 
Theorem 3.9. The semi-decentralized SFDIP problem has a solution for the coding 
scheme 2, if the fault signatures Lfc 's are strongly detectable for the system (3.22). 
Proof: Proof is similar to that of Theorem 3.8 and is omitted. 
According to Theorems 3.8 and 3.9, the solvability conditions for the FDI prob-
lem in the centralized and semi-decentralized architectures are the same. Therefore, 
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for vehicles with more than one neighbor, the same isolability performance will be 
achieved by using either scheme. However, in the semi-decentralized scheme the 
FDI algorithms are distributed among the vehicles and the computational load of 
each vehicle is much less than that of a centralized FDI unit. 
In order to compare the total number of residuals that are necessary in the 
centralized and the semi-decentralized architectures, let us assume that each vehicle 
has at most two neighbors. This assumption is based on the fact that a vehicle 
having two neighbors can detect and isolate its own faults. With this assumption in 
mind, the total number of residuals in the semi-decentralized architecture is found 
to be at most 3a/V, which for N > 7 is less than the total number of residuals 
needed in the centralized architecture which is a x TV x (JV — l) /2 . This shows that 
for a relatively "large" network of unmanned vehicles, that is for TV > 7, the total 
computational load of the semi-decentralized architecture is also much less than the 
centralized approach. 
It should be noted that in the semi-decentralized architecture, these residuals 
are distributed among all the vehicles. Moreover, by utilizing the semi-decentralized 
architecture, one can also reduce the practical limitations that are often imposed on 
the centralized architecture vis-d-vis computational bottlenecks and scarce commu-
nication bandwidth resources. Consequently, the semi-decentralized FDI algorithm 
is more scalable and flexible when compared to the centralized counterpart. Note 
that in the semi-decentralized architecture the communication overhead per each 
vehicle is higher than the centralized approach. However, one should also keep in 
mind that the efforts required (due to the presence of obstacles, limited line of sight, 
etc.) to maintain the communication links between each vehicle and the central 
FDI unit in the centralized approach are much higher than those needed to keep the 
communication links among only the neighboring vehicles in the semi-decentralized 
architecture. 
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3.3.3 Simulation Results For Formation Flight of Satellites 
In this section, our proposed fault detection and isolation strategy is applied to 
an application area of significant strategic interest, namely the satellite precision 
formation flying problem [76,94]. For simulation studies, the relative motion of four 
satellites are configured with respect to a reference virtual satellite that is following 
a desired orbit and that can be approximated by linearizing the Keplerian orbital 
mechanics about this reference trajectory. These equations are known as the Hill-
Clohessy-Wiltshire equation [142]. The equations of motion for each satellite about 
a circular reference orbit are governed by the following dynamics 
x = 3n2x + 2ny + ux 
y = - 2 n x + uv (3.24) 
z = —n2z + uz 
where x points in the radial direction, y points along the track, and z points out 
of the plane. The orbital rate is given by n. The vector [uj, Uy , uJ]T represents 
external input accelerations due to the applied actuators thrust. It is assumed 
that each satellite can measure its relative position with respect to its neighboring 
satellites where in this example we have assumed Ni = {2}, N2 — {1,3}, ./V3 = {4} 
and N4 = {1}. The satellites are tasked to form a regular square. It is clear from 
equation (3.24) that the xy-dynamics are decoupled from the z-dynamics. Here, we 
only consider actuator faults in the xy-dynamics. 
A multiple fault scenario is considered for simulations where four faults are 
injected in both actuators of satellites 2 and 4. Specially, (a) the x-direction and the 
y-direction actuators of satellite 4 are injected with a lock-in-place fault resulting in 
the actuators being locked at the values of u4i = 0.1 and U42 — —0.1 at t = 10 and 
t = 15 seconds, respectively, (b) an 80% loss of effectiveness fault is injected at the 
x-direction actuator of satellite 2 at t = 20 seconds, and (c) the y-direction actuator 
of satellite 2 is locked at the value of «2i = 0.5 at t — 20 seconds. 
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One can easily verify that the actuator fault signatures of each satellite are 
strongly detectable when each satellite has exact position measurements (that is 
Zi = Cxi). Therefore, according to the Theorem 3.8 the centralized FDI architecture 
has a solution for the coding scheme 2 and the isolability index of the whole family of 
signatures is 2. Actuator fault signatures of all the satellites can be categorized into 
two sets FLX = [Lf^Lg, Lg,Lg] and FL2 = [L% L&, L&, L°2], where h=b2 = 4, 
Mi = A*2 = 2, and L^ represents the fault signature of the z'-th actuator of the 
fc-th satellite in the observable part of the entire network. A total of 12 residuals 
ri,i = 1,..., 12 are needed for the coding scheme 2. The family of the coding sets for 
the above residual set and the family of fault signatures are as follows fi^ = {1, 2, 3}, 
n§! = {1,4,5}, ^ = {2,5,6}, nc41 = {3,4,6}, fi£2 = {7,8,9}, Qc22 = {7,10,11}, 
^32 = {8,11,12} and Q\2 = {9,10,12}, where ft?- corresponds to the fault signature 
In the semi-decentralized architecture, since satellites 1, 3 and 4 have only 
one neighbor, according to Remark 3.3 they can isolate faults among actuators 
but cannot isolate between themselves and their only one neighbor. By utilizing 
the coding scheme 2, two residuals rn and ri2 are designed for the z-th satellite 
(i = 1,3,4) where they are affected by faults in the x-direction actuator and the 
y-direction actuator of the satellite and its neighbor, respectively. However, since 
IJV2I = 2, satellite 2 not only can detect and isolate multiple faults in its own 
actuator but also it can detect and isolate faults in satellites 1 and 3. The actuator 
fault signatures of satellites 1, 2, and 3 can be categorized into two sets FL2i = 
[ L ? ! , ! ^ , ! ^ ] and FL22 = [Z?2,Lg,,L$2], where 61 = b2 = 3, ^ = fu-2 = 1, and 
L°{ represents the fault signature of the z-th actuator of the fc-th satellite in the 
observable part of the nodal model of satellite 2. Based on the coding scheme 2, 
six residual signals r2j,j = 1,..., 6 are needed for satellite 2. Therefore, in the semi-
decentralized architecture, a total of 12 residuals should be generated. Residual 
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evaluation function for each residual is selected as an instantaneous value of the 
residual, i.e. JTi = r;. A uniformly random noise (5%) is added to the relative 
distance measurements (representing the sensor noise). By considering the worst 
case analysis of the residuals corresponding to the healthy operation of the satellites 
that are subject to measurement noise, a threshold value of ±0.1 is selected for all the 
residual signals for fault detection and isolation logic evaluation and analysis. The 
family of the coding sets for satellite 2 is as follows: fin = {21, 22}, fi21 = {21, 23}, 
fl3i = {22,23}, n1 2 = {24,25}, ft22 = {24,26}, and n32 = {25,26}, where ntj 
corresponds to the fault signature Lfy 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the residuals corresponding to the considered fault 
scenario for the centralized architecture. As shown in this figure, faults in the x and y 
direction actuators of satellite 4 can be detected and isolated using 0,^ and fi^ \j€t\2 
at t = 10.5 and t = 16.4 seconds, respectively. The occurrence of faults in the x and 
y direction actuators of satellite 2 can be detected and isolated using 1721UQ^ Uf^2, 
and 0,21 u ^ 2 2 u ^4i u ^42 at t = 20.5 and t = 25.6 seconds, respectively. Figures 3.3 
and 3.3 show the residuals that are generated by using our detection filters associated 
with the considered fault scenario for the semi-decentralized architecture. As shown 
in this figure, satellite 2 can detect and isolate the fault in its x-direction actuator 
at t = 20.5 seconds by using the coding set fi2i, and the fault in its y-direction 
actuator at t = 25.8 seconds by using the coding set fi2i U Jl22, but satellites 1, 3, 
and 4 can only detect the occurrence of faults in both actuators of the satellites and 
cannot isolate among the satellites. It should be noted that all the residual signals 
in both centralized and semi-decentralized architectures are generated according to 
the geometric approach in Chapter 2. 
Based on the above results one can conclude that for satellites with more 
than one neighbor (satellite 2 in the above formation example) the detection and 
isolation performance of the centralized and the semi-decentralized architectures are 
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Figure 3.1: The residuals corresponding to multiple fault scenario r l 5 ...r6 (central-
ized architecture). 
similar (multiple faults in all their actuators can be detected and isolated). However, 
in the semi-decentralized architecture the FDI algorithm is distributed among the 
satellites. This results in an approach that is more robust and fault-tolerant to 
complete failure of a central FDI unit that is generally placed in one of the satellites 
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Figure 3.4: The residuals corresponding to multiple fault scenario (semi-
decentralized architecture). 
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3.4 Fault Detection and Isolation of F-18 HARV 
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed fault detection and isolation strat-
egy for overactuated systems, we consider actuator faults in an F-18 High Angle of 
Attack Research Vehicle (HARV) [143]. For simplicity, a linear longitudinal motion 
is considered. The state vector is defined as xT = [v,a.q,8], where v represents 
a change in the forward speed of the aircraft, a represents a change in the angle 
of attack, q represents a change in the pitch rate and 9 represents a change in the 
pitch angle. There are six independent input channels, namely, (1) 5TH'- throttle 
change (2) 6rv- thrust vectoring change (3) SSTAB'- change in stabilator, (4) SASYM'-
change in symmetrical aileron, (5) &LEF'- change in leading edge flap deflection and 
(6) 5TEF'- change in trailing edge flap deflection. 
The aircraft is assumed to be flying at the Mach number of 0.24 at an al-
titude of 15000ft which corresponds to a steady forward speed of 239 ft/s. The 
equilibrium flight path angle is 0° and the angle of attack is 25°. The state equation 
corresponding to this flight condition is given by : 
x = Ax + Bu, y = x (3.25) 
where 
A 
-0.075 -24.05 0 -32.16 
-0.0009 -0.196 0.9896 0 
-0.0002 -0.1454 -0.1677 0 
0 0 1.0 0 
B = 
-1.15 0 -2.482 0.0393 
-0.01 -0.005 -0.0136 0 
-0.335 -0.035 -0.408 -0.0006 








 ~ [ $TH &TV SsTAB &ASYM &LEF &TEF J 
According to Theorem 3.4, the possible value of isolability index for this system 
is 2. One can check that the observability subspaces of Theorem 3.3 also exist for 
p = 2, and therefore in addition to detecting faults in each input channel, one can 
also detect concurrent faults in two input channels. Based on the coding scheme 1, 
a total of 15 (C(6,2)) residuals may be generated such that each is decoupled from 
2 input channels. It can be verified that the fault signatures cannot be categorized 
according to the coding scheme 2. 
By considering the maximum value or the worst case scenario of residuals 
corresponding to the normal mode of the system subject to measurement noise and 
taking into account some safety margins, a threshold value of 0.1 was considered for 
all the residuals. The coding sets for the above fault signatures are as follows 
fii = {6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15} 
Vt2 = {2,3,4,5,10,11,12,13,14,15} 
ft3 = {1,3,4,5, 7,8,9,13,14,15} 
Q4 = {1,2,4,5,6,8,9,11,12,15} 
n5 = {1,2,3,5,6,7,9,10,12,14} 
ft6 = {1,2,3,4,6,7,8,10,11,13} 
where f^  corresponds to the fault signatures of the i-th actuator. 
First, we consider that there is a hard over fault in the input channel u5 = SLEF 
at t = 50 sec. Figure 3.5 depicts the residual outputs corresponding to this fault 
scenario. According to these figures, one can detect and isolate this fault using the 
coding set f25. Next, we consider a 60% loss of effectiveness in the input channel 
^6 = <5TEF at t — 50 sec. Figure 3.6 shows the residual outputs corresponding to this 
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fault scenario. According to this figure one can clearly detect this fault using Q.Q. 
Finally, we consider concurrent hard over faults in the two input channels, namely 
u-i = 5TH at t — 50 and u5 = SLEF at t — 70 sec. Figures 3.7 shows the residual 
outputs corresponding to this scenario. According to these plots, one can detect 
and isolate these concurrent faults based on the coding set f^  U Cl5. 
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Figure 3.5: Residual outputs corresponding to the hard-over fault in the leading 
edge flap deflection. 
3.5 Fault Detection and Isolation of Redundant 
Reaction Wheels 
Let T0 denote the inertial frame with origin O € 1Z3 and Tb a moving body frame 
whose origin O* is at the mass center of the spacecraft. The attitude kinematics may 
be described by quaternion q — (qJ,qi). The attitude and angular velocity of the 
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Figure 3.6: Residual outputs corresponding to 60% loss of effectiveness in the trailing 
edge flap deflection. 
quaternion equation [1] 
°dq q^LO — LO x q 
~dt ~ 2 
<74 _ u-q 
dt~ 2 
(3.26) 
and the Euler equation 
°d{Iuj + h) 
dt = T d 
r
bdu ,T . , I—— + td x (IUJ + h) = -h + rd dt 
(3.27) 
where qT = (qT, q^) denotes the unit quaternion, / is the tensor of inertia in the body 
frame J7/,, h is the angular momentum of wheels, and TJ is the external disturbance 
torque associated with the spacecraft. 
Let hi, (i = 1, 2,3,4) denotes the angular momentum of the zth reaction wheel 
and hw = [hi, hi, h3, h^, then the relationship between h and hw is given by 
h = Ahu 
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(3.28) 
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Figure 3.7: Residual outputs corresponding to concurrent hard over faults in the 
throttle and trailing edge flap deflection. 
where A € 1Z3*4 is the configuration matrix of the reaction wheels. As shown in 
Figure 3.8, four wheels in a tetrahedron configuration were employed where A is 
given by [1] 
i V3 
0 
0 0 -J\ 
0 (3.29) 
Figure 3.8: Gyrostat with four reaction wheels in a tetrahedron configuration [1]. 
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By substituting equation (3.28) in equation (3.27), we have 
bduj 
I——\- LJ x (Iu> + Ahw) = —Au + rd (3.30) 
where the control input is u = hw. We further assume that the following output 
measurements are available: 
V (3.31) 
The main problem that we are addressing is how one can detect and isolate 
faults in the redundant reaction wheels. We can rewrite equation (3.30) as 
4 
LJ = f(lS) + ^ giUi + Td 
i=\ (3.32) 
y = u 
where 
/(") = -I-
9. = I-1 
gs = r1 













. y / l 
According to Theorem 3.4, one can check that the possible value of the isola-
bility index for the above system is 2. Thus one should try to generate C(4,2) = 6 
residual signals ri(t),i = 1,...,6. The sets IYs for having the isolability index of 
2 can be found from Theorem 3.3 (coding scheme 1) as I^ = {3,4}, F2 — {2,4}, 
T3 = {2,3}, T4 = {1,4}, T5 = {1,3}, r 6 = {1,2} and the corresponding coding sets 
a r e ^ = {4,5,6}, Q2 = {2,3,6}, ft3 = {1,3,5}, and fi4 = {1,2,3}. 
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Next, the observability codistributions of Theorem 2.6 for the above coding 
set are obtained by using the algorithm proposed in [60] as follows 
nfj = spanjcL^} 
nj;2 = span{d(-0.8165wi + 0.4619u;2 + 0.3464w3} 
IIJ3 = span{d(0.8165w1 - 0.4619w2 + 0.3464u;3} 
ITf4 = span{d(-0.8165wi - 0.4619w2 + 0.3464w3} 
nj;5 = span{d(0.8165u;1 + 0.4619w2 + 0.3464^} 
Ilr6 = span{d(w2)} 
where it is assumed that the inertia matrix is / = diag{5,4,3}. It is easy to verify 
that the necessary conditions (2.47) of Theorem 2.6 are satisfied and the SFDIP 
problem has a solution for the above system with a isolability index of 2. According 
to the above observability codistributions, the following set of new states can be 
found: 
z2 = -0.8165W! + 0.4619w2 + 0.3464w3 
z3 = 0.8165^ - 0.4619co>2 + 0.3464^3 
zA = -0.8165wi - 0.4619^2 + 0.3464w3 
z5 = 0.8165a;! + 0.4619a;2 + 0.3464a>3 
z& = <^2 
The state space representation of the satellite attitude dynamics may now be ex-
pressed in the new coordinates as follows: 
1 /2 
Z\ = 0 ( ^ 1 ^ 2 + U2hwi - UihW2 + | / - ( ! J 4 - U3)) 
z2 = -0.8165(-(LO>2LJ3 + u3hW2 - u2hW3)) + 0A619(-{-2uiu3 - uj3hwi + u>ihW3)) 0 4 
+ 0.3464(-(w!u;2 + u2hW} - w ^ J ) + 0.1886(u4 - u2) 
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z3 = 0.8165(-(u;2u;3 + u3hW2 - u2hW3)) - 0A619(-(-2UJ1UJ3 - u3hm + U\hW3)) 5 4 
+ 0.3464(-(u;1u;2 + u2hwi - w ^ ) ) + 0.1886(u2 - u3) 
-{LJ2LO3 + u3hW2 - u2hW3)) - 0.4619(-( 
,1 
i4 = -0.8165(-(o;2u;  — . 7 -2u;iW3 — u3hwi + u>xhW3)) 
+ 0.3464(-(a,'!u2 + tu2hWl -uJihW2)) + 0.1886(u4 - uj) 
o 
i 5 = 0.8165(-(u;2u;3 + uJ3hW2 - u2hW3)) - 0.4619(-(-2a;1a;3 - u3hwi + uJihW3)) 
o 4 
+ 0.3464(-(U;1CJ2 + u2hwi - uxhW2)) + 0.1886^! - u3) 
1 [2 




= Ahw (3.33) 
The next step is to design observers for generating the estimated states i j , z2, z3, 
z4, z5, and z^, and subsequently define the residuals as r^  = Zi — Zi, i € {1, . . . ,6}. 
The simulation results of our proposed nonlinear FDI scheme when applied to 
the attitude dynamics of a satellite are presented below. The circular dawn-dusk 
sun synchronous orbit with a 6pm ascending node and 650 km altitude has been 
considered for simulations. The satellite is subjected to four disturbance torques, 
namely: gravity gradient, solar radiation, the Earth's magnetic field, and aerody-
namic torque. Table 3.1 shows the characteristics of these disturbance torques for 
the selected orbit. The Earth observation mission is considered for the satellite with 
pointing accuracy of 0.5 degree in all the three axes. According to the mission re-
quirements and disturbances, a PD controller has been designed for the satellite. 
One of the common faults in the reaction wheel is the loss of effectiveness due to 
bus voltage drop or friction [68,69,73,144,145] which can be modeled as: 
Utme — kuc, , 0 < k < 1 (3.34) 
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where utrUe and uc denote the actual output and controller command of the reaction 
wheel, respectively. 




The Earth's magnetic field 
Aerodynamic torque 
Magnitude 
3.006e - 8 N.m 
5.468e - 6 N.m 
4.568e - 5 N.m 






Figure 3.9 shows the residuals corresponding to the normal operation of the 
satellite. According to this figure, the residuals are cyclic due to disturbances. 
First, we consider a 20% loss of effectiveness in the reaction wheel # 3 . Figure 3.10 
depicts the residuals corresponding to this fault scenario. As shown in this figure, 
the residuals are still cyclic, but the magnitude of the residuals is increased due to 
the fault. This cyclic feature of the residuals will make the fault decision making 
process more difficult. To remedy this problem, the L2 norm of the residuals in each 
orbit was considered for deciding on the fault detection and isolation tasks. Figure 
3.11 shows the L2 norm of the residuals corresponding to the healthy mode where 
the norm are reset when the satellite passes the perigee of its orbit. According to 
Figure 3.11 different threshold values have been chosen for each residual as shown 
in Table 3.2. Figure 3.12 depicts norm of the residuals corresponding to the 20% 
loss of effectiveness fault in the reaction wheel # 3 , and one can easily detect and 
isolate the fault in this reaction wheel using the coding set Q3. Finally, a concurrent 
fault scenario was also considered for the reaction wheels # 1 and # 3 . Figures 3.13 
and 3.14 show the residuals and their norms corresponding to this faulty scenario. 
As shown in Figure 3.14, all residuals except r2 exceed their threshold and based 
on the coding set f^  U f23 one can detect and isolate both faults in these reaction 
wheels. 
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Figure 3.9: Residuals corresponding to the normal mode (Healthy operation). 
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Figure 3.10: Residuals corresponding to a 20% loss of effectiveness in the reaction 
wheel # 3 . 
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Figure 3.1.2: Residual L2 norm corresponding to a 20% loss of effectiveness in the 


























Figure 3.13: Residual corresponding to a 40% loss of effectiveness in the reaction 













Figure 3.14: Residuals L<i norm corresponding to 40% loss of effectiveness in the 
reaction wheel # 3 and 50%. loss of effectiveness in the reaction wheel # 1 . 
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In this chapter, new structured residual sets are designed and developed for both 
linear and nonlinear systems with dependent fault signatures. The notion of a isola-
bility index is formally defined for these systems and necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for the coding sets to achieve a specific isolability index is obtained. Our 
proposed residual set is applied to three case studies, namely, actuators FDI in F-18 
HARV aircraft, actuator FDI in a satellite with redundant reaction wheel and the 
FDI problem in a network of unmanned vehicles. Three FDI architectures, namely, 
centralized, decentralized and semi-decentralized, are considered for a network of un-
manned vehicles. Simulation results are also presented to illustrate and demonstrate 
the effectiveness of our proposed approach. 
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Chapter 4 
A Robust Fault Detection and 
Isolation Scheme with a 
Disturbance Decoupling Property 
In this chapter, the actuator fault detection and isolation problem for a network 
of unmanned vehicles subject to large input disturbances is considered. One of 
the main challenges in the design of FDI algorithms is to distinguish the effect of 
disturbances from faults and develop a robust FDI scheme without compromising 
the detection of incipient faults in the vehicles. In unmanned vehicles such UAV's, 
this problem is more challenging due to the small size feature and more sensitivity 
of them with respect to disturbances such as wind gust. In this chapter, we try to 
design a robust FDI algorithm by developing a hybrid fault detection and isolation 
scheme for both linear and nonlinear systems that are subject to large environmental 
disturbances. 
This chapter is organized as follows. We begin with a brief literature review. 
In Section 4.2, we formulate the FDI problem for both linear and nonlinear systems 
subject to external disturbances. In Section 4.2.1, a systematic way for generating 
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a novel set of residuals in the hybrid FDI scheme is presented. In Section 4.2.2. 
we discuss the residual evaluation functions required for our hybrid FDI scheme. 
A discrete-event system (DES) fault diagnoser is presented in Section 4.2.3. In 
Sections 4.3 and 4.4, our proposed hybrid FDI algorithm is applied to actuators 
fault detection and isolation in a network of unmanned vehicles (linear systems) and 
an Almost-Lighter-Than-Air-Vehicle (ALTAV) (nonlinear systems), respectively. 
Contributions 
The main contributions of this chapter are now summarized below: 
• A novel hybrid FDI scheme is introduced for designing a robust FDI algorithm 
for both linear and nonlinear systems subject to large disturbances. 
• A robust hybrid FDI algorithm is developed for a network of unmanned vehi-
cles. 
4.1 Introduction 
One of the important issues in the model-based FDI is robustness against uncer-
tainties and modeling errors. Since a perfectly accurate and complete mathematical 
model of a physical system is never available and parameters of the system may vary 
with time in an uncertain manner, there is always a mismatch between the actual 
process and its mathematical model even when there is no process faults and this 
discrepancies cause fundamental difficulties in FDI application. Therefore, the effect 
of modeling uncertainties is the most crucial point in the model-based FDI concepts. 
Various robust model-based FDI techniques have been developed in the literature. 
These include Unknown Input Observer (UIO) approach [38,146-148], eigenstruc-
ture assignment [149-151], optimal parity relation for robust FDI [152-154]. fre-
quency domain design and Hx. optimization FDI approach [155-157]. A compre-
hensive treatment of robust FDI is presented in [6]. 
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In UIO robust. FDI approach, disturbances and model uncertainties are mod-
eled as an additive disturbance in the state space representation of the system. 
Model uncertainties include interconnecting terms in large scale systems, nonlinear 
terms in system dynamics, terms arising from time-varying system dynamics, lin-
earization and model reduction errors, and parameters variations. In this approach 
an observer is designed whose estimation error converges to zero regardless of an un-
known input (disturbance) in the system. The remaining design degree of freedom 
is used for fault detection and isolation purposes. In the eigenstructure assignment 
robust FDI, a direct approach to design disturbance decoupled residuals is developed 
where the residual signal is decoupled from disturbance while the state estimation 
error may not be decoupled from it. The existing conditions for an eigenstructure 
assignment could be relaxed when compared with those required for UIO. 
In the optimal parity relation approach, two objective functions for the design 
of parity relations are defined. The optimization objectives are the minimization 
of effects due to the modeling uncertainty and the maximization of fault effects. 
These lead to a multi-objective optimization problem which is solved by forming a 
mixed objective function optimization problem. In this approach the uncertainty 
is considered as bounded parameter variations and set of possibilities for system 
parameters within their bounds is considered to describe multiple models of the 
system. In an H^ optimization approach one tries to keep the sensitivity of the 
residual signal to unknown inputs (disturbances) less than a specific bound while 
increase the sensitivity of the residual signal to the fault over a frequency range 
of the fault. Different methods can be used to achieve the above criteria such as 
coprime factorization, LMI method, and H^ filtering based on algebraic Riccati 
equation. The main difference between the UIO and the eigenstructure approaches 
with parity relation and Hx. approaches is in the first two approaches, one seeks to 
decouple the effect of unknown inputs from the residual signals. However, in the 
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second pair of robust approaches, effects of unknown inputs on residual signals are 
attenuated. Therefore, solvability conditions of the second pair of approaches are 
generally more relaxed when compared to the first two approaches. 
In all the above approaches, the modeling uncertainties and errors are con-
sidered as unknown inputs and OIK; seeks to decouple or attenuate the effects of 
them on residuals. An alternative approach [158,159] is to consider structured 
model uncertainty in the system and design a robust fault detection filter for the 
system with such structured uncertainty. However, in this approach prior choice 
of a nominal model can lead to suboptimal solutions in all situations in which a 
nominal plant model is not easily identifiable or is not available. To remedy this 
problem, recently [160,161], has developed robust fault detection filters for systems 
with polytopic model uncertainty based on an H^ optimization approach. 
In another research direction, discrete-event based fault diagnosis approaches 
[162-164] attempt to represent the nominal and the faulty-system behaviors in the 
form of event trajectories, and as a result design fault diagnosers to estimate the 
current status of the system. This abstraction may result in the loss of information 
that can be critical to the task of fault isolation. Recently, hybrid fault diagnosis 
approaches have been investigated for complex dynamical systems whose behavior 
is modeled as a hybrid system. In [165], fault diagnosis of a continuous-time system 
with embedded supervisory controllers subject to abrupt, partial and full failure of 
components is investigated as a model selection problem. Reference [166] presents an 
online model-based diagnosis methodology for parametric faults in hybrid systems, 
which is based on tracking hybrid behavior (for both continuous-time and discrete-
event behaviors). In [121] a discrete-event system diagnosis approach is presented for 
abrupt parametric faults in continuous-time systems based on qualitative abstraction 
of the system behavior. 
In this chapter, a novel hybrid FDI algorithm for both linear and nonlinear 
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systems that are subject to large environmental disturbances is developed. Many 
modern systems such as aircraft and balloons are expected to operate in harsh 
environments where large disturbances (wind gust) may be present. One of the main 
challenges in designing a robust FDI algorithm for these systems is to determine how-
to distinguish between large environmental disturbances and faults or failures. 
Towards the above end, a hybrid architecture for a robust FDI is introduced 
that is composed of a bank of continuous-time residual generators and a DES fault 
diagnoser. First a set of residual signals is generated based on the coding set in-
troduced in Chapter 3 for a family of fault signatures with a given detectability 
index. Two threshold levels are assigned to the residual signals. It is further as-
sumed that the input disturbances can be categorized into two families, namely, 
the tolerable disturbance inputs and the large and unexpected disturbances. A first 
level of threshold is selected such that the tolerable disturbance inputs do not gen-
erate any false alarms using the residual signals. Next, a complementary set of 
residual signals is generated by considering the effects of the disturbances on the 
first set of generated residual signals. A DES fault diagnoser is then designed to 
invoke an appropriate combination of the residual signals and their sequential fea-
tures to not only detect and isolate faults and guarantee no false alarms subject to 
large external disturbance signals but also to detect and identify the occurrence of 
large external disturbances. It should be emphasized that our proposed FDI ap-
proach performs simultaneous robust fault detection and isolation as well as large 
and unexpected disturbances detection without imposing any limitations on the to-
tal number of faults that can be detected and isolated. In contrast, in the previous 
FDI algorithms developed in [49,60,167], robustness against disturbance inputs is 
achieved by limiting the number of possible faults that can be present in the system. 
Our proposed hybrid FDI algorithm is subsequently applied to the actuators fault 
detection and isolation problem in a network of unmanned vehicles as well as an 
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Almost-Lighter-Than-Air-Vehicle (ALTAV). 
4.2 Hybrid FDI approach 
Consider the following linear system 
fc p 
x(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) + Y^ Umi{t) + ^ PjUj{t) 
2=1 j = l (4 .1 ) 
y(t) = Cx(t) + v(t) 
and the nonlinear system 
k P 
i=\ j=\ (4.2) 
y = /i(x) + v 
where Uj € M^ denotes the disturbance input , v represents the measurement noise 
and L{ and U{x) represent fault signatures. It is assumed that oJj,v G £ P [ 0 , OO] for 
some 1 < p < oo where £p[0, oo] denotes the space of £ p norm bounded signals, i.e. 
\\UJ\\P < oo. 
Assumption 4 .1 . The disturbance inputs are categorized into two types, namely 
tolerable disturbance signals £>i = {UJ € £p[0,oo] | \\u)\\p < 5\} and large and unex-
pected disturbance signals 2>2 = {^ £ £p[0, oo] | 5\ <C IM|P < 52} where 5i <C 52. 
Assumption 4.2. The faults and the large disturbance inputs do not occur simul-
taneously and there exists a sufficient time separating the occuiTence of a fault and 
the disturbance. 
The objective of this chapter is to design a Hybrid Fault Diagnoser (HFD) 
for detecting and isolating each fault m^ while guaranteeing that the diagnoser re-
mains robust with respect to both types of disturbances. In other words, no false 











R'.s DES Model (G) 
DES Fault 
Diagnoser 
Figure 4.1: General architecture of our proposed hybrid diagnoser. 
is composed of two modules, namely, a low-level bank of residual generators and 
a high level DES diagnoser. The bank of continuous-time residual generators pro-
duces first a set of residual signals based on the geometric FDI approach. It then 
compares, using an evaluation function, each residual signal to its corresponding 
threshold value, from which a set of residual logic units is generated. Two levels 
of thresholds are needed for certain residual signals (this will be discussed in more 
details subsequently). The DES diagnoser module is a finite-state automaton that 
takes the residual logic units as inputs and estimates the current state of the sys-
tem. For designing such a DES diagnoser, the combined plant and the bank of 
residual generators is modeled as a finite state Moore automaton (G). The general 
architecture of our proposed hybrid fault diagnoser is shown in Figure 4.1. 
Remark 4 .1 . One possible approach to design a robust FDI algorithm for system 
(4.1) f (4.2),) is to generate a set of residual signals [3] ( [60]) that each residual 
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is affected by only one fault a.nd, is decoupled, from all other faults and all the dis-
turbances. If such a set of residual signals exist, then one can robustly detect and 
isolate faults despite the presence of disturbances. Under these circumstances, there 
will be no need to have a hybrid structure for the fault diagnoser. However, such a 
set of residual signals may not always exist due to presence of multiple faults that 
can occur in the system. 
In the following sections, the procedure for designing a hybrid fault diagnoser 
composed of a bank of residual generators and a DES diagnoser is described in 
details. 
4.2.1 Bank of Continuous-Time Residual Generators 
In this section, a systematic approach is proposed to design a set of residual gen-
erators that provides the necessary information required by the DES diagnoser. 
Towards this end, two sets of residual signals are developed. The first set is gen-
erated according to the coding set that is introduced in Chapter 3 for a family of 
fault signatures with a given detectability index. The hybrid fault diagnoser (HFD) 
developed below is guaranteed to remain robust with respect to both tolerable dis-
turbance inputs Wj € ©i and measurement noise v by selecting appropriate threshold 
values associated with this first set of residual signals. To ensure that the HFD is 
also robust to large disturbance inputs (ui G 5)2), a second set of complementary 
residuals is generated so that the DES fault diagnoser, by utilizing the entire set of 
residual signals, will robustly detect and isolate a fault. 
In the following, we assume that the detectability index of Lj's (^(x)'s) is 
/i < k (which includes strong detectability). Therefore, the SFDIP problem has 
a solution for the coding scheme JVs with detectability index of /u, and a set of 
residuals ri:i e Hj = {1. ...,£} can be generated (£ = C(k,fi) for the coding scheme 
1). We denote 9^ = {r,,i 6 E^}. Let A, denote the set of disturbance signatures 
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P/'s (PJ(.T)'S) that affects the residual r,. In other words, for linear system (4.1), 
A ^ O - e P I ^ - n s ; , . =0}? i e - , (4.3) 
and for nonlinear system (4.2) 
Ai = {jeP\span{pj(x)}%(U^)1}, ieE, (4.4) 
where «Sj*. and Uy are defined in Theorems 2.3 and 2.6, respectively. 
Assume tha t one can generate a set of complementary residuals 9^ 2 = {f^+u i E 
E]} such that r^+i is decoupled from the disturbance inputs specified by Aj but is 
affected by all the faults m;,/ E T, and possibly other fault modes. Necessary 
and sufficient conditions for generating such complementary residual signals will be 
derived below in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2. 
For each disturbance input Uj E P and fault mode m^i E k, the coding sets 
ttpj and n{ denote a set of residuals that are affected by ojj and m,, respectively. It 
is clear that Oj C Of , i E k. The following two lemmas will be used subsequently to 
design our proposed DES fault diagnoser. 
L e m m a 4 . 1 . a) The coding sets QP and flj are distinct i.e. flp ^ il^,i E P,j E k. 
and b) The coding sets il{ and f i j , i 7^  j are distinct, i.e. il{ ^  JlJ, i,j E k, i ^ j . 
Proof: a) First we consider the disturbances ujj, j E P such that j E Aj for 
some i E E] (UJ affects at least one of the residuals r$ E 9^i). Since the residual r^+j 
is decoupled from uij and is affected by all the faults m,, i E Tj, we have £ + i ^ ttP 
and ( + i € il{, / E Ft. Hence, we have QP ^ Q{, I E IV Moreover, for all mh I E k 
such that I $. Ft, we have i E npj and i <£ Q{; hence fi? ± Of, I $ I \ . Therefore, 
i2P j^ il{,i E k. Next we consider the disturbances ujj, j E P such that j ^ uf=1Aj, 
i.e. disturbance; inputs that do not affect any of the residuals r,-,i E E j . Therefore, 
we have i (£ ^ , V z E E] . However, for any j E k. there exists at least one residual 
signal r, eSH, (I E E}) such that / e ilj: hence ^ ^ n{,i E k. 
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b) Given the procedure in Chapter 3 for generating the residual signals r,. i G r-i, 
we conclude that i\ ^ Qj, i,j G k, i: ^ j . Let us define a new set TJ according to 
T{ = il{ n {£ + 1,..., 2f }, ? € k. Consequently, wo can write tt{ = tt2 U Xf; i € k. 
Since fij n {£ + 1,..., 2Q = 0, i G k, it follows that J}/ ^ J]J, ?, j G k. i ^ j . 9 
For each fault m,, i G k. the set Xf represents the complementary residuals 
Ti G 9\2 that are affected by mx, i.e. T{ = {j G {£ + 1,...?2^"} | r3 G ttf}- The 
above lemma ensures that the occurrence of faults and disturbances can be uniquely 
distinguished. 
Assumpt ion 4 .3 . For disturbance inputs Uj such that j <£ (jf=i A«.. ^ s^ assumed 
that fl£ = 0. 
The disturbances which satisfy Assumption 4.3 have no effect on the residuals, 
and therefore the hybrid diagnoser does not need to be robust to them. In other 
words, the generated set of residuals are already decoupled from these disturbances 
and no further invoking of the DES diagnoser is required. 
Lemma 4.2. Consider the sets Tf as defined above, then £1? ^ Xf, i G k, j G P. 
Proof: For the disturbance inputs Uj G P such that j G Aj for some i G k, 
the proof follows along the same lines as that in proof of part a) of Lemma 4.1. 
According to Assumption 4.3, for the disturbance inputs that do not affect any of 
the residual signals r» G 9^i we have Q? = 0. Since i + k G Xf, then if- ^ Y{. • 
As will be demonstrated in Section 4.2.3, the above lemma guarantees tha t 
one can distinguish between the occurrence of low severity faults and the distur-
bances. Based on the geometric framework presented in Chapter 3 for both linear 
and nonlinear systems, the next two theorems provide the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for existence of the residuals rt G £H2 f ° r linear and nonlinear systems, 
respectively. Note that the necessary and sufficient conditions for generating the 
residuals Tj G 9^ are presented in Theorems 2.3 for linear systems. 
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Theorem 4.1. The residual signals r* G 9^ 2 can be generated if and only if 
sz+in£j = o, j e r . i G E , (4.5) 
where S*+i = inf «S(£ i € A . Vf) 
Proof: The proof follows from Theorem 2.3 and is omitted. 9 
Theorem 4.2. The residual signals r; £ SH] U 9\2 can be generated if and only if 
there exist observability codistributions II,*. = o.c.a. ( ( E r i ) ± ) , i = l , . . . ,2f where 
CTi = span{lj(x),j ^ T J , i e H j (4.6) 
£ri+i = span{pj(x),j €Ai}, i G Ea (4.7) 
snc/i £/ioi 
span^-} £ [nf J 1 , i G E1 (4.8) 
5pan{^} £ [n F { + j \ t e n , (4.9) 
/ o r a// j G Tj. 
Proof: The proof follows from Theorem 2.6 and is omitted. 9 
Remark 4.2. For a system where At = A,i G k. in other words when the set 
of disturbances that affects all the residuals Ti G £Hi are the same, only a single 
extra residual r^+i is sufficient for designing our hybrid FDI scheme. According to 
Theorem 4-2, the residuals can be generated for the nonlinear system if and only if 
there exist observability codistributions Ilf-. = o.c.a.((X)+*)"L),z = 1, ...,£ + 1 where 
CTi = span{lj(x),j i T J , i G - j (4.10) 
£ r i + 1 = span{pj(x),j G A} (4.11) 
such that span{lj} <£. [Ilf.]1 for j G ri:i G E I ; and span{lj} <£ [II J1- J1 / o r jf G k. 
The same result can be derived for linear systems. 
89 
In the following example, we demonstrate how to construct and generate the 
above set of residual signals for a given nonlinear system. 
Example 4 .1 . Consider a nonlinear system that has 3 fault signatures and one 
disturbance input as governed by the following dynamics 
i\ — —XjX2 + mj + exp(x2)m-2 + 2ra3 + LO\ 
2 X2 
x2 = —x1 — 2—m-i + m2 + 0.5m3 — 0.2u;i 
with the output measurement y = [xi,X2]J - It is clear that the above family of fault 
signatures does not satisfy the necessary condition (2.29). and hence it is not strongly 
detectable. Now we show that the detectability index for the above fault signatures 
is 1. i.e. /.i = 1. First we generate the coding sets that are required for the family of 
fault signatures with JJL = 1. Towards this end, the sets r, , i = 1, 2, 3 are selected as 
2 combinations of the set {1,2,3},. namely Y\ = {1,2}. T2 = {1,3} andT3 = {2,3}. 
The corresponding coding sets fij, i = 1,2,3 are given by fi] = {1,2}. 0 2 = {1,3} 
and Q3 = {2, 3} and the number of residuals is £ = C(3,1) = 3. Our next step 
involves checking the solvability conditions for the SFDIP problem. According to 
Theorem 2.6. one needs first to obtain unobservability codistributions U^.,i = 1, 2,3. 
These codistributions are found by using the algorithm that is presented in [168] and 
are given as follows 
Ilpj = span{d(x\x2)} 
IIr2 = span{d(xx — exp(x2))} 
Ilp3 = span{d(xi — 4x2)} 
It can be verified that the necessary conditions (2.27) are satisfied, and hence the 
detectability index for the above family of fault signatures is 1. We are now ready to 
design the residual generators. Towards this end. the z^-subsystem (2.41) for each 
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unobservability codistribution is obtained as follows: 
n n 
ij = - 2 g - y\ + ( 2 | e x p ( | ) + y22)m2 




y\ = zi 
z\ = -(21 + exp(y2))y2 + (1 - 2Zl+g,(y2)exp(t/2))m1 
- exp(y2){zi + exp{y2)f + (2 - 0.5exp(y2))"i3 + (1 - 0.2exp(2/2) Vi 
yi = 21 
ix - - f a + 4y2)y2 + 4fa + 4z2)2 + (1 + 8 : ^ ) ro, 
+ (exp(y2) - 4)m3 + 0.2u/i 
2/i = *i 
The residual generators can easily be designed from the above system of equations 
since the state z1 is measurable. It follows that Aj = A = {1} (the disturbance input 
u>i affects all residual signals ri? i = 1,2,3,) and according to Remark 1^.2. only one 
extra residual signal is required. To generate this residual, one needs to find Ilf
 4 that 
is given by 
rip4 = span{d{x\ + 52:2)} 
The corresponding z\ -subsystem is governed by the dynamics: 
ii = ~(zi - 5y2)y2 - lOfa - 5y2)2 + (1 - l O ^ J m j 
+ (exp(y2) + 5)m2 + 4.5m3 
y\ = z\ 
Consequently, by using the above zj-subsystems. the coding sets fl^ and iq , i = 
1,2,3 are determined as follows: f2f = {1,2,3}. Q\ = {1,2,4}, Q,{ = {1,3,4}, and 
Qf3= {2,3,4}. It is easy to show that these coding sets satisfy Lemmas 4-1 and 4-2, 
where T{ = {4}.i = 1,2,3. 
It should be noted that since the above family of fault signatures is not strongly 
detectable, the method proposed in [60J cannot be applied to this system. Moreover, as 
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n i \ : { 
a comparison with some methods in the literature that consider disturbances as faults 
[49,60,167], if the disturbance input u\ is treated as the fourth fault, the detectability 
index for the new family of fault signatures (four faults) is 1, implying that one 
cannot detect the concurrent occurrence of a fault and a disturbance. However, as 
will be shown subsequently, our proposed hybrid FDI algorithm enables one to detect 
a single fault in the system while a large disturbance input is applied through ui\. 
In the next section, a residual evaluation criteria is introduced for the generated 
residuals set 9ti U 9^ 2-
4.2.2 Residual Evaluation Criteria 
Corresponding to each residual signal r, G 9 i^ U 9^2, an evaluation function is now 
assigned. Various evaluation functions have been introduced in the literature [132]. 
For the residual signals r; G 9ti, two different thresholds are needed as specified 
below 
J]hi = sup (J r.), i G ~i (4.12) 
J?hi = sup (JTi), i G E1 (4.13) 
In determining the first threshold, only tolerable disturbance inputs (ui G £>i) are 
considered. However, the second threshold incorporates all the possible disturbance 
inputs. 
Remark 4.3. It should be noted that one may choose to only consider the threshold 
level given by J^h. as a worst case scenario associated with large disturbances. In this 
case, no false alarms will be generated due to disturbances. However, this leads to 
selection of higher threshold values that would unnecessarily reduce the sensitivity of 
the FDI algorithm to low severity faults. As will be shown subsequently, by selecting 
two threshold levels and considering the temporal and sequential characteristics of 
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the residual signals, one can not only enhance the fault sensitivity but also design a 
robust FDI algorithm. 
The threshold values for the residual signals r^  e D\2 are selected according to 
Jk= sup (J r J , z = £ + l,...,2£ (4.14) 
De£p,u.')eX)2.«6nf,?n :,=0j€k 
For a system, such as in Example 1 and the ALTAV system that is discussed in 
Section 4.4, where the residual signals r; G 9^ 2 are affected by a few or even no 
disturbance input channels, one can select lower threshold values for these residuals. 
In other words, the residual signals r^  e 9^ 2 are generally less sensitive to disturbance 
inputs than residual signals rj G 5^]. 
For each residual r^  e 9 i^ defined at a given point in time t, we can choose the 
corresponding two threshold logic units R}{t) and Rf(t) according to 
Rl(t) = { , Z G = I (4.15) 
0 otherwise 
1 if Jr.(t) > Jfh 
m)={ l ,itZi (4-16) 
0 otherwise 
Similarly, for each residual r,(£) € 9^2, the threshold logic unit is assigned as follows 
f 1 if JrAt)> Jtht 
Rl(t) = { , i e U + l , . . . ,20 (4.17) 
I 0 otherwise 
For each fault mode ra^i 6 k, let us define A* as 
Ai = {Rl]\pe{l,2},jen{}, i e k (4.18) 
In other words, A, is the set of all residual logic units that may take the value of 1 
due to the occurrence of a fault in the i-th actuator. The sets Aj's will be used in 
the next section to define the possible DES model outputs of the system (as shown 
in Table 4.2). 
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Definition 4.1. The fault scenarios are categorized into the following three classes, 
namely, high severity faults, low severity faults, and non-detectable faults: 
1. High severity faults correspond to faults that will affect residual logic units 
R},ie{l,...,2Qr 
2. Low severity faults correspond to faults that will affect only Rj,i E {£ + 
1, ...,2£}, and 
3. Non-detectable faults correspond to faults that do not affect any of the residual 
logic units Rj,i G {1,..., 2£}. 
4.2.3 DES Fault Diagnoser 
For simplicity, let us assume that multiple faults in two components are possible. 
Furthermore, let us consider the scenarios where only occurrence of one fault and one 
large disturbance is allowed concurrently. This assumption will limit the number of 
all possible operational states of the DES system. However, our proposed algorithm 
is easily expandable to more general cases. 
First the plant (linear/nonlinear) along with a bank of residual generators 
is modeled as a finite state Moore automaton [163] specified according to G = 
(S, E, 5, so, Y, A), where S, E, Y are finite state, event and output sets; so is the initial 
state, S : S x E —» S is the transition function and A : S —> Y is the output map. For 
both linear and nonlinear systems, the state set S along with its description is given 
in Table 4.1. The event set is E = {J%, ...,J^,T{, ...,Frk,V°,Vr} where the events 
T° and T\,i = k correspond to the occurrence and removal of a fault in the z-th 
component, respectively and the event T>° corresponds to the occurrence of an large 
disturbance in one of the u>j, j €E P channels and Vr corresponds to the removal of 
disturbance from all the channels. The output set is Y = {(R\, •••, R^,, R\, •••, R\) £ 
BK} where B = {0,1} and K can be either 2£ + 1 or 3£ depending on the property 
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Fault state 1 
Fault state k 
Multiple faults state (1,2) 
Multiple faults state (k-l,k) 
Disturbance state 
Fault/Disturbance state 1 
Fault/Disturbance state k 
Description 
No fault and no large disturbance input 
Fault in the first actuator 
Fault in the fc-th actuator 
Faults in the first and second actuators 
Faults in the (k — 1) and k-th actuators 
Occurrence of large disturbance input 
Fault in the first actuator and 
large disturbance inputs 
Fault in the £;-th actuator and 
large disturbance inputs 
of Aj's. Based on the above definitions, the transition function 8 is now defined 
formally as follows 
6(so, T>°) = sD, 8(sD, Vr) = s0, 5(sD, F°) = si>D, i e k 
5(so, T°) = sh S(si, V°) = si<D, S(su T[) = s0, i e k 
8(si,T°) = Sij,8(sij,Fl) = Sj,S(sitj,^) = su i,j £k,i^ j 
8(si,D,F[) = sD, 8(si:D,Vr) = sh i e k 
As an illustration, Figure 4.2 shows the corresponding transition function of the 
nonlinear system that was considered in Example 4.1. It should be noted that 
since for this system the detectability index is fj, = 1, multiple fault states are not 
applicable. As shown in Figure 4.2, the DES model of the combined nonlinear system 
and the bank of residual generators in Example 4.1 has eight states, namely the 
normal operational state so, three faulty states Si,i = 1, 2,3, three concurrent fault 
and large disturbance states sitD, i = 1, 2, 3, and the large disturbance input sD. The 
event set and the output set for this system are £ = {J7", F%, T^, T\, T^, J-%, T>°, Vr} 
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Figure 4.2: The transition function corresponding to Example 1. 
The output map A depends on the severity of a fault and the threshold values 
for the residual signals. As mentioned in the previous section, threshold values for 
the residual signals r; G 9^ 2 a r e usually lower than those of r\ € 9\\. Therefore, there 
could be a low severity fault scenario where the residual logic unit R^+i becomes 
one while Rj is zero. In defining the output map A, such scenarios are also incor-
porated. Table 4.2 shows the corresponding output map A where S2 = {1,...,2£}. 
For instance, the outputs of the system which are one at state si are a nonempty 
subset of the set Ai since some residual signals in fif may not exceed their thresh-
old values. Thus, some states may have different outputs that would depend on 
the severity of the fault and disturbances. Moreover, non-detectable fault scenarios 
(refer to Definition 4.1) are not observable from residual logic units, and therefore 
they cannot be detected and isolated. These types of faults are not considered in A. 
In other words, no event is assigned to such faults. 
The purpose of the DES diagnoser is to use the output sequence of the system 
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Output map A 
(0.....0) 
{(Rl:...,Rf) G Y\3l G P,Vj e tf,R) = 1} 
{(R\,...,B$) G Y\3(3 G {1,2}, j G H2,i2? G A,. R» = 1} 
{( i?{, . . . ,^)Gy|3^G{l,2}, jGE 2 , 
3i2f eA,U Aj. R(- = 1} 
{(R\,...,RI) G y|3/? G {1,2},j G H 2 , ^ € A,. R% = 1} 
U{(i?},...,it:2) G Y\3l G P,Vj G nf,i?) = 1} 
(residual logic units) as inputs and to generate an estimate of the state of the 
system. In this work, a DES diagnoser is modeled as a finite state automaton 
H = {SH,IH,SH,ZO,YH, A//) where Sn, Ifj, YH denote the finite state, input and 
output sets; z0 is the initial state of the diagnoser, 5H '• SH X IH —+ SH denotes the 
transition function and A# is the output map. In order to eliminate any possible 
ambiguity in the DES model (G) output, two additional states with respect to the 
state set of G are considered for H, namely SH = {S,Sf, SF,D}, where s? corresponds 
to the faulty state where one cannot isolate the faulty channel and SF,D corresponds 
to the concurrent occurrence of a fault and a large disturbance in the system when 
a fault may not be isolated. The input set for the diagnoser is an output set of G 
(set Y). The output set is the same as the state set of the diagnoser (Y# = SH) and 
the output map XH '• SH —> YH is an identity map. 
The main step that is left is the design of a transition map SH- First, we 
consider the case when the system is in a normal operational mode s0 and try to 
find the transition function corresponding to this mode. Based on Assumption 4.2, 
three transitions are possible in the normal operation, namely transition to the state 
Si which corresponds to the occurrence of a fault in the i-th actuator (event T°), 
transition to the state sp which corresponds to the occurrence of a large disturbance 
in one of the input disturbance channels (event V°), and finally the transition to 
the fault mode sp which corresponds to the occurrence of a low severity fault in one 
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of the actuators that may not be isolable. According to Lemma 4.1, the effects of 
a fault and a disturbance can be distinguished easily by the fault diagnoser using 
the coding sets Jlf and f^ , and therefore the sets Q.[ and £1? can be used for the 
transition to states s, and sp, respectively. 
The only remaining case of interest is when the occurrence of a low severity 
fault (refer to Definition 4.1) in the 2-th actuator will lead to changes in only H^+i. 
In this case, according to Lemma 4.2, the diagnoser can detect the occurrence of 
a fault in the system since Yj 7^  Q?. However, we may have Tf = TJ for some 
i, j G k, and therefore the fault cannot be isolated. In this case, the state of the 
fault diagnoser will change to sp. Table 4.3 summarizes the transition function that 
is initiated from the state so where all the unspecified residual logic units are zero. 
The next step is now to consider scenarios when initially a large disturbance 
is applied to the system followed by a fault that is concurrently present in one of 
the system actuators. Therefore, it is assumed that the system has a transition 
from the normal operation state s0 to the disturbance state sp where we define a 
set V = {1 < i < £\R} = 1}. In this state, the second threshold logic units R\ 
are used for all the residuals r^i G V. The transition function for the state sp 
is given in Table 4.4. It is assumed that the effects of the fault is not nullified by 
a large disturbance input, which is quite a reasonable consideration for practically 
most situations. 
Now let us consider a scenario where a fault is detected in the z-th actuator and 
the state of the fault diagnoser is S;. Generally, we should investigate three possible 
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cases, namely 1) the removal of a detected fault, 2) the occurrence of a second fault 
in the j - th actuator, and 3) the occurrence of a disturbance in u>i,l G P . Actually, 
the main challenge here is to distinguish between cases 2 and 3, since the removal of 
a fault can be easily detected when all the threshold logic units become zero. The 
necessary condition for distinguishing between cases 2 and 3 is governed by 
n{ u nj ± Q{ U ft?, i , j e k , ; i e P (4.19) 
The next lemma provides the sufficient condition for satisfying the condition (4.19). 
Lemma 4.3. If the number of residuals ^ G 9ti that are affected by each disturbance 
input is more than |fij U ft,-| = £ — C(k — 2,k — ji), i.e. |Qf D Ei| > £ — C(k — 2, fc — 
//), V/ G P, then the condition (4.19) is satisfied for all the disturbance inputs I G P 
as well as fault modes mi,mj,i ^ j . 
Proof: If |Of D Hi | > £ — C[k — 2,k — fi), then for any two fault modes 
mi,mj,i,j 6 k , i ^ j , there exists at least one residual ra G D^ i such that ra G ftf 
and ra $. QJ u fij, and therefore it follows that Q{ U Qj ^ ftf U Of. • 
It can be easily verified that the system in Remark 4.2 where A, = A,i 6 k 
satisfies the above sufficient, condition if/f > 1 since |ftf Pl!Ei| = £ and \Q{ Uftj| < £. 
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Remark 4.4. In a situation where Vt\ U ilj C Of U fif one cou/d potentially have 
a false alarm associated with the second fault while a large disturbance input is 
present. To remedy this problem, the DES diagnoser will declare the detection of 
the second fault after a specific waiting-time interval TQ, if all the residual threshold 
logics specified by Vt{ U fij are at 1 while the remaining residual threshold logic units 
specified by {fif USlj} — {Clj UOf} remain at zero. Table 4-5 illustrates the transition 
function for the state associated with Si, i G k. 
Table 4.6 shows the remaining transitions that should be considered for the 
DES diagnoser. By specifying these transitions, the design of our proposed hybrid 
DES diagnoser is completed. 
Example 4-1 (Cont.) According to the coding sets that were obtained for 
the nonlinear system in Example 4.1, the DES diagnoser can be designed as follows: 
the state set is specified by SH = {so, Si, S2, s3, sp, sF , SI.D, «2,D, <S3,D}, the input set 
is defined by IH = {R\, R\, R\, R\, R\, R%, R%\ and the transition map XH is given in 
Table 4.7. Therefore, the design of our proposed hybrid diagnoser for the nonlinear 
system in Example 4.1 is completed. 
In the next two sections, our proposed FDI algorithm will be applied to the 
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actuator FDI problem in a network of unmanned vehicles (linear system) and the 
ATLAV system (nonlinear system). 
4.3 Actuator Fault Detection and Isolation in a 
Network of Unmanned Vehicles 
In this section, our hybrid FDI method is applied to the actuator fault detection 
and isolation (FDI) problem for a network of N vehicles whose (identical) linear 
dynamics are governed by 
a P 
Xi{t) = Axi(t) + Bin(t) + J2 Lkmik(i) + J^ p^ij(t) (4.20) 
k=\ j=\ 
where the fault signature Lk represents a fault in the A>th actuator of the vehicle, i.e, 
I/fc is the A;-th column of B. It is assumed that matrix B is full rank (Rank(5)=a). It 
should be noted that in comparison with the vehicle dynamics considered in Section 
3.3, additional disturbance terms are added to the vehicle dynamics. Similar relative 
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state measurements are considered for each vehicle as 
zlJ{t) = C{xl(t)-x3{t)) jeN{ (4.21) 
where the set Nj c [1, N]\i represents the set of vehicles that vehicle i can sense and 
is designated as the neighboring set of the vehicle i, and ztj € Zi: j e N, represents 
the state measurement relative to the other vehicles. It is assumed that the pair 
(A C) is observable. 
Assumption 4.4. It is assumed that the family of fault signature Li's are strongly 
detectable when each vehicle has an absolute state measurement yi = Cx^. 
In this section only semi-decentralized FDI architecture (Section 3.3.2) is in-
vestigated and hence it is assumed that local communication links exist between 
each vehicle and its neighbors and the control signals Ui are communicated among 
them. 
Let Ni = {M2,- , i |N 4 |} - We have z^t) = [zjh(t),zji2(t),-• • ,4|N.|(*)]T> a n d 
equation (3.2) can be rewritten as Zi(t) = Cix(t) where x(t) — [xj(i), • • • ,xJf(t)]T. 
Since the output measurement Zi depends on the state of the neighboring vehicles, 
the following nodal model should be considered for the z-th vehicle for designing a 
FDI filter, namely 
|Ni|+l
 a INil+1 p 
k=l j=l fc=l j = l 
Zl(t) = CmxNi(t) (4.22) 
where x^(t) = [xj(t),xl(t), • • • , xj^t)], < = [uJ(t),uT(t), • • • ^(t)], Lkj 
is the (k-l)xa + j column of 5"N'"+1, zj{t) = [z]h{t),zl2{t),- • • ,4|Nil(*)]> It 
should be noted that Z^-'s represents the fault signatures of the i-th vehicle in the 
nodal system (4.22). It is clear that the entire state x^t is not fully observable from 
the relative state measurements Zi, and the states of the centroid of vehicle i and 
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its neighbors cannot be determined from Zi. Since the pair (j4jNil+1, C|N,|) is not 
observable, one can first try to obtain the observable part of system (4.22) as 
|Ni|+l a |Ni|+l a 
±°i(t) = A^x°i(t)+B°iluNt(t)+ E E z S m ^ ) + E E ^ w 
fc=l j=\ fc=l j ' = l 
zi{t) = C»*x%itt) (4.23) 
where s ° (*) = [xf(t) - < ( * ) , xf(t) - *£(*), • • • , xf(t) - x^(t)f and L% and i>g 
are the (k — 1) x a + j column of BQ , and ^ ^ , 1 ' respectively where B^A anc^ -^ Nil 
are defined based on (3.5). 
As discussed in Section 3.3.2, the family of a x (|Nj| + 1) fault signatures 
Zjy, k = 1,..., |Nj| + 1, j = 1,..., a satisfies the conditions of Theorem 3.6 with the 
detectability index of ji = |Nj| — 1. Based on Assumption 4.4, the SFDIP problem 
has a solution for coding scheme 2 and one needs to generate C(ax (|Nj| + l) , |N;| — 1) 
residuals for detecting and isolating |Nj| — 1 multiple faults. 
As pointed out in Remark 4.1, considering the disturbance inputs as faults in 
the system limits the number of fault that can be detected and isolated, i.e. , it will 
decrease the detectability index of fault signatures. However, by using our proposed 
FDI algorithm, one can keep the detectability index of fault signatures as high as 
possible. 
4.3.1 Simulation Results 
In this section, our proposed hybrid FDI strategy is applied to a network of four 
unmanned vehicles, whose dynamics are assumed to be governed by double integra-
tors in a plane and each vehicle can measure its relative position with respect to its 
neighboring vehicles. Hence, each vehicle is modeled as in equation (4.20) with the 
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following matrices: 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 











with d = 1. The neighbor sets for this network are given by Ni = {2}, N2 = {1, 3}, 
N3 = {4} and N4 = {1}. Here, we only consider actuator FDI problem for vehicle 
2. According to the results in Section 3.3.2, the detectability index for the family of 
actuator fault signatures in the nodal model of vehicle 2 is 1, i.e. fi = 1. Therefore, 
£ = C(6,1) = 6 residual signals T\,...,TQ are needed for the fault detection and 
isolation. The corresponding coding sets are as follows fin = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, O21 = 
{1,3,4,5,6}, fi31 = {1,2,4,5,6}, Ql2 = {1,2,3,5,6}, ft22 = {1,2,3,4,6}, and 
^32 = {I; 2, 3,4, 5}, where fiy corresponds to the fault signature L®. The next step 
is to find the sets Aj's for each residuals. According to (4.3), these sets are as follows 
Aj = { l , 2 , 3 } , i = l , . . . , 6 which implies that all residuals are affected by disturbance 
inputs u>\\,u)2\ and o;3i. It should be noted that the disturbance input un does 
not affect the nodal model of vehicle 2 since the vehicle 4 is not a neighbor of the 
vehicle 2. According to Remark 4.2, one extra residual is sufficient for design of 
the DES diagnoser. The residual signal r-j should be affected by all the faults and 
decoupled from all the disturbance inputs. It can be verified that the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of Theorem 4.1 for generating the residual signal r-j are satisfied. 
Hence, the coding sets fq's and J^'s are as follows: ilu = {2,3,4,5,6,7}, f^i = 
{1,3,4,5,6,7}, Qf31 = {1,2,4,5,6,7}, fi{2 = {1,2,3,5,6,7}, i\{2 = {1,2,3,4,6,7}, 
and tt32 = {1> 2, 3,4, 5, 7} and fl^ = {1, 2, 3,4, 5, 6}, j — 1, 2, 3 where f^ correspond 
to disturbance input ujj\. 
The evaluation functions are selected as Jri(t) = j t T rf(t)ri(t)dt,i = 1, ...,7 
where To = 5 seconds is the length of the evaluation window. By considering the 
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worst case scenario of residuals corresponding to the healthy mode of the network 
subject to the measurement noise with uniform distribution ± 0.005 and tolerable 
input disturbances (w e 3 i ) as a band-limited white noise with power of 0.01, the 
threshold values are J\hi = 0.3, Jfh. = 1.2, i = 1,...,6 and J\hl = 0.005. It should 
be pointed out that since the residual signal r7 is decoupled from the disturbance 
inputs, one can select a lower threshold value for it. 
The next step is to design a DES fault diagnoser H. The state set is defined 
as SH = {s\,..., S6, SI^D, ..., SG}D, SF, $F,D} where cardinality of S is 14. Since the 
detectability index of actuator fault signatures of vehicle 2 is 1, concurrent faults 
in two actuators cannot be isolated. Therefore, the states that correspond to con-
current faults in two components are not applicable. Therefore, the only cases that 
should be considered for the DES diagnoser when it is in the state Si,i = 1, ...,6 
is removal of the fault from the i-th component. The input set of the diagnoser is 
/ = {{R\,..-, R), Rj, •••R-l) e B13} and the output set is equal to SH- The transition 
function A# can be found by following the results in Section 4.2.3. 
Figure 4.3 shows the residual evaluation functions corresponding to a perma-
nent lock in place fault in the first actuator of vehicle 2 at t = 30 seconds. A 
concurrent large disturbance (u>2 G £2) represented by a rectangular pulse of a con-
stant amplitude 0.5 between t = 20 and t = 40 seconds is also applied to the vehicle 
2 in this simulation. Figure 4.4 depicts the state of the DES fault diagnoser. As 
shown in this figure, the diagnoser state first changes to sp at t = 23.6 seconds 
after the occurrence of the large disturbance with no false alarm generated. Later 
on when a fault in the first actuator of the vehicle 2 is injected, the diagnoser state 
switches to si.£> at t = 33.72 seconds. Consequently, we can conclude that the 
diagnoser can perfectly detect and isolate the fault despite the presence of a large 
concurrent disturbance. Finally, after the disturbance is removed at t — 40 seconds, 
the diagnoser switches to the state Si at t = 48 seconds. It should be emphasized 
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that if one only uses the first 6 residuals r^, ...,r6 with threshold values Jfh. = 1.2, 
although no false alarm will be generated due to the large disturbance but the ac-
tual fault at t = 30 cannot be detected and isolated after t = 45 seconds (false 
negative). However, by using our proposed hybrid FDI methodology, we are able to 
distinguish the occurrence of a fault as well as large disturbance by designing only 
one additional residual signal. 
Figure 4.5 depicts the residual evaluation functions associated with a per-
manent 50% loss of effectiveness (LOE) in the second actuator of the vehicle 2 at 
t = 40 seconds, and Figure 4.6 shows the corresponding hybrid fault diagnoser state. 
A large disturbance that is represented by a rectangular pulse of constant amplitude 
0.5 (N) is also injected between t = 20 and t = 30 seconds in the simulations. As 
seen from Figure 4.6, the diagnoser first detects the occurrence of a large distur-
bance between t = 23.6 and t = 34 seconds and no false alarm is generated due to 
the presence of this disturbance input. Moreover, in this fault scenario, the residual 
evaluation functions Jn,i — 1,...,6 do not exceed their threshold Jt^ whereas the 
residual evaluation function JTl does exceed its threshold Jth7. Therefore, in this 
scenario the fault diagnoser can only detect the occurrence of the fault but cannot 
isolate it. 
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Figure 4.3: Residual evaluation functions corresponding to a fault in the first actu-
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Figure 4.4: Fault diagnoser state corresponding to fault in the first actuator of the 
vehicle 2. 
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Figure 4.5: Residual evaluation functions corresponding to a 50% loss of effectiveness 
fault in the second actuator of the vehicle 2. 
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Figure 4.6: Fault diagnoser state corresponding to a 50 % loss of effectiveness fault 
in the second actuator of the vehicle 2. 
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4.4 Hybrid FDI Design for the ALTAV System 
Example 4.1 and a network of unmanned vehicles worked out in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 
belonged to a class of systems with not strongly detectable family of fault signatures. 
In this section, we consider the application of our proposed FDI methodology to an 
ALTAV system where the actuator fault signatures are strongly detectable. 
4.4.1 ALTAV System 
The ALTAV system considered in this section is a six degrees of freedom unmanned 
aerial vehicle as shown in Figure 4.7. The states/variables describing the motion of 
the system are x, y, z, 0,7 and 0. These states correspond to the translation in the 
x, y and z directions and rotations about the 2, y and x axes (heading, pitch and 
roll angles) in the local horizontal/local vertical frame, respectively. It is assumed 
that these states and their first order derivatives are available for measurement. It 
should be pointed out that the system uses a "right handed" coordinate system with 
the positive z direction as down. The dynamics of the ALTAV system is governed 
by the following equations [169]: 
4 
Mx = ^  Fisin(j) - Cxx + Wx 
i = l 
4 
My = J2 FiSin{4>) - Cyy + Wy 
1=1 
4 
Mz = - ] P FiCos(-y)cos((f)) - FB + Mg - Czz 
J0§ = (Ftl - F2l + F3l - F4l)sin(p) - Ce6 
J77 = (FjZ - F3l) - FBLBsin(7) - C T 7 
J^ = -(F2l - F4l) - FBLBsin{$) - C^ (4.24). 
where the physical significance and definition of the states and parameters are pro-
vided in Table 4.8. 
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Moment of Inertia, kg TO2 
Translation in x direction, m 
Translation in y direction, m 
Translation in z direction, m 
Drag coefficient 
Perpendicular distance between the 








Heading angle, Radian 
Pitch angle, Radian 
Roll angle, Radian 
Wind disturbance, N 
Buoyant force, N 
Force of propeller, N 
Angular offset from vertical 
of the motor thrust vectors 
Figure 4.7: Schematic of an Almost-Lighter-Than-Air-Vehicle (ALTAV) [2]. 
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The ALTAV system has four input forces Fi:i — 1, ...,4 that are produced by 
propellers which are controlled through four vectoring brushless DC motors subject 
to the constraints 0 < Ft < F™ax. 
4.4.2 Design of a Hybrid FDI Scheme for the ALTAV Sys-
tem 
In this section, a bank of residual generators is first designed for the four input 
channels of the ALTAV system. The state space representation of the ALTAV system 
is rewritten as follows: 
4 3 
X = f(X) + Y,9i(X)Fi + J2^X)^ 
»=I j=i (4.25) 
Y = X + v 
where F\,..., F4 are the input force control channels, XT = [x, y, z, x, y, z, 9,7, 0, 6, 
7,0], u\ and u>2 represent the wind disturbances in the x and the y directions, 
respectively, u3 represents a change in the buoyant force FB, V is the measurement 
noise and 
Pi(X) = O O O ^ O O O O O O O O J (4.26) 
M x ) = O O O O ^ O O O O O O O ] (4.27) 
r i T 
&{X)= 0 0 0 0 0 ^ 0 0 0 0 - L B T ( X S ) -LB^,"(X9) (4.28) 
where we denote X = { X * } ^ and Y = {^}Ei-
First, we need to generate residual signals r*, i = 1,..., 4 such that each residual 
signal Ti is only affected by Fj and is decoupled from all other faults Fj,j ^ i. To-
wards this end, the largest observability codistributions II* = o.c.a^C^T*')1) should 
be found where d = span{g2(X),g3(X),g4(X)}, C2 = span{g1(X),g3(X),g4(X)}, 
£3 = span{g1(X),g2(X),g4(X)}, and £4 = span{g1{X),g2(X),g3(X)} such that 
span{9l(X)} £ ( n * ) \ i = 1,..., 4 (4.29) 
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Condition (4.29) is the necessary condition for decoupling faults in a nonlinear sys-
tem. For the ALTAV system since full state measurements Xi,i = 1,..., 12 are 
assumed to be available, we have n* = Cf. 
According to the above observability codistribution, the following set of states 
can be found such that Zi,i = 1, ...,4 is affected by F, and is decoupled from the 
other input channels Fj,j ^ i, namely 
Z\ = 2J1sin(p)sin(X8)Xn + Jesin(Xg)Xio + lMsin{p)X4 
z2 = —2Jrf>sin(p)sin(Xg)Xi2 — Josin(X8)Xio + lMsin(p)X4 
z3 = — 2J1sin(p)sin(X8)Xn + J0sin(X8)Xw + lMsin(p)X4 
z4 = 2Jc/>sin(p)sin(X8)Xi2 — Josin(X8)Xio + lMsin(p)X4 
The state space representation of the ALTAV system corresponding to the 
above states is now expressed as follows: 
Z\ = —2C1sin(p)sin(X8)Xn — 2FBLBsin(p)sin2(X8) + 2J1cos(X8)sin(p)X21 
— CeXwsin(X8) + J0XIQXUCOS(X8) — CxX4lsin(p) + Alsin(p)sin(X8)Fx 
+ lsin{p)u\ — 2LBsin(p)sin2 (X8)u>3 
z2 = 2C(f)sin(p)sin(X8)X12 + 2FBLBsin(p)sin(X8)sin(X9) 
— 2J4>cos(X8)sin(p)XnXi2 + CnX1Qsin(Xs) - J0X10Xncos(X8) - CxX4lsin{p) 
+ 4lsin(p)sin(X8)F2 + lsin(p)uj\ + 2LBsin(p)sin(X8)sin(Xg)tU3 
z3 — 2C1sin(p)sin(X8)Xu + 2FBLBsin(p)sin2(X8) — 2J1cos(X8)sin(p)X21 
— CoXwsin(X8) + J0X10XnCos(X8) — CxX4lsin(p) + 4lsin(p)sin(X8)F3 
+ lsin(p)u!-[ + 2LBsin(p)sin2 (X8)u3 
z4 = —2C<psin(p)sin(X8)Xi2 — 2FBLBsin(p)sin(X8)sin(X9) 
+ 2J4>cos(X8)sin{p)XllXn + CnX-iosin(X8) - J0X10Xucos(X8) - CxX4lsin{p) 
+ 4lsin(p)sin(X8)F4 + lsin(p)uji — 2LBsin{p)sin{X8)sin{X9)uz 
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From the above equations, we have A* = {pi,P3},i = 1, ...,4 and according to 
Remark 4.2, one needs only to generate one extra residual signal that is decoupled 
from LO\ and U3. Towards this end, the largest observability codistribution Ilg = 
o.c.a.((^<:5)-L) should be found where £5 = {pi,j»3} such that 
span{9l{X)} £ ( n ; ) 1 , i = l, . . , 4 
For the ALTAV model, we have 
W = Ci 
Based on II5 the following set of states can be found that are decoupled from p\ and 
Pz and are affected by all control inputs Fj's, namely 
Z5 = -^10 
z$ = X5 
However, only one of the above states is sufficient and in order to satisfy Assumption 
4.3, we can only select z5 for this purpose, since fif = {r6} where r6 corresponds 
to the residual signal that is generated by the observer of state z%. The state space 
representation and the governing equation corresponding to Z5 is given by: 
.s= a _w»w ( i , i_F i + Fj_Fi) 
Jo Jo 
In the next step, detection filters or nonlinear observers are designed for the 
complete set of the five states z\ to z5. Given our original assumption regarding the 
availability of all the ALTAV states, the following observers are now constructed. 
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!i = -2C1sin{p)sin{Y8)Yll - 2FBLBsin{p)sin2(Y8) + 2J1cos{Y8)sin(p)Y2l 
— C0Y10sin(Yg) + J0Yi0Yncos(Ys) — CxY4lsin(p) + Alsin{p)sin(Y8)F1 + k^{zi - i i) 
z2 = 2C(psin(p)sin(Y8)Y12 + 2FBLBsin(p)sin(Y8)sin(Y9) - 2J4>cos{Y8)sin{p)Y1{Y12 
+ C0Ywsin{Y8) - J„Y10Yncos(Y8) - CxY4lsin(p) 
+ 4lsin(p)sin(Y8)F2 + k2(z2 - z2) 
i 3 = 2C1sin(p)sin(Y8)Yn + 2FBLBsin(p)sin2(Y8)] - 2J77cos(Y8)sm(p)Y121 
— C0Ywsin(Y8) + J0Y10YnCos(Y8) - CxY4lsin(p) 
+ 4lsin(p)sin(Y8)F3 + k3(z3 - z3) 
z4 = —2C(j)sin(p)sin(Y8)YV2 — 2FBLBsin(p)sin(Y8)sin(Yg) 
+ 2J^cos(Y8)sin(p)YuY12 + CeYwsin(Y8) - J0Y10Yncos(Y8) 
— CxY4lsin(p) + 4lsin(p)sin(Y8)F4 + k4(z4 — z4) 
k = ~ h - l^El{F1 -F2 + F3- F4) + h(z5 - iB) 
where ki > 0,i = 1,...,5 are the observer gains that can be selected to achieve 
a tradeoff between ensuring higher robustness to uncertainties and disturbances 
versus higher sensitivity to faults. By utilizing the above observers, the residual 
signals ri(t) = Zi(t) — Zi(t),i = 1,...,5 can now be produced. The coding sets for 
the fault channels Fi,...,F4 and the disturbance inputs u>i and u>3 are as follows: 
ft{ = {1,5}, n{ = {2,5}, nf3 = {3,5}, 0{ = {4,5} and ft? = ttp3 = {1,2,3,4}. 
Moreover, it is clear that the sufficient condition in Lemma 4.3 is also satisfied for 
the ALTAV system. 
Once the residual signals r,(t), i = 1,..., 5 are constructed, the next step is to 
determine the threshold Jthi and the evaluation function Jri{t). In this paper, the 
following evaluation functions are selected 
Jri{t)= I rj (t)ri(t)dt, i = l,...,5 (4.30) 
Jt-To 
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where T0 is the length of the evaluation window. The main advantage of these 
evaluation functions is that one can detect intermittent faults easily. The threshold 
values and the corresponding residual logic units Rj,i = 1, ...,5 and R\,i = 1, ...,4 
are selected according to equations (4.12), (4.14), (4.15) and (4.17), respectively. 
Remark 4.5. The evaluation function Jri(t) = Ti(t) is not applicable to the ALTAV 
system since oscillations are present in the residual signals r^i = 1, ...,4 when si-
multaneously there is a fault in one of the input channels Fi and the state 7 happens 
to be also varying about zero. Under these circumstances the corresponding residual 
signals will also behave similar to that of 7. Refer to Figure ^ . i i depicted in the 
next section for further clarification. 
The next step is to design a DES fault diagnoser H. According to Table 4.1, 
the state set is defined as SH = {SQ, •••, S4, Si,2, ••-, s3i4, si.p,..., 54,0, sp, «F,D} where 
cardinality of S is 23. The input set of the diagnoser is / = {R\,..., R\, R\, ...-Rf} 
and the output set is equal to SH- The transition function A# can be found following 
the results in Section 4.4.2, which is shown in Table 4.9. 
4.4.3 Simulation Results 
In this section, simulation results of our proposed hybrid scheme that is applied to 
the nonlinear ALTAV system are presented. Various actuator faults are considered in 
the four input channels of the ALTAV system. Figure 4.8 shows the desired reference 
trajectory and the actual ALTAV trajectory in the normal or healthy operation of 
the system. In this surveillance-type maneuvering mission, the ALTAV initiates its 
motion from the coordinate (0,0,10) (m), follows a rectangular path in the x-y plane, 
and then changes its altitude to 20 (m) and follows the same pattern in this altitude. 
Tables 4.10 and 4.11 show the characteristics of the output measurement noise and 
tolerable disturbance inputs £>i that are considered in the simulation results below, 
respectively. Since large changes in the buoyant force FB do not produce any changes 
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R^ ... R5 R-^ ••• R4 
R\ARl = l 
RlARl = l 
RlARl = i 
R\ARl = l 
R}ARlARlAR\ = i 
Rl = l 
all zero 
R\ARlARl = i 
R\ARlARl = i 
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all zero 
R\AR\ARl = i 
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all zero 
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Figure 4.8: The reference trajectory (dashed line) and the ALTAV trajectory (solid 
line) corresponding to a healthy operation. 
in the residuals, only the wind disturbance in the x-direction needs to be considered 
for simulations (the wind disturbance in the y-direction is unobservable from the 
residual signals), i.e. 
£>2 = {Wx\0.5 < Wx < 5(Newton)} 
By considering the worst case scenario of residuals corresponding to the healthy 
mode of the ALTAV system subject to the measurement noise and tolerable input 
disturbances £>i (refer to Table 4.11), the threshold values of J}h. = 6e — 4, Jfh. = 
4.5e —3, % = 1,..., 4 and J\h = 3e —5 and the evaluation window T0 = 5 seconds and 
T0 = 10 seconds were selected for the residual signals r1( ...,r4 and r5, respectively. 
It should be pointed out that since the residual signal r§ is decoupled from all the 
disturbance inputs, one can select a lower threshold value for it. 
Figure 4.9 shows the residual evaluation functions corresponding to a perma-
nent float fault in the input channel F\ at t = 100 seconds. A concurrent wind 
disturbance gust represented by a rectangular pulse of a constant amplitude 3 (N) 
in the ^-direction between t = 80 and t = 120 seconds is also applied to the ALTAV 
system in this simulation. Figure 4.10 depicts the state of the DES fault diagnoser. 
As shown in this figure, the diagnoser state first changes to SD at t = 83 seconds 
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Uniform random variable ± 1 degree 
Uniform random variable ± 1 degree 
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Uniform random variable ± 0 . 5 degree/s 
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Uniform random variable ± 0.5 degree/s 





Uniform random variable ± 0.5 Newton 
Uniform random variable ± 0 . 5 Newton 
Uniform random variable ± 2 Newton 
after the occurrence of the large wind disturbance in the x-direction with no false 
alarm generated. Later when a fault in the input channel F\ is injected, the diag-
noser state first switches to SF,D at £ = 101.3 seconds and then after about 2 seconds 
it switches to state s^^ at t = 103 seconds. Consequently, we can conclude that 
the diagnoser can perfectly detect and isolate the fault despite the presence of a 
large concurrent disturbance. Finally, after the disturbance is removed at t = 120 
seconds, the diagnoser switches to the state S\. It should be emphasized that if one 
only uses the first 4 residuals r l5..., r4, not only a false alarm will be generated due 
to the wind disturbance but also the actual fault at t = 100 cannot be detected 
and isolated. However, by using our proposed hybrid FDI methodology, we are able 
to distinguish the occurrence of a fault as well as large wind disturbance in the 
x-direction (UJI G ^2) by designing only one additional residual signal. 
Figure 4.11 shows the residual signals corresponding to the above fault sce-
nario. According to the points raised in Remark 4.5, it is now evident from Figure 
4.11 why one cannot directly evaluate the residual signals using their thresholds, i.e. 
JTi = Ti since due to the dynamics of the ALTAV system after the occurrence of the 
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Figure 4.9: Residual evaluation functions corresponding to a float fault in the jFi 
actuator (the dashed dots correspond to the threshold values J\h. = 6e—4, i = 1,..., 4 
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Figure 4.11: Residuals corresponding to a float fault in the F\ actuator. 
Figure 4.12 depicts the residual evaluation functions associated with a per-
manent hard over fault (HOF) in the input channel F2 that is applied at t = 100 
seconds, and Figure 4.13 shows the corresponding fault diagnoser state. A wind 
disturbance gust that is represented by a rectangular pulse of constant amplitude 3 
(N) in the x-direction is also injected between t = 50 and t = 80 seconds in the sim-
ulations. As seen from Figure 4.13, the diagnoser first detects the fault at t = 100.2 
seconds and also isolates the fault at t — 107.5 seconds. Moreover, no false alarm is 
generated due to the presence of the disturbance input. As shown in Figure 4.12, 
the residual evaluation function Jr2 does not exceed the second threshold values Jfh.. 
Consequently, if one only uses a conventional FDI method and chooses the threshold 
values by considering the entire disturbance set, i.e. 2) 2, then the hard over fault 
cannot be detected and isolated. However, by using our proposed approach, this 
fault can easily be detected and then isolated despite the presence of large wind 
disturbance. 
Figures 4.14 and 4.15 depict the residual evaluation functions and the fault 
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Figure 4.12: Residual evaluation functions corresponding to a hard over fault in 
the F2 actuator (the dashed dots correspond to the threshold values J]h = 6e — 
4,i = 1, ...,4 and J}h = 3e — 5, the dashed lines correspond to the threshold value 
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Figure 4.13: Fault diagnoser state corresponding to a hard over fault in the F2 
actuator. 
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Figure 4.14: Residual evaluation functions corresponding to a 50% loss of effec-
tiveness in the F 3 actuator (the dashed dots correspond to the threshold values 
J}h. = 6e — 4,i = 1,...,4 and J}h = 3e — 5, the dashed lines correspond to the 
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Figure 4.15: Fault diagnoser state corresponding to a 50% loss of effectiveness in 
the F3 actuator. 
122 
diagnoser state, respectively, corresponding to a permanent 50% loss of effectiveness 
(LOE) fault in the input channel F 3 injected at t = 100 seconds and a wind gust 
disturbance that is represented by a rectangular pulse of constant amplitude 3 (N) 
in the ^-direction between t = 130 and t = 160 seconds. As seen from the above 
figures the residual evaluation function Jr3 does not exceed its threshold whereas 
the residual evaluation function JTh does exceed its threshold. In this scenario the 
fault diagnoser can only detect the occurrence of the fault but cannot isolate it. 
Moreover, the occurrence of a concurrent large disturbance does not cause any false 
alarms in any of the input channels. This scenario also illustrates another advantage 
of introducing our set of complementary residuals (the residual r5 in the case of the 
ATLAV system), since by incorporating this set of residuals one can also detect the 
occurrence of a low severity fault. 
The last scenario we consider corresponds to presence of multiple faults in 
the ALTAV actuators. For the generated residual signals, we have flj U fij C 
nf U fif. Therefore, according to Remark 4.4, a waiting time interval of T$ = 1 
second is considered for detecting the second fault. Figures 4.16 and 4.17 show the 
corresponding residual evaluation functions and the fault diagnoser, respectively, to 
an intermittent float fault in the input channel F\ that is applied between t = 100 
and t = 150 seconds, a permanent 50% loss of effectiveness fault in the input channel 
F 4 that is applied at t = 120 seconds and a wind gust disturbance that is represented 
by a rectangular pulse of constant amplitude 3 (N) that is injected in the ^-direction 
between t = 50 and t = 80 seconds. According to these figures one does clearly detect 
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Figure 4.16: Residual evaluation functions corresponding to multiple faults in the 
Fi and F4 actuators (the dashed dot corresponds to the threshold values J\h = 
6e — 4, i = 1, ...,4 and J^ = 3e — 5, the dashed lines correspond to the threshold 
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A novel hybrid fault detection and isolation scheme is proposed for both linear and 
nonlinear systems subject to large disturbances. The proposed scheme consists of 
two modules, namely, a bank of residual generators and a discrete-event system 
(DES)-based fault diagnoser. A DES diagnoser is developed which uses the residual 
signals and their temporal behavior to robustly detect and isolate the faulty chan-
nels. Our proposed hybrid FDI methodology is applied to the problem of actuators 
fault detection and isolation for an ALTAV system and a network of unmanned 
vehicles. Simulation results clearly illustrate and demonstrate the effectiveness and 
advantages of our proposed approach. 
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Chapter 5 
Compensating for Communication 
Channels Effects in Fault 
Detection and Isolation 
This chapter deals with the problem of fault detection and isolation in a network 
of unmanned vehicles when there exist imperfect communication channels among 
the vehicles. A discrete-time communication link with stochastic packet dropping 
effect is considered based on Gilbert-Elliott model [170,171] which is known as 
packet erasure channel model and the entire network is modeled as a discrete-time 
Markovian Jump System (MJS). The above problem can be treated in the general 
framework of Markovian jump systems. This motivates us to develop a geometric 
FDI framework for both continuous-time and discrete-time Markovian jump systems 
and apply the developed algorithm to FDI of a network of unmanned vehicles in the 
presence of imperfect communication channels. The work presented in this chapter 
has partly appeared in [172]. 
This chapter is organized as follows. After a summary of the relevant litera-
ture, we begin in Section 5.2 with briefly discussing the packet erasure channel model 
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that we use in this chapter. In Section 5.3, a discrete-time Markovian jump model 
of a networked of unmanned vehicles combined with the packet erasure channel 
model is developed in the centralized architecture. In Section 5.4, the FDI problem 
for discrete-time MJS is investigated in a geometric FDI framework. Toward this 
end, in Section 5.4.1 a geometric property related to the unobservable subspace of 
a Markovian jump system is presented. A new approach for determining the con-
ditions for weak-observability of MJS systems is then introduced. The concept of 
unobservability subspace is presented and an algorithm for obtaining it is described. 
In Section 5.4.2 the necessary and sufficient conditions for solvability of the funda-
mental problem of residual generation (FPRG) for MJS systems are obtained by 
utilizing our introduced unobservability subspace. We also present and develop suf-
ficient conditions for designing if^-based FDI algorithms for MJS systems subject 
to input disturbances in Section 5.4.3. Our proposed algorithm is then applied to 
the FDI problem in a formation flight of satellites. In Section 5.5 similar results are 
derived for FDI of continuous-time Markovian jump system. Finally, our proposed 
algorithm is applied to fault detection and isolation of VTOL (vertical take-off and 
landing) helicopter actuators in Section 5.5.4. 
Contr ibut ions 
The main contributions of this chapter are now summarized as follows: 
• A new geometric property of unobservable subspace for Markovian jump sys-
tems (both continuous-time and discrete-time) are derived. 
• The geometric concept of unobservability subspaces is introduced for Marko-
vian jump systems (both continuous-time and discrete-time) and an algorithm 
for obtaining these subspaces is presented. 
• The necessary and sufficient conditions for solvability of the fundamental prob-
lem of residual generation (FPRG) for MJS systems are derived. 
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• The problem of actuator fault detection and isolation in a network of un-
manned vehicles in the presence of imperfect communication links is tackled 
in the framework of Markovian jump systems. 
5.1 Introduction 
Recently, networked control systems (NCS) have become a hot area of research and 
have found some important applications in a wide variety of engineering systems in-
cluding manufacturing plants, aircraft, automobiles, etc. Generally speaking, NCS 
are comprised of a large amount of actuators, sensors, and controllers which are all 
equipped with network interfaces, and are equal nodes of the network. All the sig-
nals, including real-time sensing, controller outputs, commands, coordination and 
supervision signals are transmitted through shared network channels. New and in-
teresting challenges arise when feedback loops are closed via networks. The network 
itself is a dynamical system that exhibits characteristics such as networked-induced 
delay, packet dropout, asynchronous clock among network nodes which could de-
grade the performance of the closed-loop system and even destabilize the system. 
Research on NCS has received increasing attention in recent years, and a large 
body of work have been produced on the modeling, design and stability analysis. 
However, few results exist on the fault detection and diagnosis in NCS. In [173], a 
Kalman filter is designed for fault detection with the assumption that network delay 
is known but time-varying. In [174], fault detection for NCS with missing measure-
ments is investigated. In this work NCS is modeled as a Markovian jump linear 
system and an H^ optimization technique is used for designing a fault detection 
filter for the Markovian jump system. In [175], a robust parity space approach is 
developed for fault detection in NCS with unknown and time-varying delays between 
controller and actuator. In [176], NCS model is transformed into a framework of 
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linear time-invariant system with modeling uncertainty caused by stochastic changes 
in the system parameters due to the network induced delay and data loss. A unified 
approach proposed in [177] is used for residual generation. In [178], the effect of 
network induced delay is modeled as time-varying disturbance and fault isolation 
filter for NCS with multiple faults is parameterized based on directional residual 
generation approach. The remaining degrees of freedom are used to satisfy an H^ 
disturbance attenuation in the framework of Markovian jump systems. In [179], the 
FDI problem for NCS with large transfer delays is considered. With employing the 
multirate sampling method together with the augmented state matrix method, the 
NCS with large transfer delays is modeled as a Markovian jump system and an H^ 
fault detection filter is designed for the developed model. 
The packet delivery characteristics of a network can be modeled as a Bernoulli 
or two-state Markov process [170,171,180-185]. The latter is commonly used for 
modeling the fading communication channels and is also known as packet erasure 
channel model. The combination of a discrete-time plant with these channel models 
yields a discrete-time Markovian jump system (MJS). A great deal of attention has 
recently been devoted to the Markovian jump systems [186-191] which comprise an 
important class of hybrid systems. This family of systems is generally modeled by 
a set of linear systems with transitions between models that are determined by a 
Markov chain taking values in a finite set. Markovian jump systems are also popu-
lar in modeling many practical systems where one may experience abrupt changes 
in system structure and parameters. These changes are quite common and do fre-
quently occur in manufacturing systems, economic systems, communication systems, 
power systems, etc. [192]. 
In recent years, only a few work on fault detection and isolation of MJS systems 
have appeared in the literature. In [174,179,193], a robust fault detection (and not 
an isolation) filter for discrete-time Markovian jump systems is developed based on 
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an HQQ filtering framework, in which the residual generator is also an MJS system. 
An LMI approach is developed for solving the problem. In [194], a robust fault 
identification filter for a class of discrete-time Markovian jump systems with mode 
dependent time-delays and norm bounded uncertainty is developed based on an H^ 
optimization technique. In the approach in [194], the generated residual signal is an 
estimate of the fault signal. However, the problem of fault isolation for Markovian 
jump systems has not been completely solved and fully addressed in the above 
references. 
In this chapter, based on the Gilbert-Elliott model [170,171,180,181], a net-
work of unmanned vehicles combined with a two-state Markov process model of com-
munication channels is modeled as a discrete-time Markovian jump system. The FDI 
problem in a network of unmanned vehicles in the presence of imperfect communica-
tion links can be solved in the framework of Markovian jump systems. A geometric 
approach is adopted for the FDI problem of both discrete-time and continuous-time 
Markovian jump systems. Towards this end, the first contribution of this chapter is 
the derivation of a geometric property for the unobservable subspace of MJS systems 
(Theorems 5.2 and 5.9) and development of a new approach for determining their 
weak-observability (Algorithm 5.1). The notion of an unobservability subspace is 
then introduced for MJS systems (Definition 5.6). To construct an algorithm for 
obtaining this subspace, an alternative definition of an unobservability subspace 
is presented in Theorem 5.4, which only depends on the matrices of the system. 
Based on this alternative definition, an algorithm for constructing the smallest un-
observability subspace containing a given subspace is proposed (Algorithm 5.3). By 
utilizing the developed geometric framework, necessary and sufficient solvability con-
ditions are derived for Markovian jump systems (Theorem 5.6). Using the properties 
of unobservability subspaces, a set of residuals is generated such that each residual 
is affected by one fault and is decoupled from others. Finally, we investigate the 
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problem of designing an H^-based FDI algorithm for a MJS system that has an 
unknown transition matrix and is subjected to external disturbances. These results 
are obtained by applying our proposed geometric approach and H^ disturbance 
attenuation technique (Theorem 5.7). 
5.2 The Packet Erasure Channel Model 
In this chapter, discrete-time communication links with stochastic packet dropping 
effects are considered among the vehicles and the FDI unit. Many phenomena are 
introduced due to the presence of communication links such as [182]: 
1. Time delay: Data is usually buffered, quantized and coded before transmission 
over a channel. After a network delay due to propagation, the data is received 
and decoded in the receiver end. In the cases where the data is not received 
properly, the communication protocol may re-transmit the data. Hence, by 
the time the information is used by the receiver, a delay has been introduced. 
This delay is usually random with time-varying probability distribution. 
2. Data loss: In most communication protocols, if the data is not received within 
a specific time limit, the packet is assumed to be lost. A variety of reasons can 
cause this data loss. For instance, simultaneous transmission by two transmit-
ters in a shared multiple access medium such as wireless channels, may lead 
to loss of both transmitter data. In a network of communication channels, 
overflow of buffers can also cause the packet loss. Finally, in a network of 
unmanned vehicles, the presence of obstacles among vehicles and limited line 
of sight of each vehicle may lead to packet loss. 
3. Quantization: In digital communication networks any data needs to be quan-
tized and the number of bits that can be transmitted at every sampling time 
is usually upper-bounded. 
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4. Data corruption: Due to noise and attenuation introduced by the channel, 
the received data may not be identical to the signal that the transmitter sent 
through the communication channel. Most communication protocols has error 
detection and error correction algorithms to reduce the data corruption of the 
communication links. 
At every sampling time k, the time line for the operation of a communication 
link of the i-th. vehicle is as follows. 
1. The i-the vehicle creates a packet containing the information that are needed 
to be shared with other vehicles or the FDI unit. 
2. The packet is sent across the link. 
3. At time step k + 1 the packet is either received without error or dropped 
stochastically. 
In the above communication links, it is assumed that: 
• The channel coding is ignored and it is assumed that the packet will be either 
received and decoded successfully at the end of the link or totally lost. 
• If a packet arrives too late, it is discarded and treated as a dropped packet 
and the lost packets are not re-sent. 
• The number of bits in each packet is relatively large and hence the quantization 
effect of the channel is ignored. 
One of the following models [185] can be considered for modeling the stochastic 
packet dropout: 
• The independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Bernoulli model: 





Figure 5.1: The Gilbert-Elliott model 
that if the packet k is received correctly, then 7^ = 1, otherwise 7^ = 0. A 
random variable 7^ is i.i.d. with probability distribution P(-yk = 1) = A and 
P(lk = 0) = (1 - A). 
• The Gilbert-Elliott model [170,171] shown in Figure 5.1. In this model, the 
network is considered as a discrete-time Markov chain with two possible states: 
"good" and "bad". The packet is received correctly in the "good" state and 
is dropped in the "bad" state. The network jumps between these two states 
according to a Markov chain with transition probability matrix II as 
7T00 7T01 
TTlO TTll 
where 1 is the good state, 0 is the bad state, and 7Ty is the probability from 
the previous state i to the next state j . 
In this thesis, we consider the Gilbert-Elliott model of the communication link 
since this model is able to capture the dependence between consecutive losses, i.e. 
bursty packet dropping. 
7t{ 00 
Good State 
(no packet drop) 
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5.3 A Network of Unmanned Vehicles in the Pres-
ence of Imperfect Communication Channels 
In this section, a network of unmanned vehicles considered with the packet erasure 
channel model is modeled as a discrete-time MJS. It should be mentioned that 
a centralized architecture is considered here. Due to the discrete feature of the 
communication links, the discrete model of each vehicle is considered as 
p 
Xi(k + 1) = Axi(k) + Bui(k) + 2_] Ljrriij{k) 
i=i (5.1) 
Zij(k) = C(xi(k) - Xj(k)) j € N; 
with the sampling time Ts where the set Nj C N \ i represents the set of vehicles 
that vehicle i can sense and is designated as the neighboring set of vehicle i, and 
Zij G Zi, j G Nj represents the state measurement relative to the other vehicles. Let 
Ni = {ii,i2,-,i\jii\}- We have z^t) = [zjh{t),zl2{t)r • • ,4 | N . |(*)]T , and equation 
(5.1) can be rewritten as Zi(t) = Cix(i), where x(t) = [xj(t), x\(t), • • • ,x^(t)]T . 
As discussed in Section 3.3.1, in the centralized architecture, all information 
should be sent to a central FDI unit through the "entire" communication network 
channels. It is assumed that each vehicle sends its information i.e. Ui and Zi with a 
sampling time T& where Tj > Ts. Therefore, the overall system can be modeled as 
follows: 
N P 
x(k + 1) = ANx(k) + BNu(k) + J2J2L 
kj if^kj 
fc=i i= i (5.2) 
z{k) = Cx(k) 
with the sampling time Tj where AN = IN 0 A, B^ = IN ® B, <g> denotes the 
Kronecker product, N is a positive integer, IN is an N x N identity matrix, u = 
[u],v,2, • • • , ujj]j, Lkj is the (k — 1) x a + j column of BN, z = [zj, zj, • • • , zNY 
and CT = [Cj, C~l, • • • , CN]. The central FDI unit waits for Td seconds to collect 
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all the information from all the vehicles. Therefore, a network delay of less than 
Td does not affect the performance of the FDI algorithm. If the packet has a delay 
of more than T^, then the FDI unit assumes that there is a packet dropout in that 
specific communication link between the central FDI unit and the vehicle. 
In order to model packet dropout of communication network channels, a 
stochastic variable A, is assigned to the channel between the i-th vehicle and the 
central vehicle and it represents data communication status, i.e., Xi(k) = 1 means 
the measurement ut and z, at time k arrives correctly, while \i(k) = 0 means that 
this measurement is lost. A; can be modeled as a discrete-time Markov chain with 
two state *&i = {0,1} with the transition probability matrix IIj = {^ij)i,je^i a n d ftij 
is defined as 
nlj = Pr{X(k + l)=j\X(k) = l} 
When the current information (it, and Zi) of the i-th vehicle does not arrive on time 
(Xi(k) = 0), the FDI unit uses the last available measurement of the control signal 
Ui and available output measurements Zj's, j ^ i. In other words, if we denote u°;(k) 
as the z-th vehicle information that is used by the central FDI unit, then 
f «i(fc) if Ai(fc) = 1 
<(fc) = <^  
I the last available measurment if Xi(k) = 0 







Remark 5.1. It should be pointed out that the available relative state measure-
ments for Xi(k) = 0 is zl{k) = Clx(k) with variable dimension where Cl = 
[Cj, • • • , Cj_-y,Cj+1, • • • , Cjj]. However, it can be shown that the geometric proper-
ties of a Markovian jump system with measurement matrix Ci and Cl are identical. 
Indeed, we have Ker{d) = KeriC1). Moreover, let S =< KerWC^A + D'C* >, 
where Hl = [H-^,..., Hi-i,Hi+i, ...,HN] and D1 = [D\,..., A - i , A+i> •••, DN], then 
A + DiCi = A + DzCi where KerWC1 = KerHiQ Hi = [Hl,..., H^, 0, Hi+1, ...,HN] 
and Di = [D\,..., A - i , 0, A+i,. . . , DN] and hence S =< KerHiCi\A + DiCi >. 
Therefore, for keeping the dimension of output constant, the measurement matrix 
Ci is considered here. 
In the next assumption, it is assumed that the change of the control input for 
each vehicle in each FDI sampling time is bounded. 
Assumption 5.1. It is assumed that for each vehicle 0f(k) = uf(k) — Ui(k) is an 
£2 bounded signal. 
Therefore, in the case of Xi(k) = 0, the overall system can be modeled as 
N a 
X (k + 1) = ANx(k) + BNu(k) + ^ Yl Lkjmkj{k) + Bf0?(h) 
k=i j=i (5.4) 





In the case of \i(k) = 1, the overall system model is as in (5.2). Therefore, dis-
turbance terms Bf9™(k) is added due to the loss of Ui and different measurement 
matrix Ci is used due to the loss of Zj. 
In order to incorporate the data dropout of all the communication channels, 
a discrete-time Markov chain A with N + 1 states with the transition probability 
matrix II = {^ij)i,jem is introduced. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that 
only one data dropout is allowable at each sampling time. This assumption only 
limits the number of modes of the system to N + 1 and can be easily removed by 
increasing the number of mode and considering multiple data dropout. The mode 
1 corresponds to the case with no packet dropout in all the communication links 
and the mode i + 1 corresponds to the packet dropout in the communication link 
of the z-the vehicle. Therefore, the entire system can be modeled by the following 
Markovian jump system 
N a 
x(k + 1) = ANx(k) + BNu(k) + Bdx{k)eu(k) + Y^Y1 l^mkj{k) 
fe=i j= i (5.5) 







and for X(k) = i + 1, i E N we have 
0 ••• 0 ••• 
0 ••• B, ••• 
where JBj is the i-th row and the i-th column of matrices Bf+1. For \(k) = 1, we 
have Bf = 0 and C0 = C. 
Remark 5.2. It should be noted that the FDI problem in sensor networks (Figure 
5.2) can be treated similarly in the framework of Markovian jump systems. Consider 
a discrete-time linear system 
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) + Bu(k) + Bdd(k) (5.6) 
where x(k) E X is the state, u(k) E U is the control input and d(k) is the input 
disturbance. The state of the plant is measured by N sensors where the i-th sensor 
generates the output measurements according to 
yi{k) = dx(k) + Ddid(k) (5.7) 
Every sensor sends its own measurement through the communication channel. By 
combining the packet erasure channel model with each measurement equation, a 
discrete-time MJS model of the entire sensor network can be obtained as follows: 
x{k + 1) = Ax(k) + Bu(k) + Bdd(k) 
(5.8) 
y(k) = Cx{k)x{k) + Dx(k)d{k) 
Hence, our developed algorithm in the next section will be applicable to both networks 
of unmanned vehicles and sensor networks. 
In the next section, a geometric FDI framework for discrete-time Markovian 
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Figure 5.2: FDI in sensor networks 
5.4 Discrete-time Markovian Jump Systems 
Consider the following discrete-time Markovian jump system 
x(k + 1) = Ax{k)x{k) + Bx{k)u(k) 
y(k) = Cx{k)x(k), x(0) = x0, A(0) = i0 
where x G X is the state of the system with dimension n; u eU,y E y are input and 
output signals with dimensions m and q, respectively; and {X(k), k > 0} is a discrete-
time irreducible Markov process taking values in the finite set *P = {1,.. . , N}. The 
Markov process describes the switching between the different system modes and its 
evolution is governed by the following probability transitions: 
nij=F{\(k+l)=j\\(k)=i} 
A^r 
where Y2j=inij = 1- The matrices .A\(fc)> -^ A(fc) a n d CX(k) are known constant ma-
trices for all Afc = i G \&. For simplicity, we denote the matrices associated with 
X(k) = i by AX(k) = Ai, BX(k) = Bi, CX(k) = Ci. Furthermore, the MJS system 
(5.9) is represented by (21, 93, £, II), where 21 = {A1,...:AN), 93 = (B1?..., BN), 
£ = (Ci,..., CJV) and II = [TT^], i, j e * . 
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5.4.1 Unobservable and Unobservability Subspaces 
In this section a geometric definition for an unobservable subspace of discrete-time 
Markovian jump systems (MJS) is introduced. The notion of unobservability sub-
space is then formalized for discrete-time MJS systems that are governed by (5.9). 
To develop an algorithm for constructing this subspace, an alternative definition of 
unobservability subspace is presented, which only depends on the matrices of the sys-
tem. Based on this alternative definition, an algorithm for constructing the smallest 
unobservability subspace containing a given subspace is proposed. As shown in the 
next section, the unobservability subspace for the MJS system plays a central role 
in solving the fault detection and isolation problem for Markovian jump systems. 
We first start with the definition of weak observability for Markovian jump 
system (5.9) with B{ = 0, i e ^. 
Definition 5.1 ( [195]). The system (21, (£, II) is said to be weakly (W-) observable 
when there exists 7 > 0 such that 
Wn2N(x0,i) = E^T{n2N)x0\x(0) = x0, A0 = i0} > l\x0\2, Vrr0 €X, i0eV 
(5.10) 
where the pointwise observability Grammian F is defined as 
k 
r(k) = J2^T(t)cJ{t)cmm (5.11) 
and $ is the state transition matrix of system (21, 55, <£, II). 
In [195], a collection of matrices O = {0\,..., O^} is introduced for testing 
the W-observability of the Markovian jump systems according to the following pro-
cedure. Let Oi(0) = CjCi, J G $ and define the sequence of matrices as 
TV 
Oi{k) = AjC^2ntjOj(k-l))Ai k>0,ieV (5.12) 
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Then the matrix Oi is defined according to 
O, = \Ol{0) 0,(1) • • • Ol(n2N - 1)]T (5.13) 
Theorem 5.1 ( [195]). The MJS system (5.9) is W-observable if and only if Oi has 
a full rank for each iG ^ . 
Definition 5.2. A state x is said to be unobservable ifWn N(x,i) = 0 for alii e ty. 
Let Q denotes the unobservable set of the MJS system (5.9), i.e. 
Q = {x |Wn2N{x,i) = 0,Vie*,t> 0} (5.14) 
It is shown in [195] (Lemma 3) that for irreducible Markov processes, M{Oi) — 
M{Oj}, i,jeiff, i =£ j and Q = N{Oi]. Therefore, Q is the subspace of X and is 
called the unobservable subspace of the Markovian jump system (5.9). The theorem 
introduced below characterizes a geometric property of Q. 
Theorem 5.2. An unobservable subspace Q for the system (21, C, IT.) with irre-
ducible Markov process is the largest Ai-invariant (i G ty) that is contained in 
fC = f)ti Ker d-
Proof: It follows from the above discussion that Q C Ker Q , i G ^ , and hence 
Q C /C. Let x G Q. Our goal is to show that AiX G Q for all i G $ (i.e. Q is 
A-invariant, i G \l>). Since x G M{Oi(k - 1)} and x G AfjO^A;)}, i G *, then 
AT 
x
JOi{k)x = xTA]{J2*ijOj(k - l))AiX = 0 => 
Hence ^ x G N{Oi(k - 1 ) } for all A; > 0 and A{x G A/"{Oj} for all i G #. This shows 
that Q is Aj-invariant for alii G ^ . 
Next we show that Q is the largest ylj-invariant (i G $) that is contained in 
K,. Let V be an ylj-invariant (i G \I>) subspace that is contained in JC. Clearly, 
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O i ( f c - l ) 
0N(k-l) 
Axi = 0 
V C M{Oi(0)}, i e * . Let V C Af{0;(& - 1)}, i G * and x G V, then 
TV 
x
T0,(A;)a; = A T ( J ] ^uA( f c - l))A{x = 0 
since Atx G V (V is ^-invariant). Hence, V C J\f{Oi(k)}, i G $ and V C Q. 
This shows that <2 contains all the subspaces that are ^-invariant (i e f ) and is 
contained in /C. • 
Corollary 5.1. An unobservable subspace Q is contained in < Ker Ci\Ai >,i G \&. 
Proof: < Ker C,|A > is the largest ylj-invariant that is contained in Ker C*. 
Therefore, we have Q C< Ker C*|A > , J 6 $ . • 
The above corollary proves that if each pair (Ai, C;), i G \l/ is observable then 
Q = 0 and the MJS system (5.9) is W-observable. Based on our proposed Theorem 
5.2 above, the following algorithm provides a procedure for constructing the required 
subspace Q. 
Algorithm 5.1. The subspace Q coincides with and is obtained from the last term 
of the following sequence 
N 
Z0 = /C; Zi = ICn(^\A^Zi.1), (iek) (5.15) 
fc=0 
where the value of k < dim()C) is determined from the condition Zk+i = Zk-
Let us denote the largest ^-invariant (i G \&) subspace that is contained in /C 
by 
< < K\Ai » i e * (5.16) 
Consider the system (21, C, 55,11) that is governed by (5.9). Let Q be Ai-
invariant i G \1> and Q C Ker Ci5 and P : X —* X/Q be a canonical projec-
tion. The factor system is defined by (21 : X/Q,<B : X/Q,€ : X/Q,U) with 
21 : X/Q = (Ai : X/Q,...,AN : X/Q), <8 : X/Q = (Bx : X/Q,...,BN : # / Q ) 
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£
 : X/Q = (c a : X/Q,...,CN : # / Q ) where PAZ = (At : * / Q ) P , (Bz : # / Q ) = 
F 5 j , (d : X/Q)P = Ci, i E ty. Therefore, if Q is the unobservable subspace of the 
system (21, £, 93,11), then (21 : X/Q,*8 : X/QX : X/Q,U) is observable since the 
unobservable subspace is factored out. 
Definition 5.3 ( [195]). The system (5.9) is mean square (MS) stable if for each 
XQ e X and i0 6 ^, 
lim E{\\x(k)\\2} = 0 (5.17) 
k—>oo 
Definition 5.4 ( [195]). We say that (21, (£, II) is MS-detectable when there exists 
G = {Gi, ...,GN} of appropriate dimension for which (21G,I1) is MS-stable, where 
2fG = {A1 + d d , . . . , AN + GNCN}. 
The following computational linear matrix inequalities can be used for testing 
the MS-detectability of a discrete-time MJS system [195]. In other words, the MS-
detectability of (21, <£, II) is equivalent to the feasibility of the set 
< 0 (5.18) 
AjXiAi + CjSjAl + ATSiCi CJSJ 
OjCj — Xi 
N 
i= i 
in the unknowns Xi > 0, Hi and Si with appropriate dimensions. 
We are now in a position to introduce the notions of conditioned invariant and 
unobservability subspaces for the Markovian jump systems. 
Definition 5.5. A subspace W C X is said to be conditioned invariant for system 
( 2 i , € , n ) i / 
Ai(W n Ker Q) C W, i e * (5.20) 
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It is clear that if W is conditioned invariant for system (21, C, II), then W is 
(Cj,Aj)-invariant for alii e ^ . Therefore, there exist maps A : y —> A such that 
( ^ + A Q ) W C W, i e $ . 
We denote the class of conditioned invariant subspaces of X for the system 
(21, t, n) by 2U(2I, €,X). If W e 2B(2l, £, A'), we write 5)(W) for the class of maps 
Di : }> -+ A" where (A + Did)W C W, i G #. The notion of conditioned 
invariant subspace for system (21, C, II) is a dual to that of the robust maximal 
controlled invariant which is introduced in [196]. By duality it can be shown that 
2B(2l, C, X) is closed under the operation of subspace intersection, and hence for any 
given subspace C C X, the family of conditioned invariant subspaces that contains 
C (denoted by 2XJ(2l, £, C) or simply 2B(£)) has an infimal element which is denoted 
by W* = inf 2B(2l, £, £) . The following algorithm can now be used for constructing 
W*: 
Algorithm 5.2. The subspace W* coincides with and is obtained from the last term 
of the following sequence 
N 
m = C; Wk = C + J2 A(Wfc_i n Ker Q) 
Definition 5.6. A subspace S is an unobservability subspace for system (5.9) if 
there exist output injection maps D^ : y —> X and measurement mixing maps Hi : 
y —> 3^  such that S is an unobservable subspace of system (21, £, II), where 21 = 
{A1 + DiCi,..., AN + DNCN} and € = {Hid,..., HNCN}. 
We denote the class of all unobservability subspaces in X for system (21, £, II) 
by 6(21, <£, X). In the following our goal is to derive an alternative characterization 
for the unobservability subspace which is independent of the maps Di and Hi as used 
in Definition 5.6 (the idea is similar to that in Theorem 2.1). As shown subsequently, 
this alternative definition provides us with means to obtain the unobservability 
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subspaces more readily. The following lemma presents a result that is necessary for 
formulating our alternative definition. 
Lemma 5.1. Let Sj c X such that KerCj C Sj,j G \& and << fL= 1 Sj\Ai >>ieq,= 
S (refer to equation (5.16)/, then 
N 
« (^[(S + Ker Cj)\Ai »ie*= S (5.21) 
j=i 
Conversely, if << f]j=1(S + Ker Cj)\Ai >> j e * = S, there exist maps Hj : 
y —> y, j e * such that 
N 
« P| Ker HjCjlAi » i 6*= S 
Proof: We have S C f | ^ i 4 <= 4 and Ker C,- C Sj} j G * , so that C\f=1{S + 
Ker Cj) C (~)j=1Sj. Consequently, 
N N 
« P)(5 + Ker Cj)|A »ieq,C« p | 4 | A » « E * = «S 
On the other hand, A+S C 5 and 
JV AT 
P | ( 5 + Ker C3) D 5 + p | Ker C,- D «S 
Hence 5 C « p|}=i(«5 + Ker Cj)\Ai >>i6*, and as a result 
N 
« p | ( 5 + Ker C,-)!^ » i G * = <S 
To show the converse part, let {c\,...,clr} be a basis for S + Ker C, such that 
{clr_p.,..., c*} is the basis for Ker d (dim(Ker d) = pj). Therefore, ytj = d-c*-, j = 
1,..., r — pi — 1 are independent. Let {y^,..., yi9} be a basis for y, and define 
Hiyi:j = 0, j = l,...,r-pi-l 
Hiyij = yij, j = r-pi,...,r 
Consequently, Ker d + S = Ker Hid, and f)f=1 Ker C* + S = f)?=1 Ker ^ C j . • 
We are now in a position to state our next result. 
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Theorem 5.3. A subspace S is an unobservability subspace for system (5.9) if and 
only if there exist maps Di : y —> X. such that 
N 
S =« f](S + Ker Cj)\Ai + DZQ >> i 6 * (5.22) 
i=i 
Proof: The proof follows readily from Lemma 5.1 by taking Sj = Ker HjCj. • 
The above theorem eliminates the need for the maps Hi from the Definition 5.6 
(this is similar to equation (2.16) for a system with only a single mode). For a given 
unobservability subspace <S, the measurement mixing maps H^s can be computed 
from S by solving the following equations, namely 
Ker Hid = S + Ker Cu i e * (5.23) 
Next, we try to characterize the unobservability subspace by means of an 
algorithm that computes <S without explicitly constructing (£>i,..., DN) € £)(<S). 
For an arbitrary subspace S c X let us define a family 
N 
0(a,c) = {y-.y = f)(S + (A7xy n Ker Q))} (5.24) 
i= i 
Below we first show that G (<&,£) has a unique maximal member. 
Lemma 5.2. There exists a unique element 5^* G G(%e) such that 5? C 5?* for 
every S" e £(a,c) • 
Proof: Define a sequence o^M C X according to 
TV 
y° = X; ^ = f]{S + (A-1^-1 n Ker Q)), \x <E n (5.25) 
i = i 





y ^ = pj (5 + ( y l " 1 ^ n Ker C*)) c f]{S + ( / i " 1 ^ " 1 n Ker C,)) = ^ 
i = l i = l 
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Therefore, there exists k <n such that y>* •= yk, and we set y* = ^ f c . Clearly 
y* G ^ (a.c)- Next, we show that <y* is the maximal element. Let y C ^(a.c), then 
J^ C y° and if J^ C S"1, we have 
JV w 
y = p j ( 5 + ( A 7 ^ n Ker CO) C P | ( 5 + {Ajly^ n Ker Q)) = ^ " + 1 
i = l i = l 
Consequently, y C y» for all /x, and hence y C y*. • 
The next lemma provides an important property of the maximal element y* 
which will be used for introducing our suggested alternative characterization of the 
unobservability subspace of system (21, £, II). 
Lemma 5.3. Let S G 2U(2I, €, X) and (D1:...,DN) G J), then y* is the largest 
(Ai + DiCi)-invariant (i G ty) that is contained in n ;=i(^> + ^er Cj), i.e. y* = < < 
nf=i(«s+Ker CJ)\A+AC, » l 6*. 
Proof: First we show that any y G ^(a.c) is (A + DiCj)-invariant (i G ^ ) . We 
have y = rt=i(S + ( A 7 * ^ n Ker d)) and 
{Aj + DjCj)Sr = (Aj + DjCj) f | ( 5 + ( A - 1 ^ n Ker d)) 
2 = 1 
c (Aj + DjCj)(S + Aj*y n Ker Cj) 
c (A,- +
 JDjCj)«S + AjiAj1^ n Ker C,-) 
where we used the relationship y = f | i i ( S + ( A ~ l j ^ n K e r Ci)) 2 S + f ^ i t A - 1 ^ 
Ker Q) D 5 and Aj(A]1y) C J^. Therefore, (A,- + DjCj)y C y , j e $; and 
hence J^ G 20(31, £, X) and (A, . . . , Av) G £>(^). 
Consequently, we have y* G 20(21, £, A'). Next we show that for any subspace 
W such that it is (A +ACO-invariant (i G *) and is contained in n=1(<S + ker Cj), 
we have W cy*. If W C 5 then it follows that W C S?*, since 5 c y . Therefore, 
we consider the case where S C W. We have 
A;1 W n Ker Q = (A: + A ^ O " ^ n Ker Q 
147 
and as a result 
N N 
p | ( 5 + A_ 1W n Ker d) = f]{S + (A, + A Q ) " 1 W n Ker Q) 
i=l i = l 
It is clear that W cy°. If W C ^ - \ then 
^ = p | ( 5 + {Aj1^-1 n Ker Q)) D f](S + {A^W n Ker Q)) 
i=l i = l 
Af 
= f | ( 5 + (A + A Q ) - 1 ™ n Ker Q)) 
i=l 
N N 
D p | ( 5 + (W n Ker Q)) = J ^ ( W n (5 + Ker Q)) = W 
i=i i=i 
where we used the fact that W C (A + DjCj)_1>V and the modular distributive 
rule [134] (if S C W, then S + ( W n K e r Ct-) = Wn(<S + Ker C*)). As a consequence 
J"" D W; and hence ^ * D W. This shows that ^ * is the largest {At + Did)-
invariant (i G \&) which is contained in f\=1(<S + Ker Q ) . • 
We are in the position to introduce our proposed alternative characterization 
of an unobservability subspace for system (21, £, II). 
Theorem 5.4. Let S C X and define Q(%c) as i-n (5.24). Then S G (5(21, <£, II) if 
and only if 
S G 2B(2l, €, II) (S is conditioned invariant) (5.26) 
and 
S = y* (5.27) 
where 5^* is the maximal element of Q^x)-
Proof: (If part) If (5.26) and (5.27) hold, then according to Lemma 5.3, we 
have S = « f|f=i(S + K e r Cj)\Ai 
>>i'e$, and hence using Theorem 5.3, we have 
5e6(a1c,n). 
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(Only if par t ) If S e ©(21, £, n) , it follows that S e 2D(2t, £, n) and accord-
ing to Lemma 5.3, we have S = y*. • 
The above theorem provides a similar characteristic for the unobservability 
subspace of the Markovian jump system as the one that Theorem 2.1 provides for 
unobservability subspace of a system having only a single mode. Next, we show that 
the class of unobservability subspace of system (21, £, II) is a semilattice with respect 
to inclusion and subspace addition, and hence the class of unobservability subspace 
which contains a given subspace has an infimal element. This property is crucial for 
the application of unobservability subspace to the problem of fault detection and 
isolation of MJS systems. 
Lemma 5.4. The class of subspaces (5(21, <£, II) is closed under the operation of 
subspace intersection. 
Proof: The proof is based on the characterization of unobservability subspace in 
Theorem 5.4. Let Si,S2 e 6(21, <T, II). It is clear that Si n «S2 6 20(21, £, n) . 
Furthermore, «S,- = yf,j = 1,2, where 
N 
yf = X- y? = f](Sj + {A-1^-1 n Ker Q)), n e n 
i= i 
Define y according to 
N 
yQ = X- y» = p|((<Sa n S2) + {A~ly^1 n Ker Q)) , // € n 
1=1 
We have J?f = J^0 = y° and if y ^ 1 C yf~\ j = 1,2, then 
TV N 
y» = f]((S1nS2) + {A-ly»-1 n Ker Q)) C f](Sj + (A-'y*-1 n Ker C*)) 
i=l i=\ 
N 
C f | ( ^ - + (Ar'yf-1 n Ker Q) = &?, j = l,2 
i=l 
Therefore, yn C y? n «*"2n, and consequently 
sx n s2 c yn c J?7 n J^" = <Si n s2 
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and Sj fl S2 = S^n, so that the result follows from Theorem 5.4. • 
Let £ C X be an arbitrary subspace and denote 6(21, £, £) (or simply ©(£)) 
as the family of u.o.s. that contains £, i.e. 
6(21, £,C) = {S:S e 6(21, <£, A') & £ C 5} 
As indicated previously, 6(21, €,X) refers to the class of all unobservability sub-
spaces in X. 
Lemma 5.5. For any given subspace £ C X, 6(21, C, £) has an infimal element 
(denoted by S* = inf 6(21, £, £)). 
Proof: It follows that X £ 6(21, <£, £) and 6(21, £, £) is closed under intersection 
(Lemma 5.4). Therefore, it has an infimal element. • 
The next algorithm provides a procedure for constructing S*. 
Algorithm 5.3. Let W* = inf 2B(2l, £, £) and define the sequence Z^ according to 
N 
Z° = X; Z» = p | (W* + (A^Z^1 n Ker Q)) (5.28) 
i = l 
Then S* = Zk, whenever Zk+1 = Zk. 
To analyze the above algorithm note that the sequence Z^ is non-increasing 
and Zk+1 = Zk for k > n - dim(W*). Let Z* = Zk. According to Lemma 5.3, 
Z* = « HiIi(W* + KerCj)\Ai + Did » i e * for some (£>!,...,£>*) e £(W*). 
Using the same approach as in Lemma 5.1, one can obtain the maps Hj's such that 
N N 
Z* =« f)(W* + KerCj)\Ai + Did » i e * = « P|Ker^C,|A + AC, » i 6 * 
2 = 1 1 = 1 
(5.29) 
and therefore Z* is an unobservability subspace according to Definition 5.6. More-
over, it follows that £ C W* C Z* {Z* e 2U(£) and W = inf 2U(£)); hence 
Z* e 6 ( £ ) , and consequently S* C Z*. 
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On the other hand, according to Theorem 5.4 we have S* = Sn where 
N 
S° = X; S» = p|(<S* + (A^S*-1 n Ker Q)), fi e n 
i=l 
Since W* C S*, it can be shown by induction that Z11 C S^, // G n. Indeed, 
Z° = «S°, and if Z^1 C 5 ' i _ 1 , then 
AT AT 
Z» = P)(W* + ( A " 1 ^ " 1 n Ker d ) ) C p|(<S* + (A^S^1 n Ker d ) ) = S" 
i = l i = l 
Consequently Z* C <S*. 
It follows from the above algorithm and Lemma 5.3 that £>(W*) C £>(<S*). 
Therefore, the maps ZVs for S* can be found from W* and once 5* is found from 
Algorithm 5.3, the maps H^s can also be computed from S* and equation (5.23). 
The next lemma characterizes the relationship between S* and W* (similar to 
that for single mode systems as governed by equation (2.21)). 
Lemma 5.6. Given W* = inf 2U(2i, €, C) , S* = inf 6(21, £ ,£) and {DX,...,DN) G 
£>(W*), we have 
N 
S* =« f|(W* + Ker Q)|A + A d » i e * 
i = l 
Proof: The proof is immediate from (5.29) and the fact that Z* = S*. • 
Finally, we introduce the notion of outer MS-detectability of an unobservabil-
ity subspace. As shown in the next section, outer MS-detectability is a necessary 
condition for designing a stable residual generator for the FDI problem. 
Definition 5.7. A subspace S G 6(21, £, X) is said to be outer MS-detectable if 
the factor system (21 + £>£ : X/S,Sj£ : X/S,U) is MS-detectable where ?>€ = 
{//id,..., HNCN} and 21 + £ £ = {A, + A d , . . . , AN + Avdv}-
The next example illustrates how one can find S* for a given Markovian jump 
system and it also summarizes our proposed result. 
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Example 5.1. Let N = 2 and 
A,= 
0 3 4 
1 2 3 
0 2 5 
, A2 = 
1 2 4 
2 - 1 2 
0 1 4 
,c1 = 
0 1 0 
0 0 1 
,c2 = 
1 1 0 
0 0 1 
L = [—3,1,0]T and U as in Example 1. First W* can be found from Algorithm 5.2 
as 
W* = 1 
0 







The unobservability subspace S* is found from Algorithm 5.3 which is equal to W*. 
It should be noted that 
Sl = 
where S*, j = 1,2 is the infimal (Cj,Aj) unobservability subspace that contains 
£ = Im L and S* c Sf and S* C S%. 
5.4.2 Fault Detection and Isolation Based on Geometric Ap-
proach 
In this section the Fundamental Problem in Residual Generation (FPRG) is inves-
tigated for the discrete-time Markovian jump systems. This problem was originally 
considered for linear systems in [3] and was extended to nonlinear systems in [60]. 
The objective in this section is to generalize these results to Markovian jump systems 
(MJS). Consider the following discrete-time Markovian jump system 
x(k + 1) = Amx(k) + BX(k)u{k) + L\,k)mi(k) + L2x(k)m2{k) 
(5.30) 
y(k) = CMk)x(k), x(0) = x0, A(0) = i0 
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where it is assumed that all the matrices are the same as in (5.9) and the Markov 
process X(k) is irreducible. The matrices £wfc), -^ A(fc) r e P r e s e n t the fault signatures 
and are monic and rrii(k) € Mi C X, i = 1, 2 denote the fault modes. For sake of 
simplicity in analysis and derivation of our results, we first consider the case with 
two faults. The more general case of multiple faults is considered at the end of this 
section. We denote the fault signatures associated with X(k) = % by L\ and L\. The 
fault modes together with the fault signatures can be used to model the effects of 
actuator faults, sensor faults and system faults on the dynamics of the system. For 
example, the effect of a fault in the i-th actuator may be represented by L\ as the 
i-th column of Bi and if an actuator fails, then m\(k) = —Ui(k). 
The FPRG problem is concerned with the design of a Markovian jump residual 
generator that is governed by the filter dynamics of the form 
(5.31) 
w(k + 1) = Fx{k)w(k) - Ex{k)y(k) + Kx(k)u{k) 
r(k) = Mx{k)w(k) - Hx{k)y{k) 
where w(k) G T C X such that the response of r(k) is affected by the fault mode 
mi (A;) and is decoupled from m,2(k) and if mi is identically zero then 
limE||r(fc)||2 = 0 
fc—>oo 
for any input signal u(k). We can rewrite equations (5.30) and (5.31) as follows: 
x(k + l) 













Define the extended space Xe = X © T and Ue = U © M2, so that equation 
0 
r{k) 
—H\ik\C \( )^\(k) M A(fc) (5.32) 
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(5.32) can be expressed as 
x
e(k + 1) = Al{k)x%k) + Bl{k)ue(k) + L*k)mi(k) 
(5.33) 
r(k) = Hl{k)xe(k) 
with xe(t) e Xe and ue G W. In order to investigate the criteria for determining 
whether a nonzero m\{k) affects the residual signal r(k), the notion of an input 
observability for the Markovian jump system is defined and formalized below. 
Definition 5.8. The Markovian jump system (5.9) is said to be input observable if 
Bi, i € ^ is monic and the image of Bi's does not intersect with the unobservable 
subspace of system (5.9). 
Based on the above definition, the FPRG problem for system (5.30) can now 
be formally stated as the problem of designing the dynamical filter (5.31) such that 
(a) r is decoupled from ue, (5.34) 
(b) mi is input observable in the augmented system (5.33), and (5.35) 
(c) limE{||r(fc)||2} = 0, for
 mi{k) = 0, V i0 e V and \/xe0 e Xe. (5.36) 
k—>0 
We need to first derive a preliminary result for obtaining the solvability condi-
tion for the FPRG problem. The following embedding map Q : X —* Xe is defined 
according to [3]: 
Qx = x 
0 
(5.37) 
where if V C Xe, we have 
Q-lV = {x\xe X, x 
0 
e V } 
Our first result is the generalization of the Proposition 1 that was obtained in [3] to 
the Markovian jump systems. 
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Lemma 5.7. Let Se be the unobservable subspace of system (5.33). The unobserv-
ability subspace for system (21, <£, n) is given by Q~lSe. 
Proof: First we show that S = Q~1Se is conditioned invariant. Let x G <SnKer d, 








since Se is ^-invariant i E ^. Therefore, Atx G 5 and S is conditioned invariant. 






This shows that HiCiX = 0; and hence x G n ^ K e r Hid and S C n ^ K e r i/jC,. 
Finally, according to the definition of the unobservable subspace Se (the largest Ae-
invariant subspace in nKer H%), S is the largest conditioned invariant contained in 
n ^ K e r Hid, and therefore S G 6(21, £, II). • 
We are now in a position to derive the solvability condition for the FPRG 
problem corresponding to the Markovian jump system (5.30). 
Theorem 5.5. The FPRG problem has a solution for the augmented MJS system 
(5.33) only if 
S*f)£] = 0, j e $ (5.38) 
>JV 
where S* = inf 6(21, (£, X^Li £%)• ^n the other hand, if the above S* exists such 
that it is also outer MS-detectable, then the FPRG problem is then guaranteed to 
have a solution. 
Proof: (Only if part) Let Se be an unobservable subspace of system (5.33). To 
satisfy the condition (5.34), we should have B\ c Se,i G \P. Hence, Ci2 C Q~lB\ c 
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Q 1Se = S and by invoking Lemma 5.7, we obtain 
N 
5 e 6 ( a , e , ^ A 2 ) (5.39) 
1=1 
For condition (5.35) to hold, according to the Definition 5.8, L\x should be monic 
(which is already assumed to hold) and Cetl D Se = 0, i € ^ . Thus 
Q~\Cen n Se) = Cn n S = 0, « e * (5.40) 
Therefore, equations (5.39) and (5.40) hold only if equation (5.38) is true. 
(if pa r t ) : Given the unobservability subspace S* which is outer MS-detectable, 
there exist output injection maps D^s and measurement mixing maps i/j's such 
that S* =« C\j=1 Ker HjCj\Ai + DiCi > > j e * where Hj is the solution to equation 
(5.23). Let P be the canonical projection of X on XjS* and Mi, i G ^  be a unique 
solution to MiP = Hid and A0i = (At + D%d : X/S*) where P(Ai + Did) = 
A0iP, J G $ . Due to the fact that S* is assumed to be outer MS-detectable, there 
exist d, i G ^  such that (210G, n) is MS-stable where 210G = {i40i +Gi ML, . . . , ^ W + 
GNMN}. Let us define F* = A0i + GtMz, Ei = P ( A + P~rGiHi), K{ = PB{, i e tf, 
and e(fc) = w(fc) — Px(k). By using equation (5.31) we obtain 
e(fc + 1) =Fiw{k) - E^k) + KiU(k) - P(Aix(k) + Biu(k) + Lrtmi(fc) + Li2m2(k)) 
=FiW(k) - PLlimi{k) - P{At + DiCi)x(k) - GiHidxik) 
=Fiw(k) - PLam^k) - A0iPx(k) - GiMtPx{k) = F^k) - PLnm^k) 
Note that PLi2 = 0,i £ * , since £ l 2 e 5 * , i 6 * . Also 
r{k) = Miw(k) - Hty(k) = MiW(k) - Htdx(k) = M.-e(fc) 
Consequently, the error dynamics can be written according to 
e(k) = Fx{k)e(k) - PL^m^k) 
(5.41) 
r(k) = M(X)e(k) 
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It is clear that the fault mode m2(k) does not, affect the residual signal r(k) and 
since the dynamics (5.41) is observable, condition (5.35) also holds. Moreover, for 
m\(k) — 0 the system is MS-stable and condition (5.36) holds. • 
To conclude this section, we now consider a discrete-time Markovian jump 
system that has multiple faults and that is governed by the following dynamical 
system 
p 
x(k + 1) = Ax{k)x(k) + Bx(k)u(k) + ^ L3x{k)m3{k) 
j=i (5.42) 
y(k) = Cx(k)x{k) x(0) = x0, A(0) = i0 
where all the matrices are the same as in the dynamical model (5.30), L3xik\, j' £ k 
are the fault signatures, and rrij(k) £ Mj, j £ P are the fault modes. We denote 
the fault signatures associated with X(k) = i by L\,i £ ty, j G P . 
The Structured Fault Detection and Isolation Problem (SFDIP) (Section 2.1) 
for the Markovian jump system (5.42) is now defined as the problem of generating p 
residual signals ri(k),l £ p based on a given coding set fij, i £ P , from the following 
Markovian jump detection filters 
wt(k + 1) = Flmwt(k) - Elx{k)y{k) + Klx{k)u(k) 
(5.43) 
n{k) = Mlx{k)Wl(k) - Hlx(k)y(k), I £ p 
such that the residuals ri(k) for I £ Q, are sensitive to a fault of the i-th component, 
and the other residuals ra(k) for a £ p — f2j are insensitive to this fault. The 
solvability condition for the SFDIP problem is obtained by invoking the solvability 
condition that was developed earlier for the FPRG problem as follows: 
Theorem 5.6. The SFDIP problem has a solution for system (5.42) only if 
S f \ p | £ j = 0, ieVJeTj (5.44) 
where S£. = inf 6(21, <£, Y2v=i ^2i4r • ^)> 3 e P- ^n ^ e ° ^ e r hand, if the above 
5p. , j £ p exist such that they are outer MS-detectable, the EFPRG problem is then 
guaranteed to have a solution. 
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Proof: The proof is immediate by following the same steps as in the proof of 
Theorems 5.5 and 2.3. • 
5.4.3 iifoo-based Fault Detec t ion and Isolation Design 
In this section, we consider a discrete-time Markovian jump system that are sub-
jected to both external input and output measurement disturbances and noise and 
that is governed by 
p 
x(k + 1) = Amx(k) + Bmu{k) + Y, Ll{k)mj(k) + Bdx(k)d{k) 
3=1 (5.45) 
y(k) = Cmx(k) + Ddmd(k) 
where all the matrices are defined as in (5.42). The signal d(k) E MP represents an 
unknown disturbance input and output measurement noise. We denote the distur-
bance matrices B l , and D^,k^ associated with A (A;) = i by Bf and Df, i 6 $ . It is 
further assumed that the disturbance input d(t) belongs to Jz?2, i-e. 
1/2 
=(j2dT(k)d(k)) < oo 
fc=0 
Based on the above formulation of the Markovian jump system (5.45), an H^-
based Structured Fault Detection and Isolation Problem (HQO-SFDIP) is introduced 
which is concerned with the design of a set of detection filters (5.43) that generate p 
residuals Tj(k) based on given coding sets fij,z e P such that the residuals r,(i) for 
j € fti are sensitive to a fault of the i-th component, and the other residuals ra(t) 
for a G p — f2j are insensitive to this fault and 
oo 
\\ri\\lE = v{j2rJ(k)rl(k)\(x0^0)} <-?\\d\\2, l e p (5.46) 
fc=0 
for all d{k) e j£?2, where 7 > 0 is the prescribed level of disturbance attenuation. 
Below we first present preliminary results on disturbance attenuation of Marko-
vian jump systems. 
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Lemma 5.8 ( [197]). Consider the system (5.45) with u(k) = 0 and m,j(k) = 0 , j £ 
P. Let 7 > 0 be a given scalar, then the system is mean square stable when d = 0 
and under zero initial conditions satisfies 
\y\kE < 7IMH2 
if there exist matrices Ri > 0, i G \£ such that the following LMIs: 
(5.47) 
AjRiAi - Ri AjRiBf a 
? d T 
-Yl + BfRtB? Dt 
I 
< 0 (5.48) 
^Af hold for i G ^  where Ri = ^2j=1^ijRj- Moreover. LMI (5.48) is equivalent to 
-Ri Ai Ri 0 c; 
-•Rj ^ i - ^ i 0 
- 7
2 7 D: dT 
< 0 (5.49) 
/or i G ^ . 
Lemma 5.9 ( [198]). The LMI (5.49) with Ri > 0, i £ ^ is feasible if and only if 









-7 2 / Df 
< 0 
We are now in a position to derive our sufficient conditions for determining 
the solvability of the HQQ-SFDIP problem for discrete-time MJS systems. 
Theorem 5.7. The H^-SFDIP problem defined by expressions (5.46) and (5.43) 






such that «Sp P|£^ = 0, i G $ , j G T| as well as the matrices Tl, <$l and positive-
definite matrices R[, i E ^, I E p such that 
-R\ A^! + MJTT: T ^ T 0 MJT 
* —^  ?! + M &!B*-T!H!Df 0 i li """ i' 
„ 2 l 
"72 / £> d
T 
< 0 (5.51) 
w/jere P- = Y^j=inijPlj and Pi *s ^ e canonical projection of X on X/S^, Bf{ = 
-PiBf - PiD[Df, Dfi = -H\DJ, the pairs (M\,A\), i E ^, I E p are the factor 
system of the pairs (d,Ai),i £ ^ on X/S£ and Hi is the solution to Ker HlCi = 
S^ + KerQ. 
Proof: Given the common unobservability subspaces S^{, there exist output 
injection maps D\ and measurement mixing maps Hi i £ \&, / £ p such that 
S* =« Ker H\Ci\Ai + D\d » i € * 
where Hi is the solution to Ker Hid — «Sj* + Ker d- Let Ml be a unique solution 
to MltPi = Hid and 
4 = (Ai + D*Ci:X/Sll) 
where P ( A + £>-C;) = A\Pt. Let 7^ and iff be the solution to the inequality 
(5.51) and define G\ = ^ f ^ and F/ = A\ + G{M/, £j = Pt{D\ + p-rG\Hl). Let 
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K\ = PiBi. Define ei(k) = W[(k) — Pix(k), then using (5.31) we have 
et(k + 1) = FliWl{k) - E\y{k) + K\u{k) 
L 
- Pi(AiX(k) + Bzu(k) + Bfd(k) + J2 Hrrijik)) 
= Fiwi(k) - J2 PiHrnjik) - PtBfd(k) 
jer, 
- Pt{Ai + D[Ci)x{k) - GliH\Cix{k) - E\Ddzd{k) 
= FllWl{k) - J2 PiL\m3{k) + (Bft - GlHltDf)d(k) - A\PlX(k) - GlMPlX(k) 
jer, 
= {A + GtMlMQ - £ PiUmjik) + (B* - C^H\Df)d{k) 
jer, 
Note that PXL\ = 0,i 6 <H,j< £ Th since C{ e S^,j <£ T;. Also 
n(t) = MliWl(k) - H\y{k) = MliWl{k) - H!CiX{k)-H!Dfd{k) = M/e,(*0 + D%d{k) 
Consequently, the error dynamics can be written as 
et(k + 1) =(4 + GlMlMk) " E ^L>j(k) + (J3* - G\H\Di)d{k) 
i^i (5.52) 
rt(k) =Mliei(k) + Df^k) 
Using Lemma 5.8 and the inequality (5.49), it follows that the inequality (5.46) 
holds. Moreover, from the error dynamics (5.52), it follows that ri(k) is only affected 
by L3x,kyj e Ti and is decoupled from other fault signatures. • 
After constructing the residual signals ri(k),l E p, the last step for a suc-
cessful fault detection and isolation is the residual evaluation stage which includes 
determining evaluation functions Jri and thresholds Jthr In this paper, evaluation 
functions and thresholds are selected as 
k 
k—ko 
Jthl = sup E{Jri), I e p (5.54) 
de£2,mj=o.jeri 
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where k0 is the length of the evaluation window. Based on the above thresholds and 
evaluation functions, the occurrence of a fault can be detected and isolated by using 
the following decision logics 
Jn > Jth, V7 G flj ==> rrij ^ 0, j ' G P (5.55) 
5.4.4 FDI of a Formation Flight of Satellites 
In order to investigate the effect of packet dropout on the FDI of formation flight 
of four satellites (Section 3.3.3), two different topologies (neighboring sets) are con-
sidered here. The first one is the same as the network topology that is considered 
in Section 3.3.3, namely Nx = {2}, N2 = {1,3}, Nz = {4} and N4 = {1}. It can 
be verified that the SFDIP problem has a solution for the same coding sets as in 
Section 3.3.3 and hence the packet dropout does not change the detectability index 
of the actuator fault signatures of the vehicles. This is due to the fact that the 
graph of the network remains weakly connected when all the arcs that leave node % 
are deleted for each i e N. 
The second topology that is considered here is as Ni = {2}, iV2 = {3}, N3 = 
{4} and N4 = {2}. It can be verified that the SFDIP problem has a solution 
with the same coding sets as in the first topology when the communication links 
are considered to be ideal (without time-delay and packet dropout, i.e. system 
(5.2)). However, in the presence of imperfect communication links (system (5.5)), 
the SFDIP problem does not have a solution for this coding sets and hence the 
detectability index of the actuator fault signatures is less than the ideal case. This 
is due to the fact that when the graph of the network does not remain weakly 
connected when the arc leaving node 1 to node 2 is deleted. In other words, when 
the measurement from the vehicle 1 is lost, there exists no way to recover this 
information. 
Next, we try to find a suitable coding sets for the above network. Due to 
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the lack of measurement from satellite 1 when there is a packet dropout in the 
communication link between this satellite and central FDI unit, actuator faults 
in satellite 1 cannot be decoupled. In other words, we have C\\ C «S*(£i2) and 
C\2 C S*(C\\). Hence, these two fault signatures are considered together as a sub-
family FL\ = {£n, £12}- Now, we consider the generalized residual set for the 7 
fault signatures FL\ and Ckj, k G {2,3,4}, j G {1,2}. In other words, we con-
sider the following coding sets QFLI = {2, 3,4, 5,6, 7}, Q2i = {1,3,4, 5, 6, 7}, Q22 = 
{1,2,4,5,6,7}, fi31 = {1,2,3,5,6,7}, Q32 = {1,2,3,4,6,7}, Q41 = {1,2,3,4,5,7} 
and 04 1 = {1, 2, 3,4, 5,6}. It can be verified that the SFDIP problem has a solution 
for these coding sets, and hence one can detect and isolate single fault in the actu-
ators of satellites 2,3 and 4 but actuator faults of satellite 1 cannot be isolated and 
only occurrence of a fault in this satellite can be detected and isolated. 
For simulations a 10% packet dropout rate is considered for all the commu-
nication links and hence the following transition probability is considered for the 


























The length of the evaluation window is selected as k0 — 50 (5 seconds). By 
considering the worst case analysis of the residuals corresponding to the healthy 
operation of the satellites that are subject to measurement noise, threshold values 
Jthi = Jth2 = 0.002, Jtfl3 = 0.001, Jthi = Jth5 = Jth6 = Jthr = 0.0006 are selected for 
the residual signals for fault detection and isolation logic evaluation and analysis. 
Two fault scenarios are considered here for simulations. In the first one, a 
Lock-in-place fault is injected at the first actuator of satellite 1 at t = 20 where 
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?xn = —1. Figure 5.3 shows the residual evaluation functions that are generated by 
using our detection filters associated with the considered fault scenario. As shown 
in this figure, the injected fault can be detected and isolated among the satellites 
based on the coding set HF^- However, one cannot isolate between the actuators 
of satellite 1. In the second fault scenario, a Lock-in-place fault is injected at the 
second actuator of satellite 2 at t = 25 where M22 = 0.5. Figure 5.4 depicts the 
residual evaluation functions corresponding to this fault scenario. Based on this 
figure and the coding sets Q22, this fault can be detected and isolated. 
5.5 Continuous-time Markovian Jump Systems 
Consider the following Markovian jump system 
x(t) = A(X(t))x(t) + B(X(t))u(t) 
(5.56) 
y(t) = C(X(t))x{t), x{0) = x0, A(0) = i0 
where x e X is the state of the system with dimension n; u G U,y € y are 
input and output signals with dimensions m and q, respectively; and {X(t),t > 0} 
is a continuous-time irreducible Markov process taking values in the finite set ^ = 
{1,..., N}. The Markov process describes the switching between the different system 
modes and its evolution is governed by the following probability transitions: 
{ nub, + o(h) when X(t) jumps from i to 7 1 + Irak + o(h), otherwise 
where 7^ is the transition rate from mode i to mode j with mj > 0 when i ^ j , 
TTU = ~Ylj=i jjtiniji a n d o(h) is a function that satisfies /Jm/,_,o^ = 0. The 
matrices A(X(t)), B(X(t)) and C(X(t)) are known constant matrices for all X(t) = 
i £ ty. For simplicity, we denote the matrices associated with X(t) = i by A(X(t)) = 
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Figure 5.3: Residual evaluation functions corresponding to a fault in the first actu-
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Figure 5.4: Residual evaluation functions corresponding a fault in the second actu-
ator of satellite 2. 
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by (a,*B,e,II), where 21 = (A1,...,AN)J 03 = {BU...,BN), £ = (CI , . . . ,CJV) and 
n = [TTij], ij e #. 
5.5.1 Unobservable and Unobservability Subspaces 
Similar to Section 5.4.1, in this section a geometric definition for unobservable sub-
space of continuous-time Markovian jump systems (MJS) is introduced. The notion 
of unobservability subspace is then formalized for continuous-time MJS systems that 
are governed by (5.56). We first start with the definition of weak observability for 
Markovian jump system (5.56) with Bj = 0 , J E ^ . 
Definition 5.9 ( [199]). The system (21, £, n) is said to be weakly (W-) observable 
when there exist ta > 0 and 7 > 0 such that Wtd(x, i) > T|X|2 for each x £ X and 
i G <f where 
WT(x,i) = E{ / xT(r)Cj(T)CxiT)x{r)dT\x{0) = x,X0 = i} (5.57) 
In [199], a collection of matrices O = {Ci, ...,ON} is introduced for testing 
the W-observability of the Markovian jump systems according to the following pro-
cedure. Let Oi(0) = CjCi, « £ $ and define the sequence of matrices as 
N 
Ot(k) = AjOi(k - 1) + Oi(k - l)Ai + ^ 7r0-Oj(fe - 1), k > 0, i £ $> (5.58) 
i= i 
The matrix Oi is defined according to 
Oi = [Oi(0) Oi(l) • • • Ot{n2N - 1)]T (5.59) 
Theorem 5.8 ( [199]). The MJS system (5.56) is W-observable if and only if Oi 
has a full rank for each i £ ty. 
It is also known that system (5.56) is W-observable if each pair (Ai, C*), i £ fy 
is observable. However, this condition is not necessary [199]. By considering the 
above definition of W-observability, one can define the set of unobservable states as 
follows. 
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Definition 5.10. A state x is said to be unobservable ifWJ(x,i) — 0 for all t > 0 
and i e $ . 
Let Q denotes the unobservable set of the MJS system (5.56), i.e. 
Q = {x\WT(x,i) = 0,Vi € V,t > 0} (5.60) 
It is shown in [199] that for an irreducible Markov processes, N{Oi) = N{Oj}, i, j G 
\I>, i ^ j and Q = M{Oi\. Therefore, Q is the subspace of X and is called 
the unobservable subspace of the Markovian jump system (5.56). The theorem 
introduced below characterizes a geometric property of Q. 
Theorem 5.9. An unobservable subspace Q for the system (21, <£, U) with irre-
ducible Markov process is the largest Ai-invariant (i G ty) that is contained in 
IC = C\l1KerCl. 
Proof: It follows from the above discussion that Q C Ker d, i G ^ , and hence 
Q C /C. Let x G Q- Our goal is to show that Atx G Q for all i 6 $ (i.e. Q is 
^-invariant, i G #) . Since x G Af{Oi(k - 1)} and x G Af{Oi(k)}, i G #, then 
N 
Oi(k)x = AjOi(k - l)x + Oi{k - l)AiX + ^ ^O^k - l)x = Ot(k - l)Azx = 0 
3 = 1 
Hence AiX G N{Oi(k — 1)} and Q is ^-invariant for all i e ty. 
Next we show that Q is the largest Aj-invariant (i 6 $) that is contained in 
/C. Let V be an A-invariant (i G $) subspace that is contained in /C. Clearly, 
V C M{Oi(0)}, i G ^ . Let V C M{Oi{k - 1)}, i G * and x G V, then 
JV 
Oi(fc)a; = AjOiik - l)x + 0{(k - l)Atx + ^ iZijOj{k - l)x = 0 
3=1 
since 0;(A; — l)x = 0, i G \I> and ^ x G V (V is ^-invariant). Hence, V C 
J\f{Oi(k)}, i G \P and V C Q. This shows that Q contains all the subspaces 
that are ^-invariant (i G \P) and is contained in /C. • 
168 
The same algorithm as in Algorithm 5.1 can be used for obtaining an unobserv-
able subspace of continuous-time Markovian jump system (5.56). Moreover, similar 
definition of conditioned invariant and unobservability subspaces for discrete-time 
MJS can be applied to continuous-time MJS (Definitions 5.5 and 5.6, respectively) 
and the same algorithm can be used for obtaining such subspaces (Algorithms 5.2 
and 5.3, respectively). 
Next, we present definitions for stability and detectability of MJS systems. 
Definition 5.11 ( [199]). The system (21,11) is mean square (MS) stable if for each 
XQ e X and i0 e * , 
lim E{||x(i)||2} = 0 (5.61) 
t—>oo 
MS-detectability of continuous-time MJS is defined similarly to discrete-time MJS 
as follows 
Definition 5.12 ( [199]). We say that (21, <£, II) is MS-detectable when there exists 
G = {G\,..., GN} of appropriate dimension for which (21^, II) is MS-stable, where 
2tG = {A, + G1Cl,..., AN + GNCN}. 
The following computational linear matrix inequalities can be used for testing 
the MS-detectability of a continuous-time MJS system [199]. In other words, the 
MS-detectability of (21, <£, II) is equivalent, to the feasibility of the set 
N 
AjXi + XiA + CJLj + LiCi + J27rvXti)<0> i = l,-,N (5.62) 
i=i 
in the unknowns Xi > 0 and L, with appropriate dimensions. In [199] an example 
is given that is W-observable but not MS-detectable. The example below illustrates 
the results that we have developed so far for the MJS systems. It also shows that 
an MJS system could be MS-detectable or not depending on the mode transition 
matrix. 
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, C i = 0 0 ,c2 = 0 1 ;n = 
- 1 1 
1 - 1 
From (5.59), one can evaluate rank((9i)=rank(02)=l and Theorem 5.8 en-
sures that this system is not W-observable. Using Algorithm 5.1, the unobservable 




The factor system for the above system can be found as {A\ : X/S) = 1, (A2 : 
X/S) = 5, (Ci : X/S) = 0, and (C2 : X/S) = 1, which is clearly W-observable, 
but according to (5.62) it is not MS-detectable. However, corresponding to the 
probability transition matrix 
n 
-10 10 
3 - 3 
the above factor system is both W-observable and MS-detectable. 
The above example shows that W-observability is a structural property of the 
MJS system with irreducible Markov processes which depends on only the matrices 
Ai's and Q's (this also follows from Theorem 5.9), but the MS-detectability depends 
furthermore on the mode transition matrix EL 
Remark 5.3. It should be emphasized that our proposed Theorem 5.9 and Algorithm 
5.1 do indeed provide a less computationally intensive method for verifying the W-
observability of the Markovian jump systems in comparison with the results in [199], 
where one needs to obtain the N matrices Oi G TZn(n N)xn. 
We are now in a position to formally introduce the fundamental problem in 
residual generation (FPRG) for the Markovian jump systems. 
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5.5.2 Fault Detection and Isolation Based on Geometric Ap-
proach 
Similar to Section 5.4.2, in this section the Fundamental Problem in Residual Gener-
ation is now investigated for the continuous-time Markovian jump systems. Consider 
the following Markovian jump system 
x(t) = A{X(t))x(t) + B(X(t))u(t) + Li(A(t))m!(t) + L2{X{t))m2{t) 
(5.63) 
y(t) = C(X(t))x(t), x(0) = x0, A(0) = i0 
where it is assumed that all the matrices are the same as in (5.56) and the Markov 
process X(t) is irreducible. The matrices Li(X(t)), L2(X(t)) represent the fault sig-
natures and are monic and rrii(t) E Mi C X, % = 1, 2 denote the fault modes. We 
denote the fault signatures associated with X(t) = i by Ln and Li2. The fault modes 
together with the fault signatures can be used to model the effects of actuator faults, 
sensor faults and system faults on the dynamics of the system. For example, the 
effect of a fault in the i-th actuator may be represented by Ln as the i-th column 
of Bi and if an actuator fails, then mi{t) = —Ui(t). 
The FPRG problem is concerned with the design of a Markovian jump residual 
generator that is governed by the filter dynamics of the form 
w(t) = F(X(t))w(t) - E(X(t))y(t) + K(X(t))u(t) 
(5.64) 
r(t) = M(X(t))w(t) - H(X(t))y(t) 
where w(t) G T C X such that the response of r(t) is affected by the fault mode 
mi (t) and is decoupled from m2 (t) and if m\ is identically zero then 
lim E|jr(t)||2 = 0 
t—»oo 
for any input signal u(t). 
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Define the extended space Xe = X © T and Ue = U © M2, so that equation 
(5.65) can be expressed as 
(5.66) 
x
e{t) = Ae(X(t))xe(t) + Be(X(t))ue(t) + Z,;(A(t))mi(t) 
r(t) = He{X{t))xe{t) 
with xe(t) G Xe and ue eW e . Similar to input observability for the discrete-
time Markovian jump systems, the same notion the continuous-time Markovian jump 
system is defined below. 
Definition 5.13. The Markovian jump system (5.56) is said to be input observable 
if Bi, i G \I> is monic and the image of Bi 's does not intersect with the unobservable 
subspace of system (5.56). 
Based on the above definition, the FPRG problem can now be formally stated 
as the problem of designing the dynamical filter (5.64) such that 
(a) r is decoupled from ue, (5.67) 
(b) mi is input observable in the augmented system (5.66), and (5.68) 
(c) limE{||r(t)||2} = 0 , for m^t) = 0, V i0 G * and Vx£ G Xe. (5.69) 
It is easy to show that Lemma 5.7 holds also for continuous-time MJS with 
the embedding map defined in (5.37). We are now in a position to derive the 
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solvability condition for the FPRG problem corresponding to the Markovian jump 
system (5.63). 
Theorem 5.10. The FPRG problem has a solution for the augmented MJS system 
(5.66) only if 
S*f]Cn = 0, j e * (5.70) 
where S* = inf ©(21, £, $^=i A2)- On the other hand, if the above S* exists such 
that it is also outer MS-detectable, then the FPRG problem is then guaranteed to 
have a solution. 
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 5.5. • 
The next example illustrates through a detailed derivation steps how to design 
the detection filter (5.64) for a given Markovian jump system. 
Example 5.3. Consider the Markovian jump system (5.63) with N = 2 and matri-
ces Ai,Ci, i — 1,2 as follows 
Ax = 
0 3 4 
1 2 3 
0 2 5 
, A2 = 
1 2 4 
2 - 1 2 
0 1 4 
,Ci = 
0 1 0 
0 0 1 ,c 2 = 
1 1 0 
0 0 1 














i £ # 
respectively. The unobservability subspace <S*(£J2) is found from Algorithm 5.3 which 
is given by 
- 3 
S*(Cl2) = 1 
0 
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It is clear that «S*(£i2) Pi Cn = 0. It can be checked that S*(Ci2) is outer MS-
detectable and hence the FPRG problem has a solution. According to Theorem 5.10, 
the matrices that specify the governing dynamics of the detection filter in (5.64) are 
found through the following steps (all the geometric manipulations are performed by 
using the "geometric approach toolbox" [200]) : 




- 2 -2.5 
,D2 = 
-1 .1 -0 .5 
-3 .3 -1.5 
0.5 -2.0 
2. The measurement maps Hi are found from equation (5.23) as H\ = H2 
0 1 
3. The canonical projection map P for S*(Ci2) is given by 
1 - 3 0 
0 0 1 
4. The maps Afa = M2 = 
1,2 










5. The induced maps A0i are found from (2.23) as follows 
A01 = 
6. The maps Gi are obtained by solving the corresponding LMVs by using the 








Figure 5.5: Residual signal: (a) m2(t) = 0.1, t > lOsec; (b) mi(t) = 0.1, t > lbsec 






- 2 -5.798 
,Fo 
,E2 = 




It is interesting to note that the FPRG problem for the mode 1 by itself does 
not have a solution since Cn C S^. However, when there is a jump in the system, 
one can solve the FPRG problem. Figure 5.5 shows the residual signal r(t) that is 
obtained for the above system by constructing the detection filter (5.64). Two fault 
scenarios are considered: (a) m2(t) = 0.1,t > 10 seconds, and (b) mi(t) = 0.1,t > 
15 seconds. As shown in Figure 5.5 the residual signal is only affected by m\{t) and 
the fault mode m2(t) does not have any effect on it. 
To conclude this section, we now consider a Markovian jump system that has 
multiple faults and that is governed by the following dynamical system 
x(t) = A(X(t))x(t) + B(X{t))u{t) + J2Lj(Ht))rnj{t) 
y(t) = C(X(t))x(t) x(0) = x0. A(0) = i0 
(5.71) 
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where all the matrices are the same as in the dynamical model (5.63), Lj(\(k)), j £ k 
are the fault signatures, and nij(t) £ Mj, j £ k are the fault modes. We denote 
the fault signatures associated with X(t) = i by Lij,i 6 ^ , j e k. 
The SFDIP problem for the Markovian jump system (5.71) is now defined as 
the problem of generatingp residual signals rj(t),j £ p from the following Markovian 
jump detection filters 
Wj(t) = FjMtywjit) - ^-(A(O)y(t) + #,-(A(t))«(t) 
(5.72) 
r3{t) = A/3-(A(t)H(i) - HjiXitMt), j £ k 
such that the residuals Tj(t) for j £ Vti are sensitive to a fault of the z-th component, 
and the other residuals ra(t) for a £ p — Oj are insensitive to this fault. The 
solvability condition for the SFDIP problem is obtained by invoking the solvability 
condition that was developed earlier for the FPRG problem as follows: 
Theorem 5.11. The SFDIP problem has a solution for system (5.71) only if 
5 ; . p | £ | = 0 , ie*,leTj (5.73) 
where 
N 
^ . = i n f 6 ( 2 l , € , ^ ^ 4 ) , jep (5.74) 
On the other hand, if the above S*,j £ k exist such that they are outer MS-detectable, 
the EFPRG problem is then guaranteed to have a solution. 
Proof: The proof is immediate by following along the lines that we developed for 
the proof of Theorems 5.10 and 2.3. • 
5.5.3 iifoo-based Fault Detec t ion and Isolation Design 
In this section, we consider Markovian jump systems that are subjected to both ex-




x(t) = A(\(t))x(t) + B{X{t))u(t) + Y^ Lj{\(t))mj{t) + Bd{\{i))d{t) 
J=I (5.75) 
y(t) = C(X(t))x(t) + Dd(X(t))d(t) 
where all the matrices are defined as in (5.71). The signal d(t) e W represents an un-
known disturbance input and output measurement noise. We denote the disturbance 
matrices Bd(X(t)) and Dd(X(t)) associated with X(t) = i by Bdi and Ddi, i e \P. It 
is further assumed that the disturbance input d(t) belongs to ^ [ 0 , oo], i.e. 
/•OO 
||d(*)||2 = / dJ{t)d(t)dt < oo 
./o 
Moreover, it is assumed that the mode transition matrix II is not known 
precisely. In other words, it belongs to the following admissible uncertainty do-
main [202]: 
®n = {n + An : | A n y | < eij: aj > 0, Vi, j e tf, i ? j} (5.76) 
where A = [fry] is a known constant matrix and denotes the estimated value of n 
and An = [A7Ty] denotes the uncertainty in the mode transition rate matrix. 
Based on the above formulation of the Markovian jump system (5.75), an 
i^oo-based Extended Fundamental Problem in Residual Generation (HEFPRG) is 
introduced which is concerned with the design of a set of detection filters (5.72) that 
generate k residuals rj(t) such that a fault in the l-th component mi(t) ^ 0 can only 
affect the residual rt(t) and no other residual rj(t)(j ^ I) and 
\\rl\\lE = E{j°°rl(t)rl(t)dt\(xo,io)}<l2\\d\\2, l e k (5.77) 
for all d(t) e «£?2 and n G £}n, where 7 > 0 is the prescribed level of disturbance 
attenuation. 
Below we first present a preliminary result on disturbance attenuation of 
Markovian jump systems. 
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L e m m a 5.10. [190] Let 7 be a given positive constant. If there exists a set of sym-
metric and positive-definite matrices 91 = (i?i,.. . , RN) > 0 such that the following 
set of coupled LMIs hold for every i G \P: 
< 0 (5.78) 




where Ji = AjRi + RiAi + Yl,j=\ nijRj + CjCi; then system (5.75) with u(t) = 0 
and rrij(t)-= 0, j G k is stochastically stable and for zero initial conditions satisfies 
the inequality 
WVWIE = E { j°°yT(t)y(t)dt\(x0,i0)} < 72||d||2, I e k (5.79) 
A system that satisfies the above conditions is said to be stochastically stable 
with a 7-disturbance attenuation. 
In the next lemma we consider the effects of uncertainties in the mode transi-
tion matrix II for analyzing the stochastic stability properties of system (5.75). 
L e m m a 5.11. Let 7 be a given positive constant. If there exists a set of symmetric 
and positive-definite matrices D\ = (Ri,..., RN) > 0 and {£y > 0,i,j G ty,i 7^  j} 
such that the following set of coupled LMIs holds for every j 6 $ : 
where 




* * —H, 
TV 
< 0 (5.80) 
N 
Qi = AjRi + RiA + ^2nijRj + CJCi+ ]T ^fe%I 
M,- = Ri — R\ 
j = 1 3=1,j& 
Ri — Ri-1 Ri — Ri+1 • • " Ri — RN 
c.i = diag(€nl, ...,^-1)1,^+1)1, ...,£iNI) 
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then the uncertain system (5.75) with u(t) — 0 and mj(t) = 0, j G k is stochastically 
stable. Moreover, for zero initial conditions the system satisfies the inequality (5.79) 
for allU G 9n. 
Proof: According to Lemma 5.10, the uncertain system (5.75) with u(t) = 0 and 
mj(t) = 0, j G k is stochastically stable with 7-disturbance attenuation if 
N 
AjRi + RiAi+ ^((Tfy + &KH)RJ + CjQ 
- {CjDdi + RiB^DlD* - ^I)-\CjDdi + i ^ ) T < 0 
for all i G ^ . The above inequality can be rewritten as [202] 
N N
 1 1 
AjRt + RiAi + ] T ^ R j + Cjd + ] T [-ATTtjiRj - Ri) + ^ij(R3 - Ri)) 
- (CjDdl + RiB^iDlDdi - 72/)-1(C7Z)di + i ^ ) T < 0 
The above inequality holds for all |A7Tjj| < e^ if there exist fy > 0, i, j G ^ , i 7^  j 
such that 
N N 
AjRi + RlAi + J2TrijRj + CjCl+ ] T f-fey + -(R3 - R,)2} 
i = i j = i j ^ ^ J 
- (CjDdi + RiBxHDlD* - -fiy^CjD* + RiBdi)T < 0 
It can be shown easily that the above is equivalent to the inequality (5.80) by using 
the Schur complement. • 
We are now in a position to derive our sufficient conditions for determining 
the solvability of the HEFPRG problem for an uncertain MJS system. 
Theorem 5.12. The HEFPRG problem has a solution for the Markovian jump sys-
tem (5.75) with uncertain mode transition matrix if there exist k outer MS-detectable 
unobservability subspaces S* = inf (3(21, £, XX=i X^=i i^j £vi),j G k such that 
« S ; P | £ y = 0 , ie^Jek (5.81) 
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as well as the matrices Tij, positive-definite matrices Rij. i £ $ , j G k. and {£^ > 
0, i, I G \l>, i 7^ /, J; 6 k} such that 
< 0 (5.82) 
^Cij ij ij di -^ij*j•'-'ij*-** di -^ij*j*-*di -*- ij•**ij*-*di ^ij 
DlHj3Hl3Ddl-^I 0 
for all i G ty,j G k with 
N N j 
Qij = AjjRij + MjjTlTj+RijAij + TijMlj + Y/«uRii + M?jMlj+ £ ^e2uI 
" j j 
i=i 
e0- = Rij — R\j • • • R^ — R(i-\)j Rij — it(j_)_i)j 
Eij = diag(&I,..., ^ _ x ) / , ?i(i+l)I, - , ?iNI) 
1=1,tyi 
riij ti-Nj 
and where Pj is the canonical projection of X on X/S*. the pairs (Mij,Aij), i e $ , 
j E k are the factor system of the pairs (C,, Ai), i G ^ on X/S*, Hij is the solution 
to Ker Hijd = S* + Ker Q and S* = « f)"=1 Ker EijCx\Ai + Dtjd » t g « , j € k. 
Proof: Given Pj as the canonical projection of X on X/S*, let M ^ , i G $ be a 
unique solution to MijPj = EijCi and define Aij = (Ai + DijCi : X/Sj),i G V&. 
Let Gij = R'^Tij, i 6 $ , j 6 k where T^ and Rij are solutions to the inequality 
(5.82). Define F{j = A{j + GijMij, E{j = P , ( A j + P~rGijHij) and K{j = PjBi for 
i G \£, j G k. Furthermore, define ej(t) = Wj(t) — Pjx(t), so that by using (5.72) we 
have 
k 
ej(t) = FijWj(t) - Eijy(t) + Kiju{t) - Pj(Aix{k) + BiU(k) + ] T Larrn(t) + Bdid{t)) 
i=i 
={Aij + GijMij)ej(t) - PjLijijijit) - PjDijDdid{t) - PjBdld{t) - G ^ Dd id(t) 
Also 
rj(t) = MijWj{t) - Hi3y{i) = Mi3Wj(t) - H^C^t) - HijDdid{t) 
= Mte3(t) - HijDdld(t) 
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Consequently, the error dynamics associated with the detection filters can be ex-
pressed as 
ej(t) =(Aij + GijMij)ej{t) - P^m^t) 
- PjDijDjidit) - PjBdid(t) - GijHijDd.dit) 
rj(t) =Mijej{t) - Hl3Ddid(t) (5.83) 
Therefore, the residual r,- is only affected by the fault rrij and according to Lemma 
5.11 and inequality (5.82), the disturbance attenuation inequality (5.77) holds for 
all the residuals rj(t), j' G k. • 
Remark 5.4. It should be noted in the above theorem that since we only considered 
the sufficient solvability conditions for the HEFPRG problem, there was no need to 
consider an augmented system for the purpose of analysis and proof. 
Once the residual signals rj(t),j 6 k are constructed and generated, the final 
step in developing a reliable fault detection and isolation strategy deals with the 
residual evaluation process which involves determining the evaluation functions Jr 
and their associated thresholds Jth • In this paper, the evaluation functions and 
the thresholds are selected, respectively according to the following formal criteria, 
namely 
J
ri<t)= [ rJ(r)rj(T)dT, jek (5.84) 
Jt-To 
Jth.= sup E(J r ,) , j e k (5.85) 
where To is the length of the evaluation window. According to the above thresholds 
and evaluation functions, the occurrence of a fault can be detected and isolated by 
using the following decision logics 
Jrj > Jthj = > rrij ± 0, j £ k (5.86) 
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5.5.4 A Case Study 
In this section, our proposed H^-based FDI algorithm is applied to a VTOL (vertical 
take-off and landing) helicopter [190,203]. The dynamics of the VTOL system can 
be written as 
x(t) = A(X(t))x(t) + B(X(t))u(t) + L!(A(t))mi(t) + L2(X(t))m2(t) + Bdd[t) 
y(t) = Cx{t) + Ddd(t) 
(5.87) 
where X(t) is a continuous time Markov process with three different modes that 
correspond to the airspeeds 135 (nominal value), 60 and 170 knots. The state 
variables corresponding to the system are taken as the horizontal velocity (xi), the 
vertical velocity (x2), the pitch rate (x^), and the pitch angle (:r4). The input 
signals U\ and u2 are the collective pitch control and the longitudinal cyclic pitch 
control, respectively. The input signal d(t) represents the external disturbances and 
uncertainties. The matrices associated with the VTOL system are given by 
A(X(t)) 
-0.04 0.04 0.02 -0 .5 
0.05 -1.01 0.0 -4 .0 
0.1 a32(A(«)) -0.71 a34(X{t)) 







1 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 














where the values of the parameters a32(A(£)), a34(A(i)), and b2i(X(t)) are given in 
Table 5.1. The fault signatures Li(X(i)) and L2(X(t)) represent the actuator faults, 
and hence are selected as the first and the second columns of B(X(t)). Different 
fault modes can be considered for actuators in general [204], namely, i) lock-in-place 
182 

















(LIP), ii) loss of effectiveness, iii) float, and iv) hard over. For this application and 
due to space limitations we consider LIP, loss of effectiveness , and float faults. The 
mode transition matrix is taken as 
n 
-2.09 1.07 1.02 
0.07 -0.07 0.0 
0.02 0.0 -0.02 
with an uncertainty level of Cij = 0.1, i,j £ tyi ^ j as specified in equation (5.76). 
The FDI problem that is considered here for the VTOL is to design two residual 
signals ri(t) and r2{t) such that r\(t) is only affected by the first actuator fault 
(mi(t)) and r2(£) is only affected by the second actuator fault (m,2(t)). Moreover, 
the effect of the disturbance input d(t) on these residuals is attenuated with a factor 
of 7. According to the results of Theorem 5.12, we first need to construct the 
unobservability subspaces S% = inf(2l, <T, £2) and S% = inf(2l, <£, ^2i=1 Cn). These 











It can be easily verified that the necessary conditions Si D Cn ~ 0, i = 1,2,3 
and «S| fl £2 = 0 are both satisfied. Next we need to verify the feasibility of the 
inequality (5.82) corresponding to a given disturbance attenuation level 7. Using 
the LMI toolbox, inequality (5.82) is solved for 7 = 0.1. Subsequently, all the maps 
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and matrices that are denned in Theorem 5.12 are obtained. It should be noted that 
from equation (5.72), r\ e K2 and r2 e K. 
The disturbance inputs d\(t) and d2(t) are assumed to be independent and 
band-limited white-noises with the power of 0.1 and 0.2, respectively. The length 
of the evaluation window is selected as To = 2 seconds. The calculated thresholds 
are found to be Jth2 = Jth2 = 5e — 3. Figure 5.6 shows both the residuals and 
the evaluation functions corresponding to a float fault that is injected in the first 
actuator (ui) at t = 25 seconds (float fault implies that the actuator is frozen at 
zero output). This fault can be modeled as mi(t) = —Ui(t), where mi(t) is the fault 
mode of the first actuator. As shown in Figure 5.6, the fault is detected and isolated 
at t = 34 seconds and the evaluation function of r2 (i.e. Jr2) remains below its 
corresponding threshold. Figure 5.7 shows the residuals and the evaluation functions 
corresponding to an intermittent fault that is injected in the second actuator where 
the actuator is locked (LIP fault) at a value of 0.1 between t = 20 and t = 30 
seconds. This fault can be modeled as m2(£) = — u2(t) + 0.1, where m2(£) is the 
fault mode of the second actuator. As shown in Figure 5.7, this fault is detected 
and isolated at t — 22.5 seconds and the evaluation function of r\ (i.e. J r i) remains 
below its associated threshold. Figure 5.8 shows the residuals and the evaluation 
functions corresponding to simultaneous faults that are injected in both actuators 
where a 50% loss of effectiveness (gain) fault is occurred in the first actuator at 
t = 25 seconds and the second actuator is locked at the output value of 0.1 between 
t = 20 and t = 30 seconds. According to Figure 5.8, both faults are properly 
detected and isolated at time t = 25 seconds and t = 26 seconds, respectively. 
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Figure 5.6: Residual signals and their evaluation functions corresponding to a float 
fault in the first actuator m\ = —u\ (the dashed line in JTi denotes the threshold). 
Figure 5.7: Residual signals and their evaluation functions corresponding to a lock-
in-place (LIP) fault in the second actuator r\%2 = — U2 + 0.1 (the dashed line in Jr% 













Figure 5.8: Residual signals and their evaluation functions corresponding to multiple 
faults in actuators, namely a 50% loss of effectiveness fault in the first actuator and 
a lock in place fault in the second actuator (the dashed line in JTi denotes the 
threshold). 
5.6 Conclusions 
The problem of fault detection and isolation in a network of unmanned vehicles in 
the presence of imperfect communication links is investigated in this chapter in the 
framework of Markovian jump systems. A geometric approach to the problem of 
fault detection and isolation of both continuous-time and discrete-time linear Marko-
vian jump systems is developed. Starting with a new geometric characterization of 
the unobservable subspace of a Markovian jump system, the concept of unobserv-
ability subspaces is formalized and an algorithm for constructing these subspaces is 
presented. By invoking the notion of unobservability subspace, the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for solving the fundamental problem of residual generation for 
Markovian jump systems is formally investigated. For uncertain Markovian jump 
systems, an i/^-based fault detection and isolation strategy is proposed and de-
veloped where a set of residual signals are constructed such that each residual is 
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1" r component 
only affected by one fault, and is decoupled from the others while the H^ norm of 
the transfer function between the unknown input (external disturbances and out-
put measurement noise) and the residual signals is guaranteed to be less than a 
prescribed desired value. Simulation results for application of our proposed novel 
methodologies to a VTOL (vertical take-off and landing) helicopter and network of 
unmanned vehicles are also presented to demonstrate and illustrate their effective-
ness and capabilities. 
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Chapter 6 
Robust Fault Detection and 
Isolation of Time-Delay Systems 
This chapter investigates the development of fault detection and isolation filters for 
retarded, neutral, distributed and stochastic time-delay systems. The notion of a 
finite unobservability subspace is introduced for time-delay systems and it is shown 
that this subspace can be considered as an unobservability subspace for Makovian 
jump systems where all modes of MJS system have identical measurement matrix. 
Hence, the same algorithm that we developed for the Markovian jump systems in 
previous chapter can be invoked here for constructing finite unobservability sub-
spaces for time-delay systems. A bank of residual generators is then designed so 
that each residual is affected by one fault and is decoupled from the others while the 
Hoo norm of the transfer function between the disturbances and the uncertainties 
in delays and the residual signals are guaranteed to remain less than a prescribed 
value. The work presented in this chapter has partly appeared in [205,206,208]. 
This chapter is organized as follows. After a summary of the relevant literature, 
we first begin in Section 6.2 by considering retarded and neutral time-delay systems. 
The notion of finite unobservability is introduced in Section 6.2.1 for these time-delay 
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systems. By utilizing the developed geometric framework, H^-based FDI algorithms 
are developed for retarded and neutral time-delay systems in Sections 6.2.2 and 
6.2.3, respectively. We then proceed by considering systems with distributed delay 
in Section 6.3 and the notion of finite unobservability is also introduced for these 
systems in Section 6.3.1. In Section 6.3.2, an i^-based FDI strategy of distributed 
delay systems is presented. The FDI problem for Markovian jump system with 
mode dependent delay is investigated in Section 6.4. Fault detection and isolation 
decision criteria is presented in Section 6.5 and numerical examples for retarded, 
neutral, distributed and stochastic time-delay systems are provided in Section 6.6. 
Contributions 
The main contributions of this chapter are now summarized as follows: 
• The geometric concept of finite unobservability subspaces is introduced for re-
tarded, neutral, distributed and stochastic time-delay systems and algorithms 
for obtaining these subspaces are presented. 
• //oo-based fault detection and isolation problem for the above systems are for-
mulated and the sufficient conditions for solvability of this problem is derived 
based on the LMI method. 
6.1 Introduction 
Time-delay is an inherent characteristic of many physical systems, such as rolling 
mills, chemical processes, water resources, biological, economical, communication, 
and traffic control systems, to name a few. Only a few results on FDI of time-delay 
systems have been developed in recent years in the literature. In [123], an unknown 
input observer (UIO) is designed for fault detection of retarded systems with known 
delays, and [122] proposed a robust UIO approach for uncertain retarded time-delay 
systems with bounded uncertainty. In [122,123], some restrictive assumptions on 
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the system structures have also been assumed. Parity space approach is developed 
in [209] for fault detection of retarded time-delay systems. In [124], [125], [126], [127, 
128], [129] a robust fault detection problem for linear retarded time-delay systems 
with known delays is investigated by solving an H^ optimization problem. In this 
approach one attempts to keep the sensitivity of the residual signal to unknown 
inputs (disturbances) less than a specific bound while to increase the sensitivity of 
the residual signal to the fault over its frequency range. In [210], [211], [212], an 
adaptive observer approach is developed for estimating the fault signal in retarded 
time-delay systems. In [213], a robust fault detection and isolation observer for 
uncertain singular retarded time-delay systems is developed. In [194], a robust fault 
identification filter for a class of discrete-time Markovian jump systems with mode 
dependent time-delays and norm bounded uncertainty is developed based on an 
.f/oo optimization technique. In this approach, the generated residual signal is an 
estimate of the fault signal. 
The fault diagnosis problem for neutral time-delay systems has only been in-
vestigated in [214] where the H^ filter approach is used for robust fault detection 
of neutral time-delay systems. However, the problem of fault isolation for general 
retarded and neutral time-delay systems with unknown delays has not been com-
pletely addressed in the above references. Moreover, it is worth pointing out that all 
the above FDI approaches were for pointwise, single or multiple time-delay systems 
and, the fault detection and isolation problem for distributed time-delay systems 
has not yet been investigated in the literature. 
In this chapter, a set of residuals that are based on the dedicated residual 
scheme [3, 6] is generated for retarded, neutral, distributed and stochastic time-
delay systems. The notion of a finite unobservability subspace is introduced for 
time-delay systems and an algorithm for constructing it is presented. By utilizing 
the developed geometric framework, a set of residuals is generated such that each 
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residual is affected by one fault, and is partially decoupled from others. Furthermore, 
the effects of the disturbances and uncertainties due to the unknown delays on the 
residuals are attenuated by using the H^ optimization technique and by utilizing 
the LMI approach. 
6.2 Retarded and Neutral Time-Delay Systems 
6.2.1 Finite Unobservability Subspaces for Time-delay Sys-
tems 
In this section, the notion of a finite unobservability subspace is introduced for both 
retarded and neutral time-delay systems and an algorithm for constructing such 
subspace is provided. As shown subsequently in Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3, the finite 
unobservability subspace plays a central role in the geometrical approach to fault 
detection and isolation of both retarded and neutral time-delay systems. Consider 
a linear time-delay system 
N 
x(t) = A0x(t) + V Aix(t - rxi{t)) + AN+1x(t - rd(t)) 
1^( (6.1) 
y(t) = Cx(t), x(0) = (t>(6), 0e[-r,O] 
where x 6 X is the state of the system with dimension n, y e y is output signal 
with dimensions q, and r = max;{rx,(0),Td(0)}. 
Lemma 6.1. Let V C X he Ai-invariant for all i e (N+ 1)0, i.e. AiV C V, i 6 
(JV+ 1)0. If<p(0) e V, V0 G [-r,0], then x(t) e V,Vt > 0. 
Proof: Based on the variation-of-constant formula, we have 
ft N t 
x(t)=eAot<f>(0) + / eA^t-^YtAx(s-Txi{s))ds+ / eAo{t-^AN+1x(s ~ rd(s))ds 
Jo
 i=1 Jo 
(6.2) 
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for t > 0 and x(t) = </>{t) for t G [-r, 0]. Since 0(0) G V, V0 € [-r, 0], then 0(0) G 
V, V0 G [-r,0]. Hence, x(t) G V,Vt G [0,r0] where r0 = min{Txz(0),Td(0)} (V is Ar 
invariant for all i G (N + l)0). Since x(t) eV,Vt£ [0, r0], equation (6.2) can be used 
again to show that x(t) G V on [r0, r 0+ri] , where ri = min{rxi(r0), Td(ro)}. Similarly, 
it can be shown by successive application of this process that x(t) G V, V£ > 0. • 
Next consider the following time-delay system 
N 
x(t) = (A) + D0C)x(t) + J2(Ai + DiC)x{t - rxi(t)) 
+ (AN+1 + DN+1C)x(t - rd(t)) 
y{t) = HCx(t), x{0) = (f)(9) 0 G [-r, 0] 
for given maps D; : y —+ X and H : y —> ^ . Let us define the subspace S C X as 
the largest A + .DjC-invariant that is contained in Ker HC. According to Lemma 
6.1, for any initial condition 0(0) G S, V0 G [—r, 0], we have y(t) = 0, Vt > 0. 
Let us denote the largest ^-invariant i G (N + 1)0 subspace that is contained in 
/C C X by < < /C|A >>ie(N+i)0- Based on the above discussion and the assumption 
that S C X (S is a finite subspace), we define the notion of a finite unobservability 
subspace for the time-delay system (6.1) as follows. 
Definition 6.1. A subspace S is called a finite unobservability subspace for system 
(6.1) if for some output injection maps Di : y —> X and measurement mixing map 
H : y —> y, we have 
S =« Ker HC\Ai + DtC »ie{N+1)o (6.3) 
It should be noted that the above definition of the finite unobservability sub-
space coincides with the unobservability subspace of the Markovian jump systems 
with identical matrices CVs, i.e. C; = C, i G \I>. Hence, based on Algorithm 5.3, the 
following algorithm can also be used for obtaining the smallest finite unobservability 
subspace S*. 
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Algorithm 6.1. Let W* = inf 233(21, C) (obtained from Algorithm 5.2) and define 
the sequence Z^1 according to 
JV+l 
Z° = X; Z» = p | (W* + (A^Z*-1 n Ker C)) (6.4) 
2=0 
Then S* = Zk, whenever Zk+1 = Zk. 
This implies that the developed algorithm for Markovian jump system is more 
general and can be used also for obtaining the smallest finite unobservability sub-
space. 
Remark 6.1. The concept of unobservability sub spaces for bilinear and LP V systems 
have been introduced in [62] and [215], respectively. It is shown in [215] that an 
unobservability subspace for the following LPV system 
x(t) = {A0 + pi{t)A1 + ••• + PN+l(t)AN+1)x{t) 
y{t) = Cx(t) 
is the largest Ai + DiC-invariant (i 6 (N + 1)0) that is contained in Ker HC. 
A similar fact is also shown in [62] for bilinear systems. The following algorithm 
[62,215] can be invoked for obtaining the minimal element S*, 
Algorithm 6.2. The subspace S* coincides with the last term of the following se-
quence 
N+l 
Z° = X- Z" = W* + ( p | AT1Z»~1\ n Ker C (6.5) 
i=0 
where W* is computed from Algorithm 5.2. In [62,215], the authors do not provide 
the detail derivation of the above algorithm. Hence, we present our own derivation 
of Algorithm 6.2 in Appendix A. 
We are now in a position to introduce an H^-based fault detection and isola-
tion problem for retarded and neutral time-delay systems. 
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6.2.2 i ^ - b a s e d FDI for Retarded Time-Delay Systems 
Consider the following linear retarded time-delay system (with A/v+i = 0 in (6.1)) 
N L 
±{t) =A0x(t) + J2 Aix(t ~ Txi(t)) + B0u(t) + Yl BMt - Tuj(t)) 
2=1 j = l 
k 
+ YjLlml{t) + Bdd{t) (6 '6) 
/ = i 
y(t) =Cx{t) + Ddd{t) 
with the continuous initial condition x(9) = <ft(9),6 G [—r, 0], where x G X is the 
state of the system with dimension n, u G U,y £ y are input and output signals 
with dimensions m and q, respectively, d(t) represents an unknown input vector 
that could include modeling errors and uncertain disturbances, rrii G M.i,i G k 
are the fault modes with dimension ki, and Lz's are the fault signatures, where 
r = maxjTxi(0). 
The fault modes together with the fault signatures may be used to model the 
effects of actuator faults, sensor faults and system faults on the dynamics of the 
system. For modeling a fault in the i-th actuator, Li = [&oi, &ii, •••, bu] and the fault 
mode mi is chosen to model the type of a fault where bji,j = 0,...,L denote the i-th 
column of matrices Bj,j = 0,..., L. For example a complete failure of an actuator can 
be represented and modeled by rrii(t) = [—Ui(t), —Ui(t — rui(t)),..., — Ui(t — TUL(^))]T . 
A system fault can be represented by a potential variation in the parameters of the 
Ai's matrices as shown below: 
N L 
x{t) ={A0 + AA0)x(t) + ^T{Ai + AAi)x{t - Txi{t)) + B0u(t) + ^ BjU(t - ruj(t)) 
i=i i = i 
y(t) =Cx(t) 
As an example, a change in the i-th row and j'-th column of matrix A\ can be 
modeled as AAix(t — Tx\(i)) = 72Aai Xj(t — Txi(t)) where Xj is the j'-th element of 
the vector x and 7, is an n-dimensional vector with all zero elements except one in 
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the i-th element. Define the signal rrii(t) = AaitXj(t — rxi(t)) as an external input 
and fault signature L, = / j , then this fault can be modeled as in equation (6.6). 
It should be noted that sensor faults can initially be modeled as additive inputs 
in the measurement equation y = Cx + X^Li Ejnj where Ej is an q x 1 unit vector 
with a one at the j - th position and rij e R is a sensor fault mode, which corresponds 
to a fault in the j-th. sensor. For example, a complete failure of the j - th sensor can 
be represented and modeled by nj = —CjX where Cj is the j - th row of the matrix C. 
The sensor fault signature can also be modeled as an input to the system [3,18,130]. 
Following [18], let fj be the solution to Ej = C fj. The new states can be defined 
according to x(t) = x{t) + Yl9=i fjnj(t)i where the state space representation for 
the new states can be written as 
N L q 
x(t) = A0x(t) + J2 AMt ~ rxi(t)) + B0u(t) + Y^ BMt ~ Tuj(t)) + Yl L3mo^) 
2 = 1 j=\ j=l 
y(t) = Cx{t) 
where L, = j i A0fj Axfj ••• ANfr ] and m,-(*) = [hj(t), -rij(t), -Uj(t -
Txi(t)), ••• , -rij(t - TxN(t))Y. 
We now state the main assumptions needed for the development of our pro-
posed FDI scheme for retarded time-delay system (6.6). 
Assumption 6.1. The disturbance signal d(t) is 2,2-norm bounded. 
Although accurate values for the delays rXi(t),i e N and rUi(t),i G L are 
difficult to obtain and are not necessary in our work, the following reasonable as-
sumptions can be made. 
Assumption 6.2. The upper bounds on the delay functions rX2(t) and rUi(t) are 
assumed to be known, that is rXi(t) <rf<oo, rxi{t) < fj < 1. andrUi(t) < r" < oo. 
Assumption 6.3. The error signals xT(t) = [xT(t — rx\{t)) — xT(t — rf), ...,xT(t — 
TxN(t)) - xJ(t - r£)] and fiJ{t) = [u^it - Tul{t)) - uT(t - nu), ...,uJ(t - ruN(t)) -
u
T
 (t — rf)] are £2 norm bounded. 
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Remark 6.2. It should be noted that for any system where the states are required 
to track a constant setpoint or a slowly time-varying trajectory xd(t) by a proper 
controller design. Assumption 6.3 will hold without loss of any generality. More-
over, when an H^-based controller is designed for the healthy (fault free) closed-loop 
system guaranteeing that the state x is £ 2 norm bounded, then the error signals x 
and u also belong to the £2 space. 
The class of finite unobservability subspaces containing a given subspace £ for 
the above retarded time delay system is denoted by S^R(C), i.e. 
SR(£) = {S € X\S =« KevHC\Ai + DiC » i 6 N and £ e S} (6.7) 
The smallest element of S_R{£) is denoted by SR and can be obtained based on 
Algorithm 6.2. 
Before presenting the main result of this section, the next lemma provides a 
sufficient condition for asymptotic stability of system (6.6). This result guarantees 
simultaneously that the H^ norm of the transfer function between the disturbance 
d and the output signal y is less than a prescribed positive value 7 when no fault in 
the system is present, i.e. mi(t) = 0, I G k. 
Lemma 6.2 ( [216]). Given 7 > 0 , if there exist positive-definite matrices R and 
Q such that the following Riccati inequality is satisfied 
AlR + RA0 + CyC + Q + (RBd + CTJDd)(727 - DjDd)-\RBd + CJDd)T 
N 
+ NJ2 CiRAQ^AjR < 0 
with 7 2 / — DjDd > 0 and Ci = jr^; then system (6.6) is asymptotically stable and 
its £2 go-in is not greater than 7. i.e. 




 / dJ{t)d{t)dt (6.8) 
./o ./o 
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We are now in a position to introduce our main result in this section. The 
.Hoo-based Extended Fundamental Problem in Residual Generation (HEFPRG) for 
the retarded time-delay system (6.6) is defined as the design of a set of filters that 
generate k residuals such that each residual r^(i) is affected by a fault in the i-th 
component L, and is partially decoupled from all other faults Lj, j ^ i and 
/•OO . / 'OO /"OO /'OO . 
/ rj(t)ri(t)dt < 7 2 ( / d1(t)d{t)dt + xJ'(t)x(t)dt + uT (t)u(t)dtj 
(6.9) 
where dJ (t) = [dJ(t),dT(t~rf), ...,dT(t — r^)]. By utilizing the residual set {r?:},i G 
k, one can detect and isolate multiple faults in all the channels. The residual signals 
ri(t) are generated according to the following filters structure: 
N 
Wi(t) =FioWi{t) + Y, FuMt ~ rf) - Ei0y{t) + Ki0u(t) 
1=1 
N L 
- J2 Euy(t - if) + Y, K^Mt ~ rj*) 
1=1 3 = 1 
ri(t) =MiWi(t) - HiV{t), i e k (6.10) 
where the matrices are defined and selected according to the conditions in the next 
theorem which summarizes our proposed fault detection and isolation (FDI) strat-
egy-
Theorem 6.1. The HEFPRG problem specified by expressions (6.9) and (6.10) 
has a solution for the linear retarded time-delay system (6.6) if the following finite 
unobservability subspaces 
St = MSR(Y^Cj)1 iek (6.11) 
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exist such that Ci n S* = 0, i G k and gain matrices Tij,j G NQ. i £ k and positive-
definite matrices Ri and Qi, i G k exist such that 
*i Tii 
N^tli 


















< 0 (6.12) 
where Vi = A^Ri+RlA0s,+MivT^+Ti0Mi+Mi'Mi+Qir 6* = R^-T^M?Ddi, 
Tij = RiAJS, + TijMi, Ti = - 7 2 / + DTdiDdi, % = [Ti0HtDd, ...,TiNHiDd], P% is the 
i 
canonical projection of X on XjS*, Bid = -[PiBd + PiDi0Dd,..., PiDiNDd], Ddl = 
[-HiDd,0,...,0], K'i = [Ka,..., KiL], A = [P^,..., PtAN] and Ktj = PiB^j G L, 
Dij,j G NQ and Hi are the output injection and the measurement mixing maps, 
respectively, such thatS* =« Ker HiC\Aj+DijC >>J
€
N0 and the pairs (Mi,Ai). 
i 
I G JV0 are the factor system of the pairs (C, A{), I G N0 on X /S*. respectively. 
Proof: Given the unobservability subspaces S*, i G k, there exist output map 
injections D^, Da,..., D^ and measurement mixing map Hi such that S* = < < 
Ker HiC\Aj + DijC >> J (5No , where Hi is the solution to Ker HtC = S* + Ker C. 
Let Mi be a unique solution to MiPt = HiC and Ajs, = {Aj + D^C : X/S*),j G N 0 
i 
where 
Pi(Aj + D^C) = Ajs.Ph j G N0 (6.13) 
Let Gij = Ri 1Tij where Ri and T^,j G N0 are the solution to the inequality (6.12), 
FH = AJS* + GHMi' Ev = Pi(Dij + Pr'GijHi),] G N0 and Ki0 = PiB0. Define 
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ei(t) = Wi(t) — Pix(t), then using (6.10), we have 
N 
ei(t) = FioWi{t) + J2 FuMt ~ T?) - P{A0 + Di0C)x{t) - GMPixit) 
1=1 
N 
- J2 PWi + DuC)x(t - Tf) - PBdd(t) - PiDioDidit) - Gi0HiDdd(t) 
1=1 
N N 
- J2 GuMiPix{t - if) - PlLlmi{t) - ^{PiDu + G«Hi)Ddd(t - if) 
i=i i=i 
L N 
+ J2 KM* - r / ) - u(t - ruj(t))) + J2 PiA(x(t - 7f) - x(t - rxl(t))) 
3=1 1=1 
N 
= FiQei{t) + J2 Fnei(t - r?) ~ PiL^t) + (Bld - Gi)d(t) + Ktu(t) + Ax(t) 
i=i 
where G* = [GioHiDd, ••-, Gi^HiDd]. Note that PiLj = 0, j ^ i, since Cj e S*,j ^ i. 
Also 
nit) = MiWi(t) - HiCxit) - HiDdd(t) = Midit) - HiDdd{t), i e k 
Consequently, the error dynamics can be written as 
N 
ei{t) =Fi0ei(t) + ^ Fuei(t - -rf) ~ PiUmx{t) + (Bld - Gi)d(t) + Kiii(t) + Ax(t) 
i=i 
Ti(t) =Miei(t) + Ddid(t), i e k (6.14) 
Using Lemma 6.2 by setting c$ = 1 (constant delay) and the Schur complement of the 
inequality (6.12), it follows that the inequality (6.9) holds. Moreover, from the error 
dynamics (6.14), it follows that ri(t) is only affected directly by Lj. This implies 
when the delays are known perfect decoupling among faults can be accomplished. 
• 
It should be noted that the faults Lj,j ^ i have indirect effects on the residual 
signal Ti{t) through x due to uncertainties in the delay values. However, according 
to Assumption 6.3, the term x in equation (6.14) is bounded and based on our 
proposed FDI algorithm of Theorem 6.1 the residual indirect effects are attenuated 
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by the factor 7. In other words, by using the upper bounds of the delays in the 
residual generation, the effects of the faults Lj, j ^ i on the residual signal r4(t) are 
attenuated from two aspects. First, the direct effects of faults are forced to be zero 
(PiLj = 0) using the properties of the finite unobservability subspace S* of Theorem 
6.1. Second, the indirect effects of faults on the residual signal r,(t) through x are 
attenuated through the use of the H^ approach. As pointed out above if the exact 
values of the delays are known, the terms x and u will become zero and a perfect or 
an exact decoupling can be achieved. 
6.2.3 tfoo-based FDI for Neutral Time-Delay Systems 
Consider the following linear neutral time-delay system (with N = 1 in (6.1)) 
k 
x(t) = A0x(t) + AlX(t - T(t)) + A2x(t - rd(t)) + B0u(t) + ^ Um^t) + Bdd(t) 
1=1 
y(t) = Cx(t) + Ddd(t) (6.15) 
with the continuous initial condition x(9) = <fi{0),9 G [—Tm,0], where x e X is the 
state of the system with dimension n, u 6 U,y £ y are input and output signals 
with dimensions m and q, respectively, d(t) represents an unknown input vector that 
could include modeling errors and uncertain disturbances, nrti G Mi are the fault 
modes with dimension hi, Lj's are the fault signatures and rm = max{r(0),T(i(0)}. 
The fault modes together with the fault signatures can be used to model the 
effects of actuator faults, sensor faults and system faults on the dynamics of the 
system. For modeling a fault in the z-th actuator, L, = [&oi, hi, •••,bu] a n d the fault 
mode mi is chosen to model the type of a fault where bji,j = 0,...,L denote the i-th 
column of matrices Bj, j = 0,..., L. For example a complete failure of an actuator 
can be represented and modeled by mi{t) = [—Ui(t), —Ui(t — r„i),..., —Ui(t — TUL)]T• 
A system fault can be represented by a potential variation in the parameters of the 
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A0,Ai and A2 matrices as shown below: 
x(t) =(A0 + AA0)x(t) + (Ai + AAx)x{t - h) 
L 
+ (A2 + AA2)x{t - d) + B0u(t) + Y^ BM1 ~ T«j) 
y{t) =Cx(t) 
As an example, a change in the i-th row and j - th column of matrix A2 can be 
modeled as AA2x(t — d) = IiAa2,±j(t — d) where Xj is the j - th element of the 
vector x and U is an n-dimensional vector with all zero elements except one in the 
i-th element. Define the signal m^t) = Aa2i Xj(t — d) as an external input and fault 
signature Li = It, then this fault can be modeled as in equation (6.15). 
It should be noted that sensor faults can initially be modeled as additive inputs 
in the measurement equation y = Cx + Yl9j=i Ejnj where Ej is an q x 1 unit vector 
with a one at the j - th position and rtj G R is a sensor fault mode, which corresponds 
to a fault in the j - th sensor. For example, a complete failure of the j - th sensor can 
be represented and modeled by where Cj is the j - t h row of the matrix 
C. The sensor fault signature can also be modeled as an input to the system [3,18] 
and [130]. Following [18], let fj be the solution to Ej = Cfj. The new states can be 
defined according to x(t) = x(t) + Y^9j=i fjnj{t), where the state space representation 
for the new states can be written as 
L q 
x(t) =AQx{t) + Aix(t -h) + A2x(t - d) + B0u(t) + ^ Biu(t ~ T«?) + ^2 ^ T O j ( 0 
y(t) =Cx(t) 
where Lj = [fj,A0fj,A1fj,A2fj] and mj(i) = [hj(t), -rij(t), -nj(t-h)-hj(t-d)\T. 
We now state the main assumptions needed for the development of our pro-
posed FDI scheme for the neutral time-delay system (6.15). 
Assumption 6.4. The upper bound on the delay functions r(t) and r^(t) are as-
sumed to be known, i.e. r(t) < f < oo and Td(t) < fa < oo. 
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Assumption 6.5. The error signal xT(t) = [xT(t — r(t)) — xT{t — r),±J(t — Td(t)) — 
±T(t — fd)\ is £2 norm bounded. 
Remark 6.3. The same observations and statements that are made in Remark 6.2 
do also apply and can be repeated for the neutral time-delay system (6.15). 
The class of finite unobservability subspaces containing a given subspace C for 
the above neutral time delay system is denoted by S_N{£), i.e. 
Sjf(C) = {SeX\S=«KerHC\Ai + DiC»if:2={6,i,2} and £ e 5} (6.16) 
The smallest element of 5W(£) is denoted by S^ and can be obtained based on 
Algorithm 6.2. 
We are now in a position to introduce our main result in this section. The 
i/oo-based Extended Fundamental Problem in Residual Generation (HEFPRG) for 
the neutral time-delay system (6.15) is defined as the design of a set of filters that 
generate k residuals such that each residual r^(i) is affected by a fault in the i-th 
component Li and is partially decoupled from all other faults Lj ,j^i and 
/•oo /-oo 
/ rj'{t)ri(t)dt < 72 / ((F(t)d(t) + xT(t)x(t))dt (6.17) 
./o Jo 
where d7(t) — [dT(t),dT(t — f),dT(t — f^)]. As mentioned earlier, the residual set 
{rj}, i £ k enables one to detect and isolate multiple faults in all the channels. The 
residual signals r,(t) are generated according to the following niters: 
ibi(t) = FiQWiit) + FaWi(t - f) + Fi2Wi{t - fd) 
- Ei0y(t) - Eiiy(t - f) - Ei2y(t - fd) + KiU{t) 
n(t) = Mm® - Hiy(t), i e k (6.18) 
which have similar structures as the observers that are considered in [217]. As will be 
shown in Theorem 6.2, the associated error dynamics corresponding to the residual 
generators have constant delays. This is due to the fact that the upper bounds of the 
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delays are used in the detection niters that are given in (6.18). Lemma 6.3 provides 
a sufficient condition for the asymptotic stability of system (6.15) having constant 
delay values r(t) = f and rd(t) = fd while guaranteeing that the H^ norm of the 
transfer function between the disturbance d and the output signal y is less than a 
given positive value 7. 
Lemma 6.3. Given 7 > 0 and the neutral time-delay system (6.15) having constant 
delay values r(t) = f and rd(t) = fa, if there exist positive-definite matrices R, Q\ 
andQ2 such that the inequality (6.19) is satisfied where $1 = RA0+AJR+AQQIAQ+ 
Q2 + CTC, $ 2 = RBd + AlQ^Bd + CJDd and<&3 = - 7 2 / + B]Q1Bd + D]Dd, then 
system (6.15) with all the fault modes set to zero (i.e., rrii(t) = 0) is asymptotically 
stable and its £,2 gain is not greater than 7, with 
$1 RAx+AlQiA^ RA2 + AlQxA2 $ 2 
* A]Q1A1-Q2 AJQXA2 AjQ^Bd 
* * AjQxA2 - Qx A~lQxBd 
* * * $ 3 
Proof: Define a difference operator D as H>(4>) = 0(0) — A2cj)(—fd), then according 
to the inequality (6.19), we have AjQiA2 — Qi < 0. Hence the operator D is stable. 
Let V(t) be a Lyapunov-Krasovskii functional of the form V(t) = Vx(t) + V2(t)+V3(t) 
[217] where 
Vl{t) = xT(t)Rx(t), V2(t)= I xJ(s)Q1x(s)ds, V3(t) =1 xT(s)Q2x(s)ds 
Jt-fd Jt-r 
The asymptotic stability of system (6.15) can be shown following the results of 
Theorem 2 in [217]. The £2 stability result is now shown according to the following 
procedure. Define an associated Hamiltonian H(x,d(t),t) = V(t) + yT(t)y(t) — 
72dT(t)d(t). It is sufficient to show that under zero initial conditions H(x,d(t),t) < 
0. The Hamiltonian can be written as H(x,d(t),t) < 77T(t)^rj(t), where nT(t) = 
[x(t)J,x(t — f ) T , x T ( t — fd),dT(t)} and $ is the matrix defined in the inequality 
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< 0 (6.19) 
(6.19). Therefore, <f> < 0 leads to H(x,d{t),t) < 0, and hence the inequality (6.8) 
holds. • 
The following theorem summarizes our proposed FDI strategy for the neutral 
time-delay system (6.15). 
Theorem 6.2. The HEFPRG problem specified by expressions (6.17) and (6.18) 
has a solution for the linear neutral time-delay system (6.15) if (a) the following 
finite unobservability subspaces 
S* = infSN{J2 Cj), i e k, 2o = {0,1,2} (6.20) 
exist such that £, D S* = 0,i G k, and (b) the matrices Tj0,Tn,Tj2,i € k and the 
positive-definite matrices Ri, and Qi,i 6 k exist such that the inequality (6.21) is 
satisfied where fy = RiA0 + AZRi+Ti0Mi + M?Tji+M?Mi + Qi, I\j = RtAj + 
i i i 
TijMi: Qi = RiBji—Ti + M^Ddi. Y; = —y^I + D^Ddi, Pi is the canonical projection 
of X on X/S*, Ddi = [-HiDd,0,0], Bdi = Pi[-Bd - DlQDd,-DnDd,-Di2Dd], 
A = P%[-Au -A2], Ti = [TioHiDa, TnHiDd, T i2^£>d], D{j,j = 0,1, 2 and H{ are the 
output injection and the measurement mixing maps, respectively, such that S* =« 
Ker HiC\Aj + DijC »je2o and the pairs (Mi,A0 ) . (Mi,Ai ) , (Mi:A2 ) are the 
i i i 
factor system of the pairs (C,AQ), (C,Ai) and (C,A2) on X/S*, respectively. 
$< Tn Ti2 Si RiA Al IU + MJTI 
i 












- 7 2 / 
A1R + MJTZ 
ATRi 
-Ri 
Proof: Given the finite unobservability subspaces S*, there exist output injection 
maps Dio,Dn, Di2 and measurement mixing map Hi such that 
< 0 (6.21) 
S* = < < Ker HiC\Aj + D^C »je2o 
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where Hi is the solution to Ker HiC = S* + Ker C. Let M, be a unique solution 
to MiPi = HiC and Ajs, = {Aj + DtjC : X/S*),j = 0,1,2, where P^Aj + D^C) = 
i 
AJs.Pi- Define GlQ = R-'T^ Gn = R^TU ,Gi2 = RjlTi2 where Tl0:Tn,Ti2 and R, 
i 
are the solution to the inequality (6.21). Let Fij = Aj + GijMi, Eij = Pi(Dij + 
i 
P^rGijHi),j = 0,1,2, and Kt = PiB0. Define e,(f) = Wi(t) — Pix(t), then using 
equation (6.18) and following along the same lines as in the proof of Theorem 6.1, 
the error dynamics can be written as 
ei(t) =Fl0et(t) + Fnei{t - f) + Fi2ei(t - fd) 
- PiLirriiit) + {Bdi - Gi)d{t) + Ax(t) 
n(t) =Mlei(t) + Ddid{i). i e k (6.22) 
By invoking Lemma 6.3 and setting Q\ = R and using the Schur complement it 
follows that inequality (6.17) holds. Moreover, from the error dynamics (6.22) it 
follows that Ti(t) is only affected directly by Lj. • 
Remark 6.4. It should be noted again that in [214] ort^V the problem of fault de-
tection for neutral time-delay systems is investigated. However, by utilizing our 
proposed approach a set of residuals are generated to simultaneously perform both 
fault detection and fault isolation in the neutral time-delay systems. 
6.3 Distributed Delay Systems 
In this section, the problem of fault detection and isolation for distributed delay 
systems is investigated. 
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6.3.1 Finite Unobservability Subspace for Distributed De-
lay Systems 
Consider a linear system with distributed delay 
x(t) = A0x(t) + A^x(t - n ) + A2 x(s)ds 
•lt—T2 
y0(t) = C0x(t), y1{t) = C1x(t-r1), y2(t) = C2 I x(s)ds (6-23) 
Jt-Ti 
x(9) = ^{9) 0£ [-r,0] 
where x £ X is the state of the system with dimension n, yi £ y is the output 
measurement with dimension g^  and r = max{ri, T2}. The following lemma is needed 
for finding a finite invariant subspace for the above distributed time-delay. 
Lemma 6.4 ( [133]). (the fundamental lemma of the geometric approach) Any tra-
jectory x(t), t £ [<0)*i] belongs to a subspace C £ X if and only if x(t0) £ C and 
x(i) G £. almost everywhere (a.e.) in [£0,£i]. 
Based on the above lemma, we have the following result: 
Lemma 6.5. Let V C X be Ai-invariant for all i G {0,1, 2}. i.e. AiV C V, i G 
{0,1,2}. If (f)(0) £V, V0 £ [-r,0], then x{t) G V a.e. for t > 0.. 
Proof: Since 0(0) G V, V0 G [-r,0], then / ^ <p{0)d0 £ V a.e. . Indeed, recall 
that a Lebesgue measurable and integrable function is zero a.e. in [to,ti] if and 
only if its integral in any subinterval of [to,ti] is zero. Applying this property to 
function YT J_ <j)(0)d0, —r2<t<0, where Y denote a basis matrix of V, we have 
f_T (j)(9)d9 G V almost everywhere. Hence X(£Q") £ V and based on Lemma 6.4, we 
have x(£(j") G V. Similarly, it can be shown by successive application of this process 
that x(t) £ V, \ft > 0. • 
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Next consider the following time-delay system 
±(t) = (A) + D0C0)x(t) + (A1 + D1C1)x{t - n ) + (A2 + D2C2) I x{s)ds 
Jt-T2 
y0(t) = H0C0x(t), Vl{t) = H^dx{t - Tl), y2{t) = H2C2 I x{s)ds 
Jt—rz 
x{0) = <p(9) 9 e [-T, 0] 
for given maps Di : y ^ X and Hi : y —* y. Let us define the subspace S C X 
as the largest Ai + DjCi-invariant that is contained in Ker HiCi for i G {0,1,2}. 
According to Lemma 6.5, for any initial condition (f)(9) G S, M9 G [—r, 0], we have 
Vi(t) = 0, V£ > 0, i G {0,1,2}. Based on the above discussion and the assumption 
that S C X (S is a finite subspace), we define the notion of a finite unobservability 
subspace for the distributed time-delay system (6.23) as follows. 
Definition 6.2. A subspace S is called a finite unobservability subspace for system 
(6.23) if for some output injection maps Di : y —> X and measurement mixing map 
Hi : y —> y, we have 
2 
S =« f l Ker HjCjlAi + DtC » i 6 { o , i , 2 } (6.24) 
3=0 
It should be noted that the above definition coincides with the definition 
of unobservability subspace for the Markovian jump system (Definition 5.6) for 
^ = {0,1,2}. Hence, Algorithm 5.3 can be used for finding the smallest finite 
unobservability subspace containing a given subspace. 
The class of finite unobservability subspaces containing a given subspace £ for 
the above distributed delay system is denoted by S_D(C), i.e. 
2 
SD(C) = {S e X\S =« p | KerHjCjlAi + D%Q » ie2={<u ;2} and £ G S} 
j=o 
The smallest element of S_D{C) is denoted by <5>£, and can be obtained based on 
Algorithm 5.3. 
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6.3.2 i^oo-based FDI Strategy of Distributed Delay Systems 
Consider the following linear system with distributed time delays 
,-t k 
±{t) = A0x(t) + A-ix(t -ri) + A2 / x{s)ds + Bu(t) + ^ Urn^t) + Bdd(t) 
y0{t) = C0x{t) + Ddod{t), yi{t) = ClX(t - n ) + Ddld(t) 
y2(*) = C2 I x(s)ds + Dd2d{t) (6.25) 
Jt-T2 
with continuous initial condition x(6) = 4>{0), 9 G [—r, 0], where x £ X is the state of 
the system with dimension n, u £ U,y £ 3^  are the input and the output signals with 
dimensions m and q, respectively, and d(t) £ W is the disturbance input. Without 
loss of generality, it is assumed that d is L2-norm bounded, i.e. d(t) e £2(0,00]. 
Moreover, rrii £ Mi are the fault modes with dimension kiy Lj's are fault signatures 
and r = max{Ti,T2}. The fault modes together with the fault signatures may be 
used to model the effects of actuator faults, sensor faults and system faults on the 
dynamics of the system. 
The /foo-based Extended Fundamental Problem in Residual Generation (HEF-
PRG) for the time-delay system (6.25) is stated as that of designing a set of filters 
that generate k residuals r^t) such that a fault in the i-th component L, can only 
affect the residual rj(t) and no other residual Tj(t){i 7^  j) and 
/ •OO /-OO 
/ rj (t)ri{t)dt < 72 / dJ{t)d{t)dt, iek (6.26) 
Jo Jo 
Specifically, the residual signals /*,(£) are generated according to the following filters: 
Wi(t) =Fi0Wi(t) + FaWi(t -n) + Fi2 / Wi(s)ds 
Jt-T2 
- Ei0y0{t) - Eiiyi(t) ~ El2y2{t) + KiU(t) 
ri(t) = MioWi{t) - Hi0y0{t) (6.27) 
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The next lemma provides a sufficient condition for asymptotic stability of 
system (6.25) with mi{t) = 0 while the H^ norm of the transfer function between 
the disturbance d and the output signal y is less that a given positive value 7. This 
lemma will be used in the proof of Theorem 6.2 for guaranteeing both the stability 
of detection filters and 7-disturbance attenuation condition (6.26). 
Lemma 6.6 ( [218]). Given 7 > 0 and the distributed time-delay system (6.23), 
if there exist positive-definite matrices R. Q\ and Q2 such that the following LMI 
condition holds 
RA0 + ATR + Q1+TIQ2 + CJC0 RAX RA2 RBd + CjDd 
AJR -Ql 0 0 
AJR 0 -Q2 0 
BJR + DJCO 0 0 DjDd-^I 
then system (6.23) is asymptotically stable and 
< 0 
POO / "OO 
/ Vo'(t)y0(t)dt < 7 2 / dJ(t)d(t)dt 
Jo Jo 
(6.28) 
for alld(t) G £2 [0,oo]. 
The following theorem summarizes our proposed robust FDI strategy. 
Theorem 6.3. The HEFPRG problem defined by expressions (6.26) and (6.27) 




such that Li D S* = 0,i G k as well as positive-definite matrices Ri; Qn and Qi2, 
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i G k and matrices Tj,-, i € k, j< = 0,1, 2 such that 
Tj + Qn + r%Qi2 * * 
AIR, + MZTa -Qn * 
AIR, + MJ2Ta 0 -Q i2 
< 0 (6.30) 
<t>jRl + *J-D]0Hj0Mz0 0 0 Dj0H^0Hl0Dd0 - 7 2 / 
w/tere T* = RiAi0 + Tt0Mi0 + AJ0R + M^T^ + M?0Mi0, fy = -Pi(Bd + DMDd0 + 
A i A n + Di2Dd2), ^i = -(Ti0Hi0Dd0 +TnHilDdl + Ti2Hi2Dd2), Pi is the canonical 
projection of X on X/S* and the pairs (Mij,Aij),j = 0,1,2 are the factor system 
of the pairs (Cj, Aj), j = 0,1,2 on X/S*, respectively. 
Proof: Given the unobservability subspaces S*, there exist output map injec-
tions Dio,Dn,Di2 and measurement mixing map HiQ)Hn,Hi2 such that «S* = < 
Ker HijCj\Aj + DijCj >, j = 0,1,2 where Hij,j = 0,1,2 are the solution to 
Ker HijCj = S* + Ker Cj. Let A\j and Mij,j = 0,1, 2 be the matrices of the factor 
system of (6.25) on 5*, i.e. M^Pi = H^C, and A^ = (Aj + Di3Cj : X/S*), j = 
0,1,2. Let Ri and T{j, i £ k, j = 0,1,2 be the solution to the inequality (6.30). 
Define the gain matrices Gij = R^Tij, i € k, j = 0,1, 2 and let F{j = A^ + GijMij, 
Eij = Pi(Dij + P^rGijHij), j = 0,1, 2, and Ki = PiB, % e k. Define the state errors 
as ei(t) = Wi(t) — Pix(i), so that by using (6.27) we have 
e»(*) = FiQWi(t) + FnWi(t - n ) + Fi2 I Wi(s)ds - Ei0y0(t) - E^y^t) 
Jt-T2 
- Ei2y2(t) + Kiu(t) - Pi(A0x{t) + Axx{t - n ) + A2 x{s)ds + Bu{t) 
Jt-T2 
k 
+ ^jLimi(t) + Bdd{t)) 
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= Fi0Wi{t) + FnWi(t - n) + Fi2 I Wi{s)ds - PZ(A0 + Di0CQ)x{t) 
- Gl0Mi0Plx(t) - PlLtmi(t) - P ^ + AiCi)x(i - n ) - C i M i ^ ^ t - n ) 
- Pi(A2 + Dl2C2) I x{s)ds - Gi2Mi2p I x(s)ds - PiBdd(t) - El0DdQd{t) 
J t—T2 J t—T2 
- EuDdld{t) - El2Dd2d{t) 
= {Ai0 + doM^e^t) + (An + GaM a)ei(t - n ) 
+ (Ai2 + Gl2Mi2) I ei(s)ds - PiUmiit) 
Jt-T2 
- Pz(Bd + AoA*> + DaDdl + Di2Dd2)d{t) 
- (GioHi0Ddo + GnHnDdi + Gi2Hi2Dd2)d(t) 
Note that P%Lj = 0,j ^ i, since Cj G Si: j ^ i. Also 
rt(t) = MioWiW - Hioy0(t) = Mi0Wi(t) - Hi0C0x(t) - Hi0Dd0d(t) 
= Mi0ei(t) - Hi0Ddod(t) 
Consequently, the error dynamics can be written as 
ei(t) =(Ao + Gi0Mi0)ei(t) + (An + GM^e^t - n ) + (Ai2 + Gi2Mi2) / ei(s)ds 
Jt-Ti 
- PiLimiit) - Pi{Bd + Di0Dd0 + DnDdl + Di2Dd2)d(t) 
— (GioHi0Ddo + Gi\HnDdi + Gi2Hi2Dd2)d(t) 
nit) =MMei(t) - Hl0Ddod(t) (6.31) 
Using Lemma 6.6 and the inequality (6.30), it follows that the inequality (6.26) 
holds. Moreover, from the error dynamics (6.31), it follows that r^t) is only affected 
by Li and is decoupled from other fault signatures. This completes the proof of 
Theorem 6.3. • 
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6.4 FDI of Markovian Jump Systems with Time-
delays 
This section investigates development of fault detection and isolation filters for 
Markovian jump systems with mode-dependent time-delays and uncertain switching 
probability. Based on our developed results from Chapter 5 and Section 6.2.1, the 
notion of a finite unobservability subspace is introduced for these systems and an 
algorithm for finding this subspace is presented. Based on the introduced unobserv-
ability subspace, sufficient conditions for solving the fault detection and isolation 
problem are obtained. A bank of residual generators is designed such that each 
residual is affected by one fault and is decoupled from the others while the H^ 
norm of the transfer function between the disturbance and the residual signals are 
less that a prespecified value for all uncertainties in the switching probabilities. 
6.4.1 Background and Preliminary Results 
In this section, background results on H^ disturbance attenuation of Markovian 
jump systems with mode-dependent time-delays with uncertain mode transition 
matrix are presented. Consider the following Markovian jump system with time-
delay (MJSD) 
L 
±{t) = A(Xt)x{t) + AT(Xt)x(t - rXt(t)) + B(\t)u(t) + Bd(Xt)d{t) + J^ Lt(Xt)mi{t) 
y{t) = C(Xt)x(t) + Dd(Xt)d{t) x{9) = <f>(9), 9 G {-», 0] (6.32) 
where x £ X is the state of the system with dimension n; u G U,y G y are the 
input and the output signals with dimensions m and q, respectively; d{t) G W is the 
unknown disturbance input; m^ G Mi are the fault modes with dimension A;,, and 
L^s are the fault signatures. The fault modes together with the fault signatures may 
be used to model the effects of actuator faults, sensor faults and system faults on the 
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dynamics of the system. It is assumed that d(t) is £2-norm bounded, and {Xt, t > 0} 
is a continuous-time Markov process taking values in the finite set \I> = { l , . . . , iV}. 
The Markov process describes the switching between the different system modes and 
its evolution is governed by the following transition probabilities: 
{ iTijh + o(h) when Xt jumps from i to j 1 + iTuh + o(h), otherwise 
where 7TJJ is the transition rate from mode % to mode j with mj > 0 when i ^ j , nu = 
- Xlj=i 7^i7ru') an<^ °W 1S a function that satisfies H m / , ^ 0 ^ = 0 and II := [TTJJ]. 
The matrices A(Xt), B(Xt), C(Xt), Bd(Xt), Li(Xt) and Dd(Xt) are known constant 
matrices for all Xt = i G $. For simplicity, we denote the matrices associated with 
A< = i by 
A(Xt) = Ai, AT(Xt) = ATl, B(Xt) = Bu Bd(Xt) = Bdi, 
C{Xt) = Q, Dd(Xt) = Ddl, Ll(Xt) = Lli, leL 
In system (6.32), rA((i) denotes the time-varying delay when the mode is in Xt and 
satisfies 
0 < Ti(t) < fj,t < oo ii(t) < hi < 1 V i e ^ 
where //, and /i, are real constant scalars for any % e \I> and // := max{/ij, z 6 *P}. 
Moreover, it is assumed that the mode transition matrix II is not known 
precisely. In other words, it belongs to the following admissible uncertainty do-
main [202]: 
@n = {A + A n : \Amj\ < e{j, Uj > 0, Vi, j £ tf, i ± j} (6.33) 
where II = [itij] is a known constant matrix and denotes the estimated value of II 
and Al l = [ATT^] denotes the uncertainty in the mode transition rate matrix. 
First, a sufficient condition for H^ disturbance attenuation of a Markovian 
jump system with time delay is introduced. 
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Definition 6.3 ( [219]). System (6.32) with u(t) = 0.. d(t) = 0,. ra,(<) = 0,1 E L 
is said to be exponentially mean square stable if for any finite cp(t) E Rn defined on 
[—/i, 0]. and initial mode %Q E Vt. there exist constant scalars b > 0 and c > 0 such 
that 
E{|x(*,0,zo)|2} < b sup \(j)(6)\2e-ct 
-fi<0<0 
where x(t, 4>:io) denotes the solution of system (6.32) at time t with the initial con-
ditions 4>{i) and io-
Lemma 6.7 ( [219]). Let 7 be a given positive constant. If there exists a set of 
symmetric and positive-definite matrices B4 > 0,i E \P and Q > 0 such that the 
following set of coupled LMIs holds for every i E \t: 
< 0 (6.34) 
where $* = ^"=1 mjRj + Aj fy + RiAi + (1 + fi-q)Q + Cj d and 
77 = max{|7rij|,i E # } 
then system (6.32) with u{t) = 0 and rrij(t) = 0,j E k is exponentially mean square 
stable and for zero initial conditions the system satisfies the inequality 
IMIIU = E{ l°°yT(t)y(t)dt\(xo,i0)} <7 2 |M| 2 (6.35) 
Proof: The proof follows along the same lines as in proof of Theorem 1 in [219]. • 
A system that satisfies the above conditions is said to be stochastically expo-
nentially stable with a 7-disturbance attenuation. In the next lemma we consider the 
effects of uncertainties in the mode transition matrix II for analyzing the stochastic 
exponential stability of system (6.32) with a 7-disturbance attenuation. 
$i RiATi CjDdi + RiBti 
* -{l-hi)Q 0 
DjtDdi - 7 2 / 
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< 0 (6.36) 
Lemma 6.8. Let 7 be a given positive constant. If there exists a set of symmetric 
and positive-definite matrices Ri > 0, i G ^, Q > 0 and scalars {£2J > 0, i, j 6 $ , i ^ 
j} such that the following set of coupled LMIs holds for every i G \&: 
Qj RiATi Ci Ddi + RiBdi Aj 
* -(1-hAQ 0 0 
* * DID*-7*1 0 
iv/iere 
TV TV 
Qi = A~ZRi + RiAi + Y,*nRi + CjCi+ Yl ^ijI + ^  + w)Q 
J = 1 J = l j ¥ « 
Ai = Ri — Ri • • • Ri — Ri-\ Ri — R4+1 • • • i?i — -RTV 
E;8- = diag(£nl,..., £;(z_i)7, &(i+i)/, • ••, fi/v-O 
£/zen system (6.32) W£/J w(£) = 0 and mj(t) = 0,j G L is exponentially mean square 
stable. Moreover, for zero initial conditions the system satisfies the inequality (6.35) 
for all U £ @n. 
Proof: According to Lemma 6.7, the uncertain system (6.32) with u(t) = 0 and 
irij(t) = 0, j G L is stochastically exponentially mean square stable with a 7-
disturbance attenuation if 
TV 
AjRi + RiAt+ ^((irij + An^Rj + (1 + w)Q + (1 - h^1 R.A^Q-1 A\Ri 
+ CjCz - {CjDdl + RiB^iDlDdi - 7 27)-1(C7Dd i + RiBdi)J < 0 
for alH G ^. The above inequality can be rewritten as [202] 
TV 
AjRi + RiAi+ J ] itijRj + (1 + fj,ri)Q + (1 - hi)-1 RlATiQ~lAJTjRi 
* 1 1 
+ E [-A7r i j(/2 j-il<) + -A7r(J-(i? i-/2 i)] 
- (C?" A« + RiBdi)(DlDdi - ^I)-\CjDdl + R^f < 0 
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The above inequality holds for all |A7ry| < e^ - if there exist ^ > 0,i,j € ^ , i j^ j 
such that 
JV 
AjRt + RiAi+ J2 *nRj + C7°i + (1 + m)Q + (! - /0-1iV£.Q"Mri. J2i 
J'=l 
+ E ^ii+UR]-m 
- {CjDdi + RtBdi)(D]tDdl - 7 2 / ) - 1 ( C 7 ^ + RiB^y < 0 
It can be shown easily that the above is equivalent to the inequality (6.36) by using 
the Schur complement. • 
6.4.2 Unobservability Subspace for Markovian Jump Sys-
tems with Time-delay (MJSD) 
In this section, the notion of an unobservability subspace is introduced for the Marko-
vian jump system with time-delay (6.32). Since the behavior of system (6.32) in each 
mode is governed by the retarded time-delay equation, we need to first define an 
unobservability subspace for each mode of the system. The following notion of finite 
unobservability subspace is introduced in [205] for retarded time-delay systems. 
Definition 6.4. Given the matrices Ai,ATi and d for each mode of system (6.32), 
a subspace Sj is called a finite unobservability subspace if 
SI = < Ker HidlAi + Did, ATl + DTld > (6.37) 
for some output injection maps Di,DTi : y —> X and measurement mixing map 
Hi : y —> y where < Ker Hid\Ai+Did, ATi+DTid > denotes the largest Ai+Did 
and ATi + DTid~ invariant subspace contained in Ker Hid-
Based on Definition 6.4 and definition of unobservability subspaces for the 
Markovian jump systems (Definition 5.6), we introduce the notion of an finite un-
observability subspace for the Markovian jump system with time-delay. 
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Definition 6.5. A subspace S is an unobservability subspace for system (6.32) if 
S =« K\Ai + Did, ATi + DTid » i e * (6.38) 
for some output injection maps Di,DTi : y —> X and measurement mixing map 
Hi-.y^y y, i e * where K = f l L H.Q. 
The notation «S(£) refers to the class of unobservability subspace for the MJSD 
system (6.32) containing £ C X. Based on Algorithm 5.3, the following algorithm 
can be used for obtaining the smallest element of «S(£) denoted by <S*(£). 
Algorithm 6.3. The subspace S*(C) coincides with the last term of the following 
sequence 
N N 
Z° = X; Z" = f){W* + (A^Z*-1 n Ker Q)) f)(W* + (A^Z^1 n Ker Q)) 
(6.39) 
The subspace W(* = lim Wfc, where Wk can be obtained from the following 
algorithm. 
Algorithm 6.4. The subspace WJ" coincides with and is obtained from the last 
term of the following sequence 
Wo = £ 
N N 
Wk = Wfc_! + ^  MWk-i n Ker Q) + ^ ATl(Wk-i n Ker Cz) 
i=i i=i 
We are now in the position to formally introduce the i/^-based fault detection 
and isolation problem for the MJSD system (6.32). 
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6.4.3 //oo-based Fault Detection and Isolation Strategy for 
Markovian Jump Systems with Mode-dependent Time 
delays 
The i^oo-based Extended Fundamental Problem in Residual Generation (HEFPRG) 
for the Markovian jump system with mode-dependent time-delays is to design a 
set of filters for (6.32) that generates L residuals Tj{t) such that a fault in the /-th 
component Li(Xt) can only affect the residual ri{t) and no other residual Tj(t)(j ^ I) 
and 
\\ri\\22,E = ^{J0°rJ(t)rl(t)dt\(xo,i0)} < ^ J°° dT (t)d(t)dt, lek (6.40) 
for all n G 3>n.. Specifically, the residual signals rj(£) are generated according to the 
following Markovian jump filters: 
wi(t) =Fl(Xt)wl(t) + FT(\t)Wl{t - rXt(t)) - EtiXMt) 
- E[(\t)y{t - rXt(t)) + MXt)u(t) (6.41) 
n(t) =Ml(Xt)wl(t) - HiiXMt) (6.42) 
The following theorem summarizes our proposed fault detection and isolation strat-
egy-
Theorem 6.4. The HQQ-EFPRG problem defined by (6.40) and (6.42) has a solution 
for the Markovian jump system with mode-dependent time-delays (6.32) if there exist 
unobservability subspaces 
N L 
SI = mfS(%2 Y^ CJv)i l e L (6.43) 
v=l j=l,j=/tl 
such that 
S ; n £ M = 0, ie^JeL (6.44) 
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as well as the matrices TH, T[i; positive-definite matrices RH. i £ \I/. / £ L, Q > 0 
and scalars {^ > 0,i,j G $, i ^ j} such that 















Qi = AJiRi + RiAu + TiiMn + M,TTK 
N N 
(6.45) 
+ J2*tjRj + MjMli+ J2 ^ 1 + (1 + W)Q 
A, = Ri — Ri • • • Ri — i?j_i i?j — i?i+i • • • i?j — -RJV 
Hi = diag(£nl,..., &(i-i)/, ^( i+i)7,..., &JV-0 
and PI is the canonical projection of X on X/Sf, Bdu = —PiBdi — PiDuDdi, the pairs 
(Mu, An) and (MH, A^), i £ ^, I £ L are the factor system of the pairs (Cj, Ai) and 
(Ci,ATi), i £ fy on XjS\, respectively, and Hu is the solution to Ker HnCi = 
Sf + Ker Q. 
Proof: Given the unobservability subspaces S£, there exist output injection maps 
Du and DTXi and measurement mixing map Hu, i £ ty, I £ L such that 
S? = « p | Ker HuCi\A + DHCi: ATl + DTHd » i e * 
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where Hu is the solution to Ker HuCi = S{ + Ker d. Let Mu be a unique solution 
to MHPt = Hud and AH = (A{ + DuCi : X/Sf), Ajt = {ATl + DTHd : #/«$,*) where 
Pt(ATl + D;td) = AJ.P,. (6.46) 
Let T/i, T^ and Ru be the solution to the inequality (6.45) and define Gu = Rf^Tn, 
GJi = Ru1^, Fu = Au + GuMu, F% = AH + GjtMH, EH = P(DH + PrrGuHu), 
Eru = Pi(Dji + PrrGjiHii). Let KH = PtBi. Define et(t) = wt(t) - P{x{t), then using 
(6.42) we have 
e,(i) = Fuwi(t) + Fz>,(* - Ti(t)) - EHy{t) - EJiV(t - n(t)) + Kuu{t) 
L 
- Pi{Aix{t) + ATlx{t - Ti(t)) + BiU(t) + Bdld(t) + J2 Lum{t)) 
=Ftm(t) + FYiWl(t - n{t)) - PtLHmt(t) - PiBdid(t) 
- Px{Ai + DHCt)x(t) - GuHudxit) - Pt(ATi + DJtd)x(t - Ti(t)) 
- GruHHdx{t - Ti{t)) - EhDdid{t) - FJiDdidit - n(t)) 
=Fliwl(t) + FfiWl(t - nit)) - PiLumtit) - AuPix(t) 
- GuMuPixit) - AJ.Pxit -
 Ti(t)) - GTHMuPix{t - n{t)) 
+ {Bdli ~ GHHHDdi)d(t) - (/>,£>££>* - GTHHHDd{)d{t - Ti(t)) 
=(AU + GKM„)e,(*) + (Al + GlM^e^t - Ti{t)) - P,LKm,(t) 
+ {BdU - GHHHDdi)d(t) - {PiDruDdi + GTuHuDdi)d{t - Ti(t)) 
Note that P\Lji = 0 , j ^ / j ' e L , i G V, since £,; e Sf,j ^ l. Also 
rt(t) = Mtiwi(t) - HHy{t) = Muwi(t) - HuCix(t) - HuDdid(t) 
= Mhe,(t) - HHDdld(t) 
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Consequently, the error dynamics can be written as 
et(t) = (M\t) + G«(At)M,(At))e,(t) + (AJ(Xt) + G[(At)M,(At))e,(* - rXt(t)) 
- PMXjrmit) + [Bdl(Xt), -PjAT(At)£>d(At)]d(Af) 
+ [-Gi(Xt)H,(Xt)Dd{Xt), -GJ(Xt)H,{Xt)Dd(Xt)]d(Xt) 
n(t) = M,(At)e,(*) + [-i/j(At)£>d(At),0]d(At) (6.47) 
where d(A<) = [d(t)T,d(t — TAt(£)T]T. Using Lemma 6.8 and the inequality (6.45), 
it follows that the error dynamics is exponentially mean square stable and the in-
equality (6.40) holds. Moreover, from the error dynamics (6.47), it follows that ri(t) 
is only affected by Li(Xt) and is decoupled from other fault signatures. • 
Corollary 6.1. The necessary condition for the existence of a solution to the H^-
EFPRG problem is that 
N L 
£
« n ( C Y Ax) = 0, ie* , leL (6.48) 
Proof: Clearly if CH C ( £ ^ = 1 E L J:jtl£xj), then 
N L 
and hence the necessary condition (6.44) in Theorem 6.4 does not hold. • 
6.5 Fault Detect ion and Isolation Decision Cri te-
ria 
Once the residual signals ri(t),i € k are constructed, the final step for performing 
fault detection and isolation is to determine the threshold values Jthi and the eval-
uation functions Jri(t). For retarded and neutral time-delay systems the following 
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thresholds and evaluation functions are selected 
1 /'* 
Jn(t) = 7F rJ(t)n(t)dt, iek (6.49) 10 Jt-To 
Jthi = sup (J r.), i e k (6.50) 
where To is the length of the evaluation window. Similarly, the following thresholds 
and evaluation functions are selected for distributed delay systems and Markovian 
jump systems with time-delay: 
1 /"* 
JrM = 7j7 / rJ{t)ri(t)dt, i e k (6.51) 
10 Jt-To 
Jtht = SUP (Jrt), i e k (6.52) 
The main advantage of using the evaluation functions proposed above is that 
one can also easily detect intermittent faults . The evaluation function Jri(t) = ri(t) 
is not applicable for time-delay systems since often there exist oscillations in the 
residual signals of time-delay systems. By selecting a variable window size T0 = t, 
the evaluation function becomes a truncated £2 norm of the residual, however one 
may then not be able to detect a removal of the fault from the system. According to 
Assumptions 6.1, 6.3 and 6.5 for retarded and neutral time-delay system, there exist 
positive numbers 04, crx and au such that ||d||2 < crd, | |5 | | 2 < ax and ||it||2 < au. 
Therefore, during the healthy operation of the system the threshold is selected as 
Jthi = 72(°d + ax + aD- Based on the thresholds and the evaluation functions, 
the occurrence of a fault can then be detected and isolated by using the following 
decision logics 
Jn(t) > Jthi => m ? 0, » € k (6.53) 
6.6 Numerical Examples 
To illustrate the effectiveness and capabilities of our proposed FDI algorithms, a 
couple of numerical examples are provided in this section for retarded, neutral, 
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distributed and stochastic time-delay systems. 
6.6.1 Retarded Time-Delay System 
A dynamic model for a water-quality system corresponding to a representative reach 
of the River Nile as presented in [220] is considered for the retarded time-delay 


























where AA0, AA1 and AB0 represent uncertainties in the matrices A0, Ax and BQ, 
respectively. The value of the delay is given as rxi(t) = 0.1\cos(6t)\, N = 1, k = 2, 
and L = 0. The state variables are the concentrations of pollutants A (a mixture 
of the low levels in the bio-strata) and pollutant B (a mixture of the other level in 
the bio-strata). The control inputs are the relative changes in the effluent waste 
discharge and in-stream aeration rate. The fault signatures L\ and L2 are selected 
as the first and the second columns of the matrix B0 so that they represent actuator 
faults. The input disturbance v(t) — Bdd(t) and the output measurement noise 
w(t) = Ddd(t) are given by 
v(t) = 0.2 + 0.6sin{t) 
0.1 + 0.09sm(3£) 
,w(t) 0.1sin(3t) 
0.2sin(t) 
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Figure 6.1: Evaluation functions corresponding to multiple faults that are injected 
in both actuators. 
The subspaces that are needed in Theorem 6.1 for the above retarded time-
delay system are determined according to Algorithm 6.2, and are obtained as S± = 
L\ and S^ = £2- After determining the subspaces S\ and S2, the maps Di0, 
Du,Hi,Mi,i = 1,2 and matrices A c , , A i c , , i o c , , ^ i c , can be found according to 
6 3 • 6 j i 2 i 2 
Theorem 6.1. The gain matrices G10, Gn, G20 and G21 are computed by solving the 
LMI inequality (6.12) for 7 = 5 and rf = 0.1. The thresholds are calculated as 
Jthi =0 .1 and Jttl2 = 1.12 for T0 = 6 seconds. 
Figure 6.1 shows the residual evaluation functions corresponding to multiple 
faults in both actuators where a lock in place fault (mi = — U\ + 1) is injected 
in the first actuator between t = 20 and t = 40 seconds and a hard over fault 
(7712 = — «2 + 5) is injected in the second actuator at t > 30 seconds. According to 
this figure, the fault in the first actuator is detected between t = 23.1 and t = 41.2 
seconds and the fault in the second actuator is detected at t — 32 seconds. As shown 
in Figure 6.2 the time-delay system states remain stable in the above fault scenario 
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100 
Figure 6.2: System states corresponding to multiple faults scenario. 
which not only makes the task of the FDI scheme more challenging, but also ensures 
that Assumption 3 holds . 
6.6.2 Neutral Time-Delay System 
Consider the time-delay system (6.15) that is specified according to the following 
matrices 
Ao = 
1 2.5 - 1 2 
0 - 1 1.5 1 
1 3 - 2 0 
2 0 - 1 2 
,A1 
- 1 1 0.1 0 
-0.2 2.3 0.4 1 
0.3 - 2 4 0.2 
1 0.2 3 2 
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A, 
-0 .1 0 0.0 0.1 
0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.3 
0.4 0.3 0.4 0.1 
-0.1 0 0.2 0.3 
,C = 
0.2 0.3 0 0 
0 0.2 0.8 0 


















and r(t) = 1 + O.lcos(O.lt) and rd{t) = 0.9 + 0.1cos(0.2t). The fault signatures Lx 
and L2 are selected as the first and the second columns of the matrix B0, and hence 
they represent actuator faults. 
The subspaces that are needed in Theorem 6.2 for the above time-delay system 
are determined according Algorithm 6.2 and are obtained as S% = C\ and S2 = C2. 
After determining the subspaces «S{ and S2, the maps D^, Dn,Di2,Hi,Mi,i = 1,2 
and matrices AQQ. , A\„,, v42c,, Aoc. > 1^*0 1 A2* can be found according to Theorem 
•!>•• o - o - »i>2 02 52 
6.2. The gain matrices Gw, Gn, G12, G2o, G21 and G22 are computed by solving the 
LMI inequality (6.21) for 7 = 1. An H^ robust state feedback control u(t) = Kx(t) 
is also designed to ensure the stability of the closed-loop system. 
A disturbance input signal d(t) is assumed to be a band-limited white-noise 
with the power of 0.01. Constant upper bounds for the delays f = 1.1 and fd = 1 
are considered in the residual generator (6.18). The thresholds are calculated as 
Jthi = 0.05 and Jth2 = 0.11 for T0 = 5 seconds. Figure 6.3 shows the residual 
evaluation functions corresponding to multiple faults in both actuators where a 90% 
loss of effectiveness (gain) fault is injected in the first actuator at t = 20 seconds 
(mi = —0.9«i) and an 80% loss of effectiveness (gain) fault is injected in the second 
actuator (m2 = — 0.8u2) between t = 20 and t — 40 seconds. According to this 
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Figure 6.3: Evaluation functions corresponding to multiple faults that are injected 
in both actuators. 
the second actuator is detected between t = 26.2 and t = 43.2 seconds. It can be 
observed that the time-delay system states also remain stable for all time. 
Remark 6.5. It should be pointed out that the fault detection time is independent 
from the choice of To. This is due to presence of the term jr in the evaluation func-
tion (6.49). However for small evaluation window time (typically TQ < 4 seconds), 
the evaluation function may show excessive and rapid oscillatory behavior in and out 
of the threshold region after the occurrence of a fault, and this will make the FDI 
decision making logic quite challenging. However, for sufficiently large evaluation 
window time (i.e., TQ > 6 seconds), the evaluation functions are observed to have 
indeed a smooth and stable behavior. 
In conclusion, it should be emphasized that the presently available algorithms 
in the literature for both retarded and neutral time-delay systems cannot generate 
residual signals that enjoy the above FDI decoupling properties. For example, by 
using the UIO approach [123], and the associated restrictions that are imposed on 
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the system structure, the class of retarded time-delay systems that one can generate 
the decoupled residuals are made significantly limited. In the algorithms developed 
in [124], [125], [126], [127,128], [129] for retarded time-delay systems with known 
delays, faults that one needs to decouple are considered as unknown inputs and 
the algorithms seek to attenuate the effects of both faults and disturbances on the 
residual. Therefore, these types of algorithms cannot decouple fault effects from 
the residuals. Also, in the adaptive fault identification approach that is developed 
in [210], [211], [212], the delays are assumed to be known a priori. However, by using 
our proposed detection filters approach the residual signals partially decouple the 
faults from each other and remain robust to disturbances and uncertainties that arise 
due to unknown delays. Consequently, one can successfully apply these residuals for 
both fault detection and isolation. 
6.6.3 Distributed Time-delay systems 
To illustrate the effectiveness and capabilities of our proposed FDI algorithm, two 
examples are provided in this section for systems with distributed delay. Consider 
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A9 = 
0.1 0 0.0 0.1 
0.2 -0 .1 0.2 0.3 
0.4 0.3 0.4 0.1 
-0.1 0 0.2 0.3 
i Co — 
1 1 0 0 
0 0.2 1 0 
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 - • 
and n = 1 and r2 = 2. The fault signatures L\ and L2 are selected as the first and 
the second columns of the matrix B, and hence they represent actuator faults for 
the distributed time-delay system (6.25). 
The subspaces defined in Theorem 6.3 for the above time-delay system can 
be determined by using Algorithm 5.3 and are given by S$ = C2, and S^ = A-
According to Theorem 6.3, the matrices that specify the governing dynamics of 
the first detection filter r\ in (6.27) are found through the following steps (all the 
geometric manipulations are performed by using the "geometric approach toolbox" 
[200]) : 
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1. The output injection maps D\j,j = 0,1, 2 are obtained from S% as 
D 10 
Dn 
-0.0359 -0.1233 -0.3161 
0.4955 -0.9529 -0.6854 
-0.4518 0.8688 0.5759 
-0.0437 0.0841 0.1095 
-0.0057 -0.0618 -0.0286 
0.0531 -0.0290 0.0655 
-0.0894 -0.0837 -0.0469 
0.0363 0.1127 -0.0186 
A i = 
-0.5850 -0.9641 -1.0365 
0.0775 -0.3630 -0.3264 
0.1045 0.5871 0.7766 
-0.1820 -0.2241 -0.4502 
2. The measurement maps H\j,j = 0,1,2 are found by solving KevHijCj 
KerQ + Si as 
H 10 
H\2 = 
-0.6727 0.3798 0.2170 
-0.0000 -0.6350 0.7620 
0.0000 -0.9623 0.2887 
-0.8165 0.0000 0.4082 
, # i i = 
0.6325 -3.1623 1.2649 
-0.0000 -7.0711 4.2426 
3. The canonical projection map Pi for S% is given by 
Pi = 
-1.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
0.0000 -0.8165 0.4082 0.4082 
0.0000 -0.0000 -0.7071 0.7071 
4. The M\j maps are the unique solutions to M\jP\ = H\jCj, j = 0,1, 2 as 
M-10 
M,2 = 
0.6727 0.7309 -0.1151 
0.0000 0.1555 0.9878 
,Mn = 
-0.6325 0.3873 -0.6708 
0.0000 0.8660 0.5000 
0.9623 -0.2357 -0.1361 
-0.0000 -0.5000 0.8660 
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5. The induced maps Aij,j = 0,1, 2 are found as follows 
,4m = 
A~n = 
1.9641 -1.9113 0.1363 
0.1986 -1.5426 0.3456 
-0.9957 1.5146 -0.3408 
0.0382 -0.0426 -0.0327 
0.0053 -0.1561 -0.1136 
0.2147 0.2183 0.2004 
,An = 
-1.5850 2.3314 0.8015 
-0.4358 1.6956 -0.0416 
-0.4339 -0.8824 0.7770 
6. The maps Gy,j = 0,1,2 are obtained by solving the LMI (6.30) for 7 = 1 













7. Finally, the maps Fy, E\j, j = 0,1,2 and K\ are found according to Theorem 
6.3. 
The matrices for the second detection filer r2 can be found by following the 
same steps as above. A disturbance input d(i) is assumed to be a band-limited 
white-noise with power of 0.05. The thresholds are calculated as J ^ = 0.01 and 
Jth2 — 0.015 for T0 = 5 seconds. Figure 6.4 shows the residuals and the evaluation 
functions corresponding to a permanent fault in the first actuator {u\) of the system 
where the gain of the actuator is decreased by 60% at t = 10 seconds. This type 
of fault can be modeled as m\{t) = —0.60ui(t), where mi(t) is the fault mode of 
the first actuator. As shown in this figure, the fault is detected and isolated at 
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Figure 6.4: Residual signals and their evaluation functions corresponding to a fault 
in the first actuator. 
t = 12.3 seconds and the evaluation function of the residual r2 (i.e. J(rz)) remains 
below its corresponding threshold. Figure 6.5 shows the residuals and the evaluation 
functions corresponding to simultaneous faults in both actuators where a permanent 
60% loss of effectiveness (gain) fault is injected in the first actuator at t = 10 seconds 
and an intermittent 55% loss of effectiveness fault is injected in the second actuator 
between t = 15 and t = 25 seconds. According to this figure, the fault in the first 
actuator is detected at t = 12.3 seconds and the fault in the second actuator is 
detected at t = 15.6 seconds. It should be noted that in all the above scenarios the 
time-delay system remains stable and well-behaved, which makes the FDI problem 
more challenging. 
6.6.4 Combustion System in a Rocket Motor Chamber 
In this section, our proposed FDI algorithm is applied to a combustion system 
in a rocket motor chamber [221]. A liquid monopropellant rocket motor with a 
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Figure 6.5: Residual signals and their evaluation functions corresponding to concur-
rent faults in both actuators. 
pressure feeding system is considered. A linearized model of the feeding system 
and the combustion chamber process has been obtained in [222] and [223]. The 
linearized model has four states x(t) = [xi(t),X2{t),x3(t),X4(t)]T where x\ is the 
relative deviations of the instantaneous combustion chamber pressure, x% is the 
instantaneous mass flow upstream of the capacitance, x% is the instantaneous mass 
rate of the injected propellant from its steady value, and £4 is the ratio between the 
deviation of the instantaneous pressure in a special place in the feeding line from 
its value in steady state operation and twice the injector pressure drop in steady 
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operation. The corresponding matrices of system (6.25) are governed by 
A> = 













Cn — Co — 
1 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 1 
(l-cy (i-c)J 
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0 0 0 0 










where £ = 0.1 is the fractional length for the pressure supply, J — 2 is the line 
inertia, Ee = 1 is the line elasticity parameter, p = 1 is the ratio of steady-state 
pressure over the steady-state injector pressure drop, TI = 1, and p is the pressure 
exponent of the combustion with a nominal value of 1. The uncertainty in the 
system is represented in p as p = po + Ap with Ap e [—Spmax, +Spmax]. 
The FDI problem for the combustion chamber is to generate a residual signal 
ri(t) such that a) it is only affected by the actuator fault, b) the effect of the 
uncertainty in p on the residual r\ is zero, (that is r\{t) is completely decoupled 
from Ap), and c) the effect of the disturbance input on r\(t) is attenuated with a 
factor 7. Towards this end, the fault signature L\ is selected as B and the effect of 
1 1 
uncertainty in p is modeled with the term L27Ti2(i) where L2 = [§Q] and rri2(t) = 
Apxi(t) [ -Ap ff x1ts)ds] • The subspace Si = inf S_D(C2) in Theorem 6.3 for the combustion 
chamber system is determined by using Algorithm 5.3 and given by 
5? 
1 0 0 
0 0.9939 0 
0 -0.1105 0 






Figure 6.6: Residual signal and its evaluation function corresponding to the normal 
mode (healthy operation). 
It is clear that S$ D L\ = 0 and hence decoupling between the actuator fault and 
the uncertainty term is possible. After determining the subspace S[, the maps D^j, 
Hij, Mij, j = 0, 2 and matrices Aij, j = 0, 2 can be found according to Theorem 
6.3. The maps Gy, j = 0,2 are obtained by solving the LMI condition (6.30) by 
using the YALMIP LMI Toolbox [201] for 7 = 0.1. 
A disturbance input d(t) is assumed to be a band-limited white-noise with a 
power of 0.1. The threshold is calculated as Jthx = 0.02 for T0 = 5 seconds. It 
is assumed that the uncertainty in p is characterized by Ap = 0.3sin(t). Figure 
6.6 shows the residual and its evaluation function corresponding to the healthy 
operation of the system. As shown in this figure no false alarm is generated during 
the normal operation of the system due to the uncertainty in p and the residual signal 
is completely decoupled from Ap. Figure 6.7 shows the residual and the evaluation 
function corresponding to a permanent fault in the actuator of the system where 
the gain of the actuator is decreased by 50% at t = 20 seconds. This type of fault 
can be modeled as mi(t) = —O.bOv,!(t), where mi(t) is the fault mode of the first 
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Figure 6.7: Residual signal and its evaluation function corresponding to a fault in 
the actuator. 
6.6.5 Markovian Jump Systems with Mode-dependent De-
lay 
To illustrate the effectiveness and capabilities of our proposed FDI algorithm, a 
numerical example is provided in this section. Consider the Markovian jump sys-
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where n{t) = l+0.2sin(t) and r2(£) = 0.2+0.3sin(t) and the transition probabilities 
are given by 
r
-0 .5 0.5 
0.3 -0 .3 
with uncertainty levels ei2 = 0.1 and e2i = 0.2. The fault signatures L\ and L2 are 
selected as the first and the second columns of the matrix B\, and hence represent 
actuator faults for the MJSD system. 
According to the results of Theorem 5.12, first one needs to construct unob-
servability subspaces S{ = inf £(£2) and 5^ = inf S_(C\). These unobservability 
subspaces are obtained by using Algorithm 5.3 as S^ = £2 and ^2 = £i- ^ c a n 
be verified that these two unobservability subspaces satisfy the necessary condition 
(6.44). 
According to Theorem 5.12, the matrices that specify the governing dynamics 
of the detection filter in (6.42) for I = 1 (residual r\) are found through the follow-
ing steps (all the geometric manipulations are performed by using the "geometric 
approach toolbox" [200]) : 









2. The measurement maps Hu,i = 1,2 are found from equation Ker H^Ci 
Si + Ker Ci as 
# 1 1 -0.3123 0.4685 # 1 2 = -0.4472 0.4472 
3. The canonical projection map P for S{ is given by 
0.8944 -0.4472 0 
0 0 1.0000 
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4. The maps Mu, i = 1, 2 are the unique solutions to MiP = HiCi, i = 1, 2 and 
are given by 
M„ = -0.3492 0.9370 M-12 1 0 
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6. The maps Gn and GTU are obtained by solving LMI (6.45) for 7 = 0.5, t\2 — 0.1 








































Finally, the maps Ku, i = 1, 2 are found from Ku = P\Bi as follows 
Kn = K12 = 
0.0000 -0.4472 
0 -2.0000 
The similar procedure can be used for finding the corresponding matrices for gen-
erating the residual signal r2(t). 
An input disturbance d(t) is assumed to be a band-limited white-noise with 
a power of 0.1. The evaluation window length is selected as To = 5 seconds. The 
calculated thresholds are Jthl = 0.45 and Jth2 = 0.2. Figure 6.8 shows the residuals 
and their evaluation functions corresponding to the healthy operation of the system. 
As shown in this figure, no false alarm is generated during normal operation of the 
system. Figure 6.9 shows the residuals and the evaluation functions corresponding 
to concurrent faults in both actuators where a 40% and a 30% loss of effectiveness 
(gain) permanent faults are injected in the first and the second actuators at t = 10 
and t = 20 seconds, respectively. These faults can be modeled as mi(t) = — 0Aui(t) 
and m2{t) — —0.3u2(t), where m\{t) and m2(t) are the fault mode of the first and 
the second actuators, respectively. According to this figure, the fault in the first 
actuator is detected at t = 11.6 seconds and the fault in the second actuator is 
detected at t = 20.5 seconds. Figure 6.10 shows the residuals and the evaluation 
functions corresponding to an intermittent float fault in the first actuator of the 
system between t = 10 and t = 20 seconds. This fault can be modeled as TOI(£) = 
—ui(t). As shown in this figure, the fault is detected and isolated between t = 10.5 
and t = 25 seconds and the evaluation function of r2 (i.e. Jr2) remains below 
its corresponding threshold for all time. It should be noted that in all the above 
scenarios the Markovian jump system remains stable and well-behaved, which makes 
the task of the FDI problem more challenging. 
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Figure 6.8: Residual signals and their evaluation functions corresponding to the 
normal mode (healthy operation). 
Figure 6.9: Residual signals and their evaluation functions corresponding to concur-












Figure 6.10: Residual signals and their evaluation functions corresponding to an 
intermittent fault in the first actuator. 
6.7 Conclusions 
A geometric approach to J?oo-based fault detection and isolation for time-delay sys-
tem is developed. A set of residual signals is generated so that each residual is only 
affected by one fault and is decoupled from the others while the H^ norm of the 
transfer function between the unknown disturbance inputs and the residual signals 
is less than a given positive value. Simulation results demonstrate and illustrate the 
effectiveness of our proposed method. 
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Chapter 7 
Fault Detection and Isolation of 
Linear Impulsive Systems 
In this chapter, we address the problem of fault detection and isolation for linear 
impulsive systems. The concept of an unobservability subspace is introduced for 
linear impulsive systems and it is shown that the algorithm developed for finding 
unobservability subspaces for Markovian jump system can be used for obtaining 
unobservability subspaces for linear impulsive systems. The necessary and sufficient 
conditions for solvability of the fundamental problem of residual generation for linear 
impulsive systems are obtained by utilizing our introduced unobservability subspace. 
This chapter is organized as follows. After a brief literature review, the con-
cept of unobservability subspace is introduced for linear impulsive systems in Section 
7.2. In Section 7.3, the necessary and sufficient conditions for solvability of the fun-
damental problem of residual generation for linear impulsive systems are obtained 
by utilizing our introduced unobservability subspace. Two case studies, namely, 
mass-spring system with constraint buffers and systems with impulsive control are 
considered in Section 7.4 as potential applications of our proposed FDI scheme. 
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Contributions 
The main contributions of this chapter are now summarized as follows: 
• The geometric concept of unobservability subspaces is introduced for linear 
impulsive systems 
• The necessary and sufficient conditions for solvability of the fundamental prob-
lem of residual generation (FPRG) for linear impulsive systems are derived. 
7.1 Introduction 
A great deal of attention has recently been devoted to linear impulsive systems 
[224-226]. Impulsive systems can be viewed as a subclass of hybrid systems in 
which the states behave according to a continuous-time dynamics and which are 
also subjected to time-driven or event-driven impulsive effects where the states of 
the system are changed instantaneously. These systems can be used for modeling 
biological systems [227], sampled-data systems [228,229], discrete-event systems 
[230], constraint mechanical systems [231], intelligent vehilce/highway systems [232] 
and satellite rendezvous [233]. In the past few years research has been conducted on 
stability, controllability and observability of these systems [234-236], to just name 
a few. However, no FDI results have been reported for linear impulsive systems. 
In this chapter, we have adopted a geometric approach to the FDI problem 
of linear impulsive systems. Towards this end, the notion of an unobservability 
subspace for linear impulsive systems is introduced. It is shown that Algorithm 5.3 
developed for the Markovian jump systems in Chapter 5 can be used for obtaining 
unobservability subspaces for linear impulsive systems. By utilizing the developed 
geometric framework, necessary and sufficient conditions for generating a set of 
dedicated residual signals are derived by developing a geometric FDI framework 
for linear impulsive systems. Using the properties of unobservability subspaces, a 
243 
set of residuals is generated such that each residual is affected by one fault and is 
decoupled from others. 
7.2 Unobservability Subspaces for Linear Impul-
sive Systems 
Consider the following linear impulsive system 
x(t) = Acx{t) + Bcu(t), y(t) = Ccx(t), f e l \ T 
x{rk) = AIX(TJ;) + Bxu[k], y[k) = Cxx{TJ-), keZ+ (7.1) 
where x e X is the state of the system with dimension n; u e U,y 6 y are input 
and output signals with dimensions m and q, respectively, T = {TI,T2, } is a 
countable set of impulse times assumed to contain a finite number of elements on 
any finite time interval, u[k] is a discrete-time control input and y[k] is a discrete-
time measurement. The impulse times rk can be defined either as a sequence of times 
which is independent of the state x and results in what is known as time-dependent 
impulsive system, or as a time instant when the state x touches the boundary of a 
specified region 3f in the state space that is independent of time and results in what 
is known as state-dependent impulsive system. We first start with the definition of 
an unobservable subspace for impulsive system (7.1) with Be = 0 and Bj — 0. 
Definition 7.1. For system (7.1), a state XQ G X is unobservable with free im-
pulse times if given to, x(t0) = xo yields output responses y{t) and y[k] which are 
identically equal to zero for all t > to and all impulse time sets T. 
The above definition of unobservable states is more general than the set in-
troduced in [235], where only continuous-time output y(t) is considered. It is clear 
that for the case where Cc = Cj, these two definitions are identical. 
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Definition 7.2 ( [235]). For the impulsive system (7.1). a subspace V is called 
invariant if and only if AQV C V and AjV C V. 
Let Q denote the unobservable subspace of the impulsive system (7.1) and 
< JC\Ac,Ax > denote the largest invariant subspace of (7.1) that is contained in a 
subspace /C C X. The following is our first result. 
Lemma 7.1. For the impulsive system (7.1), Q =< Ker Cc n Ker CI\AC,AJ >. 
Proof: The proof follows along the lines that are used in Theorem 4.8 in [235] and 
is omitted here. • 
We are now in a position to introduce the notions of conditioned invariant and 
unobservability subspaces for the linear impulsive system (7.1). 
Definition 7.3. A subspace W is said to be conditioned invariant for system (7.1) 
ifAciW D Ker Cc) C W and AT(W (1 Ker Cx) C W. 
It should be noted the above definition is more general than the notion of 
condition-invariant subspace in [237], where W is forced to be Ac-invariant. It is 
clear that the above definition contains the condition-invariant subspaces [237]. It 
can be shown that W is conditioned invariant if and only if there exist output 
injection maps Dc, Dx such that (Ac + DCCC)W C W, {Ax + DxCj)W C W. We 
denote the class of conditioned invariant subspaces of X for the impulsive system 
(7.1) by 2B. If W G 2D, we write D(W) for the class of maps Dc,Dj. It can be shown 
that 2D is closed under subspace intersection, and hence for any given subspace 
C C X, the family of conditioned invariant subspaces that contains £ (denoted by 
2D(£)) has an infimal element (denoted by W* = inf2D(£)) (constructed below) 
W*. 
Algorithm 7.1. The subspace W* coincides with the last term of the sequence 
Wk = Wfc_! + Ac(Wk-i n Ker Cc) + Ar(Wfc_i n Ker Cj) with W0 = C. 
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Remark 7.1. The above Algorithm is similar to Algorithm 5.2 for the Markovian 
jump systems. This is due to the fact that the definition of conditioned invariant 
for impulsive system (7.1) coincides with the definition of Markovian jump system 
(5.56) with two modes and A\ = Ac, A2 = Aj. C\ = Cc and C2 = Cj. 
Definition 7.4. A subspace S is an unobservability subspace for system (7.1) if 
there exist output injection maps Dc, Dj : 3^  —> X and measurement mixing maps 
He, Hj : y —> y such that S is an unobservable subspace for the following impulsive 
system: 
x(t) = (Ac + DcCc)x(t), y(t) = HcCcx(t), teR\T 
x(Tk) = (AI + DJCi)x(rf:), y[k] = HjCjxir-) k e Z+ (7.2) 
In other words, we have 
S =< KerHcCc f~l KerHxCT\Ac + DCCC, Ax + DJCJ > (7.3) 
We denote for the linear impulsive system (7.1) the class of all unobservability 
subspaces in X by 6 . Furthermore, 1)(S) denotes the class of maps (Dc,Dj) in 
Definition 7.4. 
It should be noted that the above definition also coincides with the unobserv-
ability subspace for Markovian jump system (5.56) with two modes and parameters 
equivalence as in Remark 7.1. Therefore, based on the result of Chapter 5, the class 
of unobservability subspaces which contains a given subspace has an infimal ele-
ment. This property is crucial for the application of unobservability subspace to the 
problem of fault detection and isolation of linear impulsive systems. Let C C X be 
an arbitrary subspace and denote &(£) as the family of unobservability subspaces 
that contains C. The following algorithm provides a procedure for constructing 
S* = inf &(£) which is similar to Algorithm 5.3. 
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Algorithm 7.2. Let W* = inf 2U and define the sequence Z*1 according to 
Z° = X- Z» = (W + {A^Z^1 n Ker Ce)) f)(W + (A^Z"'1 D Ker C2)) 
Then S* = Zk\ whenever Zk+1 = Zk. 
7.3 Fault Detection and Isolation of Linear Im-
pulsive Systems 
In this section the Fundamental Problem in Residual Generation (FPRG) for a linear 
impulsive system is investigated. This problem was originally considered for linear 
systems in [3]. The objective in this section is to generalize these results to linear 
impulsive systems. Consider the following impulsive system 
x(t) = Acx(t) + Bcu(t) + L^mi(t) + L2cm2(t), teR\T 
x(rk) = AJX(T^) + Bju[k] + L\mi[k} + L|m2[fc], k e %+ (7.4) 
with the output measurements y[t) and y[k] as in (7.1). The matrices L^, Lfe, L\ 
and L\ represent the fault signatures and are monic, and m,(t) e Mi C X, i = 1, 2 
denote the fault modes. The fault modes together with the fault signatures can be 
used to model the effects of actuator faults, sensor faults and system faults on the 
dynamics of the system. For example, the effects of a fault in the i-th actuator may 
be represented by L\ and L\ as the i-th column of Bc and Bj, respectively. The 
failure of the actuator is then represented by m\(t) = —Ui(t). 
Asymptotic stability of the impulsive system (7.4) is now presented where it is 
assumed that there exists a minimum dwell time e > 0 between each impulse. 
Lemma 7.2 ( [226]). The linear impulsive system (7.4) with zero input and no fault 
(healthy mode) is asymptotically stable if there exist a positive definite matrix R such 
thatRAc + A^R < 0 and A^RAj - R < 0. 
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The FPRG problem for the linear impulsive system (7.4) is concerned with 
the design of a residual generator that is governed by the following filter dynamics 
w{t) = Fcw(t) - Ecy{t) + Kcu(t), r(t) = Mcw{t) - Hcy(t), teR\T 
w(rk) = FXW(TJ-) - Ejy[k] + Kju{k}, r[k] = Mxw{r^) - Hjy[k] k e Z + (7.5) 
where w(t) e T C X such that the response of r(t) is affected by the fault mode 
mi (t) and is decoupled from m2(£), and if m,\ (t) is identically zero then lim^oo r(t) = 
0 for any input signal u(t). 
Toward this end, let us define the extended space Xe = Xt&F and Ue = U®M.i 
so that we can rewrite equations (7.4) and (7.5) as follows, 
x
e(t) = Acxe{t) + Becue(i) + Lclmx(t), r(t) = H£xe(t), teR\T 
x
e(Tk) = AeIxe(T^) + BeIue[k] + Lfm1[k}, r[k] = H^xe(rk~), k e Z + (7.6) 
with x%t) e X* and u* e Ue, Ac = [ _ ^ £ ] , B£ = [ g L | ] , Ax = [ _ £ C i £ ] , 
Bi = [ £ L h Lc = 1% Li = HI m = [-*<** MA and Hi = [-»**MA-
In order to investigate the criteria for determining whether a nonzero m\ (t) affects 
the residual signal r(t), the notion of an input observability for the linear impulsive 
system (7.4) is defined and formalized below. 
Definition 7.5. The linear impulsive system (7.4) is said to be (impulsive) input 
observable if Be (Bj) is monic and the image of Be (Bj) does not intersect with the 
unobservable subspace of system (7.4). 
Based on the above definitions, the FPRG problem can now be formally stated 
as the problem of designing a dynamical filter (7.5) such that 
(a) r is decoupled from ue(t) and ue(k), (7-7) 
(b) m-i (t) is input observable or mj [k] is impulsive input observable 
in the augmented system (7.6), and (7-8) 
(c) limr(t) = 0, for m^i) = 0,Vx£ e Xe. (7.9) 
248 
We need to first derive a preliminary result below in order to obtain the solvability 
condition for the FPRG problem. The embedding map Q : X —> Xe is defined 
according to [3], namely Qx = [xT,0]T where if V C Xe, we have Q_1V = {x\x G 
X, [xT,0]T G V}. Our first result is the generalization of Proposition 1 that was 
obtained in [3] to a linear impulsive system. 
Lemma 7.3. Let Se be the unobservable subspace of system (7.6). The unobserv-
ability subspace for system (7.4) is given by Q~1Se. 
Proof: First we show that S = Q~lSe is conditioned invariant. Let x G 
S Pi KerCc, we need to show that AQX G S. This follows by noting that [AQX] = 
[-EcCc F C ] [ O ] e ^ e s m c e ^ e is ^-invariant. Therefore, Acx G S. Similarly, it can 
be shown that Aj{S D KerCx) C S, and hence S is conditioned invariant. Next, if 
x e S, then Qx e Se, and therefore [xT,0]T G KerifJ D Keriff. This shows that 
HcCcx = 0 and HxCjx = 0; and hence x G KerHcCc nKerHjCj. Finally, according 
to the definition of the unobservable subspace Se (the largest Af, and A\ invariant 
subspace in KerH^ D Ker iff), S is the largest conditioned invariant contained in 
KevHcCc n KerHjCj, and therefore S G 6 . • 
We are now in the position to derive our main result on solvability condition 
for the FPRG problem corresponding to the linear impulsive system (7.4). 
Theorem 7.1. The FPRG problem has a solution for the linear impulsive system 
(7.4) only if 
S*f]Cl = 0 or < S * p | 4 = 0 (7.10) 
where S* = inf 6 ( £ ^ + £ | ) . On the other hand, if the above S* and the matrices 




c < ° and 
< 0 (7.11) 
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A^RAJ + A^TJMI + MJTJAX-R MjT^ 
TXMT -R 
where the pairs (A%,Mc) and (AJ,MJ) are the factor systems of (Ac,Cc) and 
(Ax, Cx) on X/S* respectively, then the FPRG problem is guaranteed to have a 
solution. 
Proof: (Only if part) Let Se be an unobservable subspace of system (7.6). 
To satisfy the condition (7.7), we should have Bc C Se and B\ c Se. Hence, 
C?c c Q~lBec C Q~1Se = S and £§ c Q~XB\ C Q~1Se = S. By invoking Lemma 
7.3, we obtain S G 6 (£e + £f)- For condition (7.8) to hold, according to the 
Definition 7.5, Ccl and £§a should be monic (which is already assumed to hold) 
and Lf n Se = 0 or £fJ n S2 = 0. Thus Q~l{C^ n 5 e ) = 4 f l 5 = 0 and 
(5~1(£f1 n Se) = £ j n 5 = 0. Therefore, the above conditions hold only if equation 
(7.10) is true. 
(if part): Given the unobservability subspace S*, there exist output injection maps 
Dc, Dx and measurement mixing maps He, Hx such that S* —< KevHcCc D 
KerHxCx\Ac + DcCc, Ax + DxCx > where He and Hj are found from Lemma 5.1. 
Let P be the canonical projection of X on X/S* and Mc and MT be unique solutions 
to MCP = HCCC and MXP = HTCi, respectively, and Ac = (Ac + DCCC : ^ / 5 * ) 
and ^ = (Ax + DTCx : * / £ * ) where P(AC + £>CCC) = A%P and P(Ar + £>iCx) = 
AXP. Define Gc = R~lTc and Gx = iT a T x where R, Tc, and Tj are the so-
lution to inequality (7.11). Let us define Fc = Ac + GCMC, Fx = Ax + GxMj, 
Ec = P(DC + P-rGeHc), Ex = P(DX + P-rGxHx), Kc = PBC and Kx = PBX. 
Define e(t) = w(t) — Px(t). By using equation (7.5) we obtain 
e(t) =Fcw(t) - Ecy(t) + Kcu(t) - P(Acx(t) + Bcu(t) + Llcmi(t)) + L2cm2(t)) 
=Fcw(t) - PLlcmi(t) - P(AC + DcCc)x(t) - GcHcCcx(t) 
=Fcw(t) - PLcmi(t) - AcPx(t) - GcMcPx(i) = Fce(t) - PLlm^t) 
Note that PLC = 0, since Cc € S*. Similarly, it can be shown that e(rfc) = 
Fxe(r^) — PLjinilk}. Furthermore, according to equation (7.10) at least one of 
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the terms PL^mif/c] or PL^m!^) is nonzero. Also r(t) = Mcw(t) — Hcy(t) = 
Mcw(t) - HcCcx(t) = Mce(t). Similarly, it can be shown that r[k] = Mxe{r^). 
Consequently, the error dynamics can be written according to 
e(t) = Fce{t) - PLlm^t), r(t) = Mce{t), te R \ T 
e(7^) = Fie(r f c-)-P4m 1[fc] , r[k] = Mjefc), k e Z+ (7.12) 
It is clear that the fault mode m2(t) does not affect the residual r(t) and since the 
dynamics (7.12) is observable, condition (7.8) also holds. Moreover, for m\(t) = 0 
using the result in Lemma 7.2 and the Schur complement, it follows that the above 
error dynamics is stable and condition (7.9) also holds. • 
Remark 7.2. It should be noted that for state-dependent impulsive systems, a 
corresponding impulsive region for the detection filters can be obtained as P3f, where 
P is the canonical projection map defined in Theorem 7.1 and ^ is the region in 
the state space where the impulses occur. For time-dependent impulsive systems. 
the same sequence of times T is used for the filters. 
To conclude this section, let us consider a linear impulsive system that has 
multiple faults and is governed by the following dynamical system 
fc 
x{t) = Acx{t) + Bcu(t) + Y^L^niiit), t e l \ T 
k 
x(rk) = Ajxfa) + Bxu[k] + ] T L^mi[k], k e Z + (7.13) 
2 = 1 
with the same output measurement representation as in (7.4) and where Llc, Lj, i e 
k = {1,..., k} are the fault signatures, and m,i(t) e Mi, i G k are the fault modes. 
We now introduce the generalization to the FPRG problem. 
The Extended Fundamental Problem in Residual Generation (EFPRG) [3] for 
the linear impulsive system (7.13) is defined as the problem of generating k residual 
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signals ri(t), I € k from the impulsive detection filters governed by (7.5) such that 
a fault in the j - th component rrij can only affect the residual signal Tj(t) and no 
other residual signals rt(t), I ^ j . The solvability condition for the EFPRG problem 
is obtained by invoking the solvability condition that was just developed for the 
FPRG problem. 
Theorem 7.2. The EFPRG problem has a solution for system (7.13) only if 
s;p|4 = o or $?p|4 = o, iek 
where S* = inf &(Y1 i = i ( 4 + 4 ) ) - On the other hand, if the above S*,j G k 
and the matrices TQ and T\ and the positive definite matrices Rl exist such that 
RiA}:+A£Ri+T£Mtc+M£Tf < 0 and [ *^. M**? ] < 0 where <S>; = A^R*A^+ 
A^TjMj+M^TfAj-R1, the pair (A*,, Mc) and{Aix,Mx) are the factor systems of 
{Ac, Cc) and (Ax, C%) on X'/S* respectively, then the EFPRG problem is guaranteed 
to have a solution. 
Proof: The proof is immediate and follows along the same lines that are developed 
for the proof of Theorem 7.1. Namely, for generating each residual signal ri(t), the 
fault signatures Lc, L\, l?c and Lf in (7.6) are replaced by Llc, Lj, Ylj=ijjti^c 
and 5^7=i j^i Lji respectively. The remaining derivations follow similarly and are 
omitted. • 
After constructing the residual signals r,(£), i 6 k, the last step is to determine 
a threshold Jtht and an evaluation function Jn(t) (a fault is detected at t = tf 
if Jri(t) > Jthi for all t > tf). In this section, the following evaluation function is 
selected Jrj(i) = ^- ftT rj (T)rj(r)dr, j £ k where T0 is the length of the evaluation 
window. The threshold values Jtht are selected by conducting a worst case analysis 
of residuals that correspond to the healthy operation of the system that is subject 
to measurement noise. 
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7.4 Two Case Studies 
7.4.1 Mass-spring system with constraint buffers 
In this section, our proposed FDI algorithm is applied to a mass-spring system with 
constraint buffers as depicted in Figure 7.1. Between collisions the system dynamics 
are governed by 
hhq\(t) + k2(qi(t) - q2(t)) + kiqi(t) = F1 
M2q2{t) + k2{q2{t) - qi(t)) + k3{q2{t) - q3(t)) + c2{q2(t) - q3(t)) = 0 
M3q3(t) + k3{q3(t) - q2(t)) + c(q3(t) - q2(t)) = F2 
where Mx = M3 = 1.5 kg, M2 = 0.5 kg, kx = 1 N/m, k2 = 0.3 N/m and k3 = 
0.5 N/m. At the instant of collision, the velocities of the masses Mi and M2 change 
according to the conservation law of linear momentum and the loss of kinetic energy 
so that the system impulse dynamics can be expressed [226] as Miqi(Tk)+M2q2(Tk) = 
MiQiir,;) + M2g2(rfc") and gi(rfc) - q2{rk) = e(ga(rfc~) - g2(rfc-)) where e e [0,1) is 
the coefficient of restitution. Let us denote xT = [qi,qi,q2,q2, qz, qz[- The collision 
instant occurs when x 6 iF = {x G R4 : Xi — x3 = L, x2 > ±4}. The above system 
can be written according to model (7.4) with BT = 0 and the fault signatures 
Lj = L\ = 0. The fault signatures L\ and l?c are selected as the first and the 
second columns of matrix Be, and they represent faults in actuators F\ and F2, 
respectively. The output measurement is defined as y(t) = [xi(t),x3(t),x5(t)]T and 
Cc = Cj. An energy-based controller [226] is designed for the above open loop 
system. Figure 7.2 shows the position response of the system under the healthy 
operation where at t = 100 seconds a new reference setpoint is considered for the 
system. Two collisions occurs at t = 0.15 seconds and t = 103 seconds. 
According to Theorem 7.2 results, first we need to construct unobservability 
subspaces S\ = inf &{££) and 5^ = inf ©(££)• These unobservability subspaces are 
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Figure 7.1: The mass-spring system. 
obtained by applying Algorithm 5.3. It can be verified that these unobservability 
subspaces satisfy the necessary conditions of Theorem 7.2. Once the subspaces S^ 
and «5>2 are determined, the maps Dc, Dj, Mc, Mj, He, Hj and matrices Ac and 
Aj, i = 1, 2 are found according to Theorem 7.1. The gain matrices Gc and G\ are 
computed by solving the LMI in Theorem 7.2. 
A measurement noise is added to the outputs y(t) and y[k] which is assumed to 
be a 5% uniform random noise. For the purpose of simulations the evaluation window 
is selected as T0 = 2 seconds. By considering the worst case analysis of the residuals 
that correspond to the healthy operation of the system subject to measurement noise, 
a threshold value of 0.002 is selected for both residual signals r\ and r2. Multiple 
faults scenario is considered where 40% and 60% loss of effectiveness permanent 
faults are injected in the actuators F\ and F2 at t = 120 and t = 140 seconds, 
respectively. Figure 7.3 depicts the evaluation functions J n and JT2 corresponding 
to this scenario. One can clearly observe that both faults are detected and isolated 
with no false alarms is generated due to collisions and impulsive behavior of the 
system. Figure 7.4 shows the residual evaluation functions corresponding to the 
above fault scenario that are designed based by using the continuous-time geometric 
approach proposed in [3] without considering the impulsive effects due to collisions. 
As shown in Figure 7.4, due to collisions two and one false alarms are flagged in the 
first and the second evaluation functions, respectively. Consequently, our proposed 
method shown in Figure 7.3 is superior since it guaranteed that no false alarms are 
generated due to impulsive; effects. Moreover, it should be noted that the orders of 
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A/, k, A/. 
the filters that are utilized for the residual r2 based on our proposed method and 
the one introduced in [3] are 2 and 4, respectively. This implies that our superior 
performance was achieved even by using lower dimensional and computationally less 
complex filters. 
7.4.2 System with impulsive control 
In this section, the FDI problem of a linear system with impulsive control is con-
sidered as the second application of our proposed FDI algorithm. Consider the 
linear impulsive system (7.4) with parameters Ac = [Y ~23], Bc = 0, Aj = [ J ? ] , 
Bj = [r0°b99 i V I ] a n d Cc — Cx = [o ?]• The fault signatures L\ and L\ are se-
lected as the first and the second columns of Bj representing impulsive actuator 
faults. A periodic impulsive state feedback control is designed with a period of 1 
second to stabilize the system [224]. 
It can be shown that the necessary condition of Theorem 7.2 is satisfied and 
the EFRPG problem has a solution for the above impulsive control system. A 
5% random measurement noise is added to the outputs y(t) and y[k], and where 
T0 = 2 seconds and J ^ = Jtfl2 = 0.0001. A 70% loss of effectiveness single fault is 
injected in the second impulsive actuator at t = 10 seconds. Figure 7.5 shows the 
residual evaluation functions corresponding to the above fault scenario. As shown 
in this figure, the fault in the second actuator can be both detected and isolated at 
t = 10.4 seconds. 
To the best of our knowledge, no algorithm is available in the literature for 
FDI of an impulsive actuators. We have shown above that by utilizing our proposed 
FDI approach, one can detect and isolate faults both in impulsive control systems 
as well as systems with inherent impulsive phenomenon. 
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Figure 7.3: Residual evaluation functions corresponding to multiple fault scenario 
in the actuators F\ and F2 (based on our proposed approach). 
7.5 Conclusions 
A geometric approach to the problem of fault detection and isolation of linear impul-
sive systems is developed in this chapter. The concept of unobservability subspaces 
is formalized and an algorithm for constructing these subspaces is presented. By 
invoking the notion of unobservability subspace, the necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for solving the fundamental problem of residual generation (FPRG) for linear 
impulsive systems is formally developed. Simulation results demonstrate the effec-












Figure 7.4: Residual evaluation functions corresponding to multiple fault scenario 




Figure 7.5: Residual evaluation functions corresponding to single fault scenario in 
the second impulsive actuator (based on our proposed approach). 
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Chapter 8 
Perspectives and Future 
Directions of Research 
In this dissertation, we have been interested in design of fault detection and iso-
lation algorithms in a networked multi-vehicle unmanned systems. This problem 
is important since one of the main challenges in these systems is developing au-
tonomous cooperative control which can maintain the group behavior and mission 
performance in the presence of undesirable events such as failures in vehicles. In 
order to have an autonomous network of unmanned vehicles, fault detection and 
isolation algorithms should be designed which are capable of detecting and isolat-
ing faults in the vehicles. The approach that we proposed was based of geometric 
FDI framework. We formulated several problems within the domain of multi-vehicle 
systems and obtained some very interesting results. 
In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, we tackled different issues in the design of FDI al-
gorithms for a network of unmanned vehicles such as different FDI architectures, 
robustness with respect to external disturbances and compensation of the effects of 
communication links. In Chapter 6, the FDI problem for time-delay systems was 
investigated. Potential application of our proposed FDI algorithm for time-delay 
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systems in a network of unmanned vehicles and in networked control systems is in 
design of an integrated fault diagnosis and controller. We briefly discuss this issue 
in Appendix B. Finally, in Chapter 7, the FDI problem for linear impulsive systems 
was investigated and it is shown that our developed geometric framework for the 
Markovian jump systems can be applied to other classes of systems such as linear 
impulsive systems. Obviously, there is more work that needs to be done to have a 
complete theory of fault detection and isolation in a networked multi-vehicle sys-
tems. In this chapter, a brief summary of each chapter is provided and a couple of 
major open problems in each area are identified. 
8.1 Research Directions Considered in this Dis-
sertation 
In this section, we summarize the major research areas addressed in this dissertation 
and identify some of the open problems in each area. 
8.1.1 Fault Detection and Isolation in a Network of Un-
manned Vehicles: Ideal Communication Channels 
In Chapter 3, we dealt with the problem of fault detection and isolation for a network 
of unmanned vehicles without considering the effect of communication channels on 
the performance of FDI algorithms. It was shown that actuator faults signatures 
in multi-vehicle systems with relative state measurements are dependent and hence 
the entire network is overactuated. New coding schemes are developed for both 
linear and nonlinear systems with dependent fault signatures. Three case studies 
are considered as potential applications of our novel coding schemes. In the first 
case study, the FDI problem in a network of unmanned vehicles with relative state 
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measurement is solved within three different architectures, namely, centralized, de-
centralized and semi-decentralized. It was shown that the solvability conditions for 
the centralized and semi-decentralized architectures are identical for vehicles with 
more than one neighbor. Moreover, it was shown that vehicles cannot perform fault 
detection and isolation in the fully decentralized fashion without an exchange of 
information among them. In the second case study, the actuator fault detection and 
isolation in an F18-HARV aircraft was presented as an example of linear overac-
tuated system. Finally, in the third case study, fault detection and isolation in a 
satellite with redundant reaction wheels is considered as an example of a nonlinear 
over actuated system. 
The major directions for future research in this area are as follows: 
• Development of FDI algorithms for a network of unmanned vehicles with both 
internal and relative state measurement. 
• Investigation of the effects of time-varying network topology on the FDI algo-
rithms. 
• Development of robust FDI algorithms with respect to modeling errors and 
un-modeled dynamics. 
8.1.2 Fault Detection and Isolation in a Network of Un-
manned Vehicles Subject to Large Environmental Dis-
turbances 
In Chapter 4, we proceeded with considering the effects of environmental distur-
bances on the vehicles and a hybrid fault detection and isolation algorithm was 
developed for achieving robustness with respect to these disturbances. A hybrid ar-
chitecture for a robust FDI is introduced that is composed of a bank of continuous-
time residual generators and a DES fault diagnoser. It was shown that the proposed 
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hybrid FDI algorithm is applicable to both linear and nonlinear systems. 
The directions for future research in this area are as follows: 
• Investigation of the effects of time-varying network topology on the FDI algo-
rithms. 
• Development of robust fault identification for a network of unmanned vehicles 
subject to external disturbances. 
8.1.3 Fault Detection and Isolation in a Network of Un-
manned Vehicles with Imperfect Communication Links 
In Chapter 5, we considered a network of unmanned vehicles in the presence of im-
perfect communication channels. The packet erasure channel model was considered 
for communication links and the combination of this model with vehicle dynamics 
yielded a discrete-time Markovian jump model for the entire network. A geometric 
approach was developed for fault detection and isolation of both discrete-time and 
continuous-time Markovian jump systems and a notion of unobservability subspaces 
was introduced for Markovian jump systems. Our proposed FDI scheme was applied 
to the FDI problem in formation flight of satellites with imperfect communication 
links. Moreover, to show the applicability of our proposed algorithms beyond the 
main focus of this dissertation (network of unmanned vehicles), the actuator fault 
detection and isolation for an VTOL helicopter is considered as a case study for 
continuous-time Markovian jump systems. 
The major directions for future research in this area are as follows: 
• Development of the geometric property of weak controllability for Markovian 
jump systems and defining the notion of controllability subspaces for MJS. 
• Development of FDI algorithms for discrete-time Markovian jump systems 
which are robust with respect to uncertainties in the transition matrix. 
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• Development of FDI algorithms for nonlinear Markovian jump systems. This 
problem has a potential application to a network of vehicles with nonlinear 
dynamics. 
• Development of geometric framework for nonlinear Markovian jump systems 
and introducing notions such as observability codistribution and controllability 
distribution. 
8.1.4 Fault Detection and Isolation for Time-delay Systems 
In Chapter 6, we investigated the problem of fault detection and isolation for time-
delay systems, which has its own importance in the development of FDI algorithms 
for complex industrial systems. Moreover, it was shown how the geometric frame-
work developed in Chapter 5 can be used for time-delay systems. In Chapter 6, we 
covered broad classes of time-delay systems, namely, retarded, neutral, distributed 
delay and stochastic time-delay systems. Robust //^-based FDI algorithms are de-
veloped for each class of time-delay systems. Finally, as discussed in Appendix B, 
our proposed FDI algorithms for retarded time delay systems and Markovian jump 
systems have a potential application for an integrated design of FDI/Controller for 
networked control systems as well as network of unmanned vehicles. 
The major future research directions in this area are as follows: 
• Integrated FDI/Controller design for a network of unmanned vehicles. 
• Study the minimum input sensitivity (H_ index) for time-delay systems. The 
lowest level of sensitivity of system outputs to system inputs is defined as an 
H index. This has a potential application in investigating a worse-case fault 
sensitivity. 
• Fault detection and isolation for time-delay systems with polytopic uncertain-
ties. 
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• Development of geometric framework for fault detection and isolation of non-
linear time-delay systems. 
• Development of FDI algorithms for systems over ring. Time-delay systems 
can be modeled as a system over ring. Hence, the FDI problem for time-delay 
systems can be solved in a broader family of systems, namely systems over 
ring. 
8.1.5 Fault Detection and Isolation for Linear Impulsive 
Systems 
In Chapter 7, we dealt with the problem of fault detection and isolation in linear 
impulsive systems. This chapter also showed the applicability of our proposed al-
gorithm in Chapter 5 for finding an unobservability subspace in another area of 
research, namely linear impulsive systems. We solved the fundamental problem of 
residual generation for linear impulsive systems. 
The major directions for future research in this area are as follows: 
• Development of FDI algorithms for hybrid impulsive systems where after each 
impulse the dynamics of the system also switches. 
• Development of FDI algorithms for nonlinear impulsive systems. 
• Development of geometric framework for nonlinear impulsive systems and in-




Finite Unobservability Subspaces 
for Time-delay Systems 
In this section, the detail derivation of Algorithm 6.2 for finding the smallest finite 
unobservability subspace is presented for a given pair of matrices (C, Ai),i G N0 . To 
develop this algorithm, an alternative definition of unobservability subspace is pre-
sented, which only depends on the matrices of the system. Based on this alternative 
definition, an algorithm for constructing the smallest unobservability subspace con-
taining a given subspace is proposed. First, the definition of finite unobservability 
subspace is reviewed. 
Definition A . l . A subspace S is called a finite unobservability subspace for system 
(6.1) with matrices (C,Ai),i E iV0 if for some output injection maps Di : y —> X 
and measurement mixing map H : y —> y, we have 
S=«KerHC\Ai + DiC»ie(N)o (A.l) 
Next, we introduce the notion of a common conditioned invariant subspace for 
given pairs of matrices (C, Ai),i € N0 . 
Definition A.2. A subspace W is said to be a common conditioned invariant for 
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matrices (C,Ai),i G NQ if 
A(W n Ker C) c W, i e iV0 (A.2) 
It is clear that if W is a common conditioned invariant for matrices (C, A) , * £ 
No, then W is (C, A)-invariant for all i G N0 . Therefore, there exist maps Di : y —» 
X such that (A + DiC)W C W, i G N0 . We denote the class of conditioned invari-
ant subspaces of X for matrices (A, C), i G N 0 by 2U(2l, A') where 21 = (A0, ...,AN). 
It should be noted that the above definition coincides with the definition of condi-
tioned invariant subspace for Markovian jump system (Definition 5.5) when the 
matrices Cj for i G N0 are identical, i.e. d = C, i G N0 . Therefore, the class of 
common conditioned invariant subspaces is closed under the operation of subspace 
intersection and the notation 2D(2l, C) refers to a common conditioned invariant 
subspace containing C C X. Based on Algorithm 5.2, the following algorithm can 
now be used for constructing an infimal element of 2D(2l, C) (denoted by H7*): 
Algorithm A. l . The subspace W* coincides with and is obtained from the last term 
of the following sequence 
N 
W0 = £; Wk = m~i + J2 MWk-i n Ker C) 
Next, along the same way as in Theorem 5.3, the following theorem provides 
an alternative definition of a finite unobservability subspace. 
Theorem A. l . A subspace S is an unobservability subspace for system (5.56) if 
and only if there exist maps Di : y —> X. such that 
S =« S + Ker C)\At + DtC »ieNo (A.3) 
For a given finite unobservability subspace <S, the measurement mixing map 
H's can be computed from S by solving Ker HC = S + Ker C. We denote the class 
of finite unobservability subspaces of X for matrices (Ai,C),i G N0 by 6(21, X). 
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Next, we try to the characterize the unobservability sub-space by means of an algo-
rithm that computes S without explicitly constructing (D0,..., DN) G 5)(«5). For an 
arbitrary subspace S C X let us define a family 
N 
g = {y:y = S + (f] A-'y) n Ker C} (A.4) 
i=0 
Below we first show that Q has a unique maximal member. 
Lemma A. l . There exists a unique element y* G Q such that y C y* for every 
Proof: Define a sequence y*1 C X according to 
N 
y° = X; y =S + f]^-1^-1) n Ker C (A.5) 
i=0 
The sequence y* is non-increasing since yx C y° and if J ^ C y^1, then 
TV Af 
y ^ = <S + p ) ^ 1 ^ ) n Ker C C S + ^ ( A " 1 ^ ^ 1 ) n Ker C = J^" 
i=0 i=0 
Therefore, there exist fc < n such that y* = yk and we set y* = yk. Clearly 
y* G Q. Next, we show that y* is the maximal element. Let y C Q, then 
J^ C ^ ° and if y C «*"*, we have 
N N 
y = s + OiA^y)n Ker C))cs + (\A-ly»)n Ker c = y»+l 
i=0 2=0 
Consequently, y c ^ M for all /i, and hence y C y*. • 
The next lemma provides an important property of the maximal element y* 
which is used for introducing an alternative characterization of the common unob-
servability subspace. 
Lemma A.2. Let S G 28(21, # ) and (D0,...,DN) G 5). then y* is the largest 
(Ai + DiC)-invariant (i G N0) that is contained in S + ker C). 
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Proof: First we show that any 5? G Q is (Ai + L>jCj)-invariant (i G N0). We have 
5? = S + rtlotA7"1^) n Ker C and 
N 
(Aj + D3C)y = {Aj + D3C)(S + [\A~ly) n Ker C) 
i=0 
C {Aj + D3C)(S + Afy n Ker C) 
C (Aj + DjC)S + Aj(Aj1Sfi n Ker C) C S + 5? c ^ 
where we used the relationship 5 c / Therefore, (Aj + D3C)y C Y , J G N0; 
and hence ^ G 2B(2l, A") and (£>0, ...,£>#) € £>(^). Consequently, we have &* G 
2H(2l, A"). Next we show that for any subspace W such that it is (Ai + DiC)-
invariant (i G N0) and is contained in (S + ker C), we have W C =5^ *. If W C 5 
then it follows that W C y*, since »S C 5?*. Therefore, we consider the case where 
5 C W. We have A^W n Ker C = (A + A C ) _ 1 W D Ker C and as a result 
$ + fl!Io(A7lW) n Ker C = S + f l t o ( (A + DiC)~xW) n Ker C. It is clear that 
W C ^ ° . If W C J ^ " 1 , then 
JV TV 
y ^ D 5 + p l ^ W ) n Ker C = S + f]((At + DiC^W) n Ker C 
i=0 i=0 
D S + (W n Ker C)) = W n (<S + Ker C) = W 
where we used the fact that W C (Ai + DiC^W and the modular distributive rule 
(if S C W, then S + ( W n K e r C) = Wn(<S + Ker C)). As a consequence y» D W; 
and hence <y* D W. This shows that ^* is the largest (Aj+AC,)-invariant (z G N0) 
which is contained in S + Ker C. • 
We are in the position to introduce our proposed alternative characterization 
of the finite unobservability subspace. 
Theorem A.2. Let S C X and define Q as in (A.4). Then S € ©(21, X) if and 
only if S G 2B(2l, X) and S = y* where y* is the maximal element of Q. 
Proof: (If part) If a) and b) hold, then according to Lemma A.2, we have S is the 
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largest Ai + DiC-invariant that is contained in S + ker C and hence using Lemma 
A.l, we have S G 6(21, # ) • 
(Only if part) If S G 6(9L,X), it follows that S G 2B(2I, X) and according 
to Lemma A.2, we have S = 5?*. • 
Similar to Lemma 5.4, it can be shown that the class of finite unobservability 
subspaces is closed under the operation of subspace intersection. The notation 
©(21, C) refers to a common u.o.s. containing C C X. Therefore, ©(21, C) has 
an infimal element (denoted by S*). The next algorithm provides a procedure for 
constructing <SN°. 
Algorithm A.2. Let W* = inf 2U(2l, C) and define the sequence Z11 according to 
N 
Z° = X; Z» = W* + pliA^Z^1) n Ker C) 
i=0 
Then S^=Zk, whenever Zk+l = Zk. 
To analyze the above algorithm note that the sequence Z^ is non-increasing 
and Zk+1 = Zk for k > n - d i m ( W ) . Let Z* = Zk. According to Lemma A.2, Z* is 
the largest Ai + DiC, i G N 0 that is contained in W* + ker C for some (D0, •••, DN) G 
£>(W*). Let H be the solution to Ker HC = W* + ker C. Then Z* is an u.o.s. 
according to Definition A.l. Moreover, it follows that C C W* C Z* (Z* G 2B(2l, £) 
and W = inf 2U(£)); hence Z* G 6(21, £) , and consequently S* C Z*. 
On the other hand, according to Theorem A.2 we have S* = Sn where 
TV 
S° = X; S» = S* + p l ^ S " - 1 ) n Ker Q, <JGn 
Since W* C S*, it can be shown by induction that -ZM c S11, /i G n. Indeed, 
_Z° = 5°, and if Z^1 C 5"" 1 , then 
TV N 
Z» = W* + p l ^ " 1 ^ - 1 ) n Ker C C S* + p l ^ S " - 1 ) 0 Ker C = S" 
2=0 i=0 
Consequently Z* c S*. 
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Appendix B 
Integrated Fault Detection, 
Isolation and Control for a 
Network of Unmanned Vehicles 
In this appendix, we briefly discuss an integrated design of fault diagnosis and 
control for a network of unmanned vehicles. Most of the methods that we discussed 
in this dissertation use an open-loop model of the plant, however, in many cases, 
the fault detection systems are closed-loop feedback systems. In such situation, 
faults may be covered by control actions and early detection of faults is clearly 
more difficult [238,239]. An integrated approach to control and fault detection 
using four parameter controller is proposed in [240]. In [241] and [242] an H^ 
optimization technique is used to minimize the fault estimation errors and attenuate 
the disturbance influence on the fault detection and control problem. In [243], the 
simultaneous fault detection and control problem is formulated as a mixed /^/-^oo 
optimization problem. In this appendix, we briefly show how an integrated FDI 
and control can be formulated for a networked control system and specifically for a 
network of unmanned vehicles. 
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B.l Integrated Fault Detection, Isolation and Con-
trol for Networked Control Systems 
Consider the network control system shown Figure B.l. Usually, there exist two 
kinds of network-induced time delays, namely, sensor-controller delay rsc and con-
troller actuator delay rca, which are time-varying. The dynamics of the open-loop 
plant is governed by the following linear continuous-time system: 
k 
x(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) + Y^ Limit) (B.l) 
i=i 
y(t) = Cx(t) (B.2) 
As shown in Figure B.l, the FDI block has access to y(t — TSC) and u(t), and 
hence the above open-loop system cannot be considered for the design of an FDI 
algorithm. To remedy this problem, a new state X(t) can be defined as 
X{t) = x(t - TSC) (B.3) 
and the state-space representation for the new state can be written as 
k 
X(t) = AX(t) + Bu(t - TSC) + J2 Lim^ ~ T*c) (B.4) 
y(t) = CX(t) (B.5) 
For simplicity, we consider a linear output feedback control u(t) = Ky(t), so that 
the closed-loop system can be modeled as 
fc 
X(t) = AX(t) + BKCX(t - T) + ] T Lifhi(t) (B.6) 
y(t) = CX(t) (B.7) 
where r = TSC + rca is the total induced-delay of the network and fhi(t) — rrii(t — 
TSC). Consequently, the entire network control system can be modeled as a retarded 
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Figure B.l: The structure of a networked control system. 
time-delay system and our proposed FDI algorithm for retarded time-delay systems 
in Chapter 6 can be applied to the FDI problem for networked control systems. 
Moreover, the design of control can be integrated with the design of fault detection 
filters as a multiobjective problem. Further work on this problem is considered as 
one of the directions of future research of this dissertation. 
B.2 Integrated Fault Detection, Isolation and Con-
trol for a Network of Unmanned Vehicles 
In this section, the problem of an integrated fault detection, isolation and control 
design for a network of unmanned vehicles is investigated. It is shown that our de-
veloped FDI scheme in Chapter 6 can be utilized for solving this problem. Consider 
a network of N homogenous vehicles where each vehicle dynamics is governed by 
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the following linear model (Equation (5.1)): 
p 
Xi(k 4- 1) = Axi(k) + Bui(k) + Y~J LjTriij(k) 
Zij{k) = Qixiik) - Xj{k)) j e Ni (B.8) 
As shown in Figure B.2, a centralized FDI/Control architecture is considered here 
and it is further assumed that vehicle-controller delay T\C and controller-vehicle delay 
T1SC exist for the communication link of the i-ih. vehicle. Similar to Chapter 5, the 
delay between the vehicle and the controller T\C can be considered as a packet dropout 
and hence the entire network can be modeled as a discrete-time Markovian jump 
system in (5.5). Here, we assume that the actuators are event-driven. Following the 
same procedure as in the previous section, the entire network can be considered as 
a discrete-time Markovian jump system with time delay as follows: 
TV a 
x(k + 1) = Ax{k) + Y, A\{k)x(k - rla) + Y.Y. lkJmkj(k) 
y(k) = CX(k)x(k) 
where A = IN ® A and the matrices A\,k^ depend on the controller design. For 
instance, for a linear output controller u(k) = Ky(k), we have A\,k, = BiKCx(k) 
where Bi is the i-th column of B = 7^ <8> B. 
The problem of an integrated FDI/controller design for a network of unmanned 
vehicles can be solved in the framework of the Markovian jump systems with delay 
and our proposed FDI algorithm in Section 6.4 can be applied with some modifi-
cations to this problem. Further work in this issue is one of the future research 













Figure B.2: Integrated FDI/Controller structure of a network of unmanned vehicles. 
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